臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文主要想要證明,在當 CEO 與一般員工的薪資支付比率(pay ratio) 越高下,是會因為 CEO 的權力越大以及薪資過高下,產生代理問題,使得員工 怠惰使公司的績效變差,造成公司債利差 Yield spread (YS)越高,或者說會如 過去文獻中提到的,在薪資支付比率越高的情況下,會產生競爭理論 (tournament incentive) 的情境,因而刺激員工努力工作的動力,爭取升遷的 機會,使得公司的績效變好,在公司績效好下會造成公司債利差的下降,我們預 期會有後面第二個結果產生.利用過去關注是否執行長 CEO 與一般員工的薪資支 付比率 (Pay ratio) 的差異過大下是否會對於公司債利差造成影響的兩個理論, 來探討債權人在面對公司的薪資支付比率,以及不同情境下會對利差造成的影響。

This thesis is mainly to prove that under high salary payout ratio between CEO and general staff,:1. agency problems arises from overpowered and over-pay CEO, makng the company's employees idle and causing yield spread of corporate bond become higher.2. tournament incentive circumstance exists and thus stimulates the employees to work hard, making the company's performance better and causing a decline of yield spread in corporate bond, as the same as the past literature mentioned. This thesis use two theories with regards to high salary payout ratio between CEO and general staff, and spread for corporate bond in the past to study the company's creditors in the face of wage payment ratios and different situations.

第一章 緒論.........................................................5
1.1 背景介紹..............................................................................5
1.2 研究動機與貢獻.....................................................................8
1.3 研究架構...................................................10
第二章 文獻回顧....................................................11
2.1 薪資支付比率與公司績效之文獻..............................................11
2.2 公司債殖利率之文獻.............................................................13
2.3 公司與殖利率相關研究..........................................................13
第三章 研究方法....................................................15
3.1 研究假說............................................................................15
3.2 樣本介紹............................................................................17
3.3 變數定義............................................................................17
3.3.1 被解釋變數-利差......................................17
3.3.2 解釋變數 .............................................18
3.3.3 財務槓桿.............................................18
3.3.4 權益波動度...........................................18
3.3.5 到期日...............................................19
3.3.6 票面利率.............................................19
3.3.7 債券年齡(Bond age)...................................19
3.3.8 發行金額(Lnamt)......................................19
3.3.9 資訊不對稱...........................................20
3.3.9.1 公司年齡(Firm Age).................................20
3.3.9.2 關注公司的分析師數目 ...............................20
3.3.9.3 分析師預測差異 (DISP)..............................20
3.4 模型設定 ...............................................22
第四章 實證結果...................................................23
4.1 敘述統計量.................................................23
4.2 相關係數矩陣......................................................................24
4.3 迴歸與實證結果—-薪資支付比率與公司債利差之影響.................24
4.4 穩健性測試.........................................................................25
4.5 以薪資支付比率變動之迴歸結果..............................................25
4.6 工會強度與產業集中度對於公司債利差的影響............................27
4.7 相對支付比率與公司績效的關聯性...........................................28
第五章 結論.......................................................30
參考文獻...........................................................33

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