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研究生:陳怡萍
研究生(外文):Yi-Ping Chen
論文名稱:上市公司董事的身份和公司的表現
論文名稱(外文):Identity of Directors and Firm Performance in Publicly Listed Corporations
指導教授:陳家彬陳家彬引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chia-Pin Chen
口試委員:李春安廖文章蕭櫓卓信佑
口試委員(外文):Chun-An LiWen-Chang LiaoLu HsiaoHsin-Yu Cho
口試日期:2016-05-18
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:英文
論文頁數:69
中文關鍵詞:法人股東法人董事公司法第二十七條
外文關鍵詞:Juristic person shareholderJuristic person directorArticle 27 of Company Act
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董事之身分(法人董事或自然人董事)是否會影響公司之績效?法律之規定對於公司的表現扮演著重要的地位,有關董事之資格, 因為不同於其他國家之立法例, 有些國家允許法人董事,有些國家僅限自然人董事。台灣是允許法人董事之國家(公司法第二十七條第一項),但不同於其他允許法人董事的國家, 台灣的法人董事允許一席法人股東可以有數個代表人參與董事選舉且可同時當選(公司法第二十七條第二項) ,因此為了取得公司董事會之控制權,法人董事在我國上市公司中仍佔很高的比例。
本文發現法人董事比例高的公司,於公司的表現上,因為法人股東之代表人可以隨時更換 ,加上雙重代理有利益衝突之問題,不管是ROA、ROE、Tobin’s Q 、EPS,均呈現顯著負相關。所以根據實證發現法人董事比例高者對公司的績效多為不佳。且當法人股東是依據公司法第二十七條第二項採行一席法人股東派有數個代表人擔任法人董事時,公司之表現亦是呈現負相關,所以公司法第二十七條在管理實證上,確實是一個需要認真審視之問題。
本研究亦將二種較極端的控制型態:單一家族和專業經理人放入法人董事席次中擔任干擾變數,發覺當家族主導此一型態納入干擾變數時,在法人董事高的單一家族此一控制型態,對公司的表現會出現不同之結果,即是在公司的表現ROE出現了顯著正相關, 表示家族企業雖會利用法人董事此一手段,但家族企業仍是在意股東權益報酬率,畢竟單一家族控制之公司多是持有一定之股權,所以對於股東權益仍是相當在乎的,此一結果支持了管家理論。至於專業經理人的公司,則是在多重代表時仍出現顯著負相關,表示專業經理人雖然具專業性, 但在法人股東操弄公司法第二十七條之第二項時,專業經理人對於這些法人董事之代表人並無法改變此一劣勢,因此對於公司之表現仍是出現顯著負相關。
有關公司治理指數應將不同立法之規定納入不同指標,不宜均採行G index,因在G index存在的staggered board在我國根本無此問題,反倒是法人董事之席次應納入我國之公司治理指標內。
此一研究之貢獻在於希望能透過實證上之研究,提醒投資人在審查公司治理因素時,需要考慮特殊之立法,例如:法人董事。因為法人董事之責任歸屬不僅不明確,加上代表人可以隨時撤換,對公司的表現均是相當不利。因此,我國主管機關對於不妥之立法,應該盡快加以改善,才能助於台灣的國際競爭力。


Does the identity of directors (juristic person director or natural person director) affect a company''s performance? Regulation plays a key role in affecting a company’s performance. Different legal provisions regulate the identity of directors. Taiwan allows a juristic person to be a director (Article 27 I of the Taiwan Company Act), and Taiwan is the only country that allows a juristic person to assign a plural number of representatives to be elected as directors (Article 27 II). To acquire control right of the board, juristic persons as directors is very common in the Taiwan Stock Exchange.
In this study, I observed a negative effect on firm performance (Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, and Earnings Per Share (EPS) with those companies with a higher number of corporations as directors. A possible conflict of interest was observed between the juristic person represented and the company where the director was seated. This finding provides support for agency theory. Moreover, I examined the interaction between control forms (single family-controlled or professional manager-controlled) and the representatives of juristic persons; a difference was observed in the single family-controlled firm. When the family-controlled firm was a moderate variable, ROE was positively correlated with a higher percentage of representatives for juristic persons. This demonstrates that family-controlled firms might use representatives for juristic persons to control the board. However, they still care about the return on equity. Because the single family-controlled company owns more shares than others do. This finding supports the stewardship perspective. As part of the professional management, a significantly negative correlation was observed when the company has a higher percentage of representatives for juristic persons. Ultimately, a professional manager cannot reverse disadvantages because the regulation is unfavorable for corporate governance practice.
Besides, this research suggests that governance index should be reconsidered. Since staggered board is an item in G index but in Taiwan there is no staggered board but there is representatives for a jurist person in the board which might influence firm performance. Therefore, it is important to consider the different regulation in governance index.
The findings of this study are helpful for reminding the administration that the identity of directors must be reconsidered for corporate governance practices in Taiwan; otherwise, it might influence Taiwan firms’ competitiveness in international business.
The main contribution of this research is to remind the investors to check governance of the company that the special regulation such as representatives for a jurist person in the board is important. Since the representatives might be replaced anytime and it is difficult to who is liable.


CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1
1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. Motivation for Research 3
1.3. Outline of the thesis 6
CHAPTER 2 Literature Review 8
2.1. Introduction 8
2.2. Theory 8
2.2.1. Agency theory 8
2.2.2. Stewardship Theory 10
2.3. Prior Research on Board Structure 11
2.3.1. Board Size and Firm Performance 12
2.3.2. Board Composition and Firm Performance 13
2.3.3. Duality and Firm Performance 15
2.4. Family-Controlled Firms 16
2.5. Identity of Shareholders and Directors 18
2.6. Different Regulations for the Qualification of Directors 19
2.7. Index of Corporate Governance 24
2.8. Hypotheses Development 25
CHAPTER 3 Sample and Research Methodology 28
3.1. Sample and Data 28
3.2. Research Methodology 33
3.3. Variables 36
3.3.1. Dependent Variable (Firm Performance) 36
3.3.2. Explanatory Variables 37
3.3.3. Control Variables 38
CHAPTER 4 Empirical Results 40
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 40
4.2. Correlation matrix 43
4.3. Results 45
CHAPTER 5 Discussion and Conclusion 52
5.1. Discussion 52
5.2. Conclusion 56
Reference 58

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