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研究生:涂銘哲
研究生(外文):Tu, Ming Jhe
論文名稱:在教育連結網絡下之董監事置換對長期經營績效的影響
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Board Turnover on the Long-term Performance of Start-ups
指導教授:李文傑李文傑引用關係王信實王信實引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:36
中文關鍵詞:董監事改變資訊不對稱經營團隊長期經營績效創業投資機構
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在創投的資金後,通常會影響被投資公司經營的自主權,甚至大規模地置換公司董事與經營團隊。因此本研究透過台灣上市櫃公司內部董事與外部董監事席次的變化,探討對被投資公司上市櫃後長期經營績效的影響。資料期間涵蓋未上市與成功上市櫃後,並考量內部董事與外部董事之間必然存在資訊不對稱的情況,故進一步加入教育連結網絡,控制資訊不對稱干擾效果,以利更深入地檢視董監事的置換對於公司長期經營績效的影響。本研究實證結果發現董監事的置換對於被投資公司的經營績效存在負向的關係。並進一步發現董監事置換的對象以被投資公司的內部董事最為顯著,因此當公司內部的董監事明顯發生更動時,對於公司經營績效而言可能是一個不佳的訊號。而在考量教育連結網絡下,董監事的置換對於公司長期經營績效的表現亦呈現負向關係,表示降低資訊不對稱下,董監事的改變同樣無法能夠對長期經營績效有正向的影響。本研究結果顯示,公司董事會與經營團隊的穩定性,有助公司經營決策上的一貫,使公司經營績效能夠更優異。
In this research, board turnover is hypothesized as key factors to influence performance of startups. Based on a uniquely contructed dataset recording key information of invested companies, ventural capitals and National Development Fund(NDF) in Taiwan, we create some new variables to this dataset, board turnover, and quantify the effect of board turnover on invested companies’ long-term performance. Our empirical results show that board turnover acts negatively towards invested companies’ long term performance. Besides, by using educational linkage between invested companies and venture capitals as control variables, there is also strong negative relation between board turnover and long-term performance. We thus conclude unstable board members will influence companies’ long-term performance despite of alleviating information asymmertry.
第一章 緒論 7
第一節、研究動機與目的 7
第二節、研究流程 10
第三節、文獻回顧 11
第二章、研究設計 17
第一節 資料收集與整理 17
第二節 主要假說 20
第三節 變數與模型設定 22
第三章、實證結果 28
第四章、結論 33
參考文獻 34
中文文獻 34
國外文獻 34

中文文獻
1.王元章(1999),《董事會規模對公司價值的影響》。
2.何哲睿(2014),《社群網絡與創投基金輔助之新創公司創新績效之研究:以教育網絡為例》。
3.林家毅(2014),《人際網路與創投目標公司選擇之研究:以教育網絡為例》。
4.黃敬堡(2015),《影響新創公司異常報酬之因素-以教育網絡為例》。
5.項柏維(2015),《影響新創公司長期表現之因素-以教育網絡為例》。
6.謝劍平(1999),《創業投資事業對被投資企業績效影響之探討》。

國外文獻
1.Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for" lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The quarterly journal of economics, 488-500.
2.Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of financial economics,32(2), 195-221.
3.Bonini, S., Alkan, S., & Salvi, A. (2012). The effects of venture capitalists on the governance of firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review,20(1), 21-45.
4.Cohen L., Frazzini A., Malloy C. (2008). The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy 116(5)951-979.
5.Fama, E. F.(1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, No.2, 288-307
6.Gladstone, David. (1988). Venture Capital Handbook Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
7.Gorman, M., Willian A. Sahlman (1989). What do venture capitalists do? Journal of Business Venturing, 4(4): 231-248.
8.Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305–360.
9.Jain, B. A., & Kini, O. (1995). Venture capitalist participation and the post‐issue operating performance of IPO firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16(6), 593-606.
10.Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong, Tianyu Zhang (2007). Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firm. Journal of Financial Economics 84 330–357.
11.Kesner, I. F., & Dalton, D. R. (1986). Boards of directors and the checks and (im) balances of corporate governance. Business Horizons, 29(5), 17-23.
12.Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture capital reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(05), 1295-1333.
13.Lantz, J. S., Sahut, J. M., & Teulon, F. (2011). What is the real role of corporate venture capital?. International Journal of Business, 16(4), 367.
14.Mangel, Robert and Harbir Singh(1993). Ownership Structure, Board Relationship and CEO Compensation in Large U.S. Corporations, Accounting and Business Research, Vol.23, 339-350.
15.Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative science quarterly, 218-228.
16.Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1989). The impact of CEO as board chairperson on corporate performance: evidence vs. rhetoric. The Academy of Management Executive, 3(2), 141-143.
17.Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of financial economics, 26(2), 175-191.
18.Singh, H., & Harianto, F. (1989). Top management tenure, corporate ownership structure and the magnitude of golden parachutes. Strategic Management Journal, 10(S1), 143-156.
19.Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start‐up firms: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 169-197.
20.Zarutskie, R. (2010). The role of top management team human capital in venture capital markets: Evidence from first-time funds. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1), 155-172.

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