臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討台灣共同基金持股比例對於其公司盈餘管理之關係，以台灣股票型基金持股之上市櫃公司為研究對象，研究期間為2011年至2015年，主要係以裁決性應計項目來衡量盈餘管理程度，並進一步探討盈餘管理方向。實證結果發現沒有充分證據顯示基金持股比例對於經理人之盈餘管理行為具有監督的效果，而在公司治理與特性方面，研究發現董事長兼總經理的企業比較具有操縱盈餘管理的能力且公司負債比率愈大時，發生盈餘操縱的可能性亦會增加，而當大股東持股比例與公司規模愈大時，經理人會謹慎使用裁決性應計項目。在進一步探討盈餘管理方向後，發現總經理雙重性會增加管理當局向上操縱盈餘的可能性；而公司獨立董事所占比例愈高，愈能有效地發揮監督效果，抑制盈餘操縱向上的發生。

This study focuses on examining the relationship between mutual funds’ holdings and listed firms’ earnings management in Taiwan. This study uses the listed firms those shares are held by equity mutual funds from 2011Q3 to 2015Q3 as research sample. This study mainly employs discretionary accruals to measure earnings management and has made further exploration of the direction of manipulation. The empirical results show that there is no sufficient evidence that fund holdings have a supervisory effect on earnings management behavior. Besides, the results indicate CEO duality and high debt ratio will increase the probability of earnings manipulation. Nevertheless, greater major shareholders’ holding ratio and firm size will reduce earnings management. Furthermore, this study also finds CEO duality will make managers employ income-increasing discretionary accruals and independent directors will supervise managers and restrict income-decreasing discretionary accruals.

目錄
摘要…………………………………………………………………………...I
Abstract………………………………………………………………...….…II
目錄………………………………………………………………………….III
圖目錄………………………………………………………………………..V
表目錄…………………………………………………………………..…..VI
第壹章 緒論………………………………………………………………….1
第一節 研究背景與動機…………………………………………………….1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………….4
第三節 研究架構與流程…………………………………………………….5
第貳章 文獻探討…………………………………………………………….7
第一節 機構投資人之偏好與類別………………………………………….7
第二節 機構投資人持股比例與盈餘管理………………………………...10
第參章 研究方法…………………………………………………………...13
第一節 研究範圍與資料來源……………………………………………...13
第二節 研究變數之定義與衡量…………………………………………...14
第三節 研究方法與模型介紹……………………………………………...20
第肆章 實證結果…………………………………………………………...22
第一節 敘述性統計………………………………………………………...22
第二節 相關分析…………………………………………………………...25
第三節 迴歸分析………………………………….………………………..27
第伍章 結論與建議………………………………………………………...32
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………….34
附錄………………………………………………………………………….42

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