臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

管理者薪酬的研究是Jensen 和 Meckling (1976)所提出代理理論衍生的代理問題中延伸而來。隨著2002年美國安隆（Enron）事件爆發到後續我國接連發生博達、力霸、東隆五金、皇統等大規模違法掏空、超貸事件，公司治理開始受到重視，其中企業管理者薪酬成為國內外學者研究探討的方向。藉由實證研究瞭解影響管理者薪酬制定的因子，從而將股東與管理者間利益相互連結，使代理人在追求個人私利的同時又能兼顧企業利潤
極大化，以達成雙贏的目標。
以往研究多探討管理者薪酬與公司績效之關聯性，此種作法容易使管理者追求短期績效，而忽略公司長遠發展。故本研究希望以台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，以公司追求長遠發展的觀點引進公司治理機制，探討短期績效指標與公司治理對於管理者薪酬制定的影響，討論是否公司治理對管理者薪酬有正向關係以及短期績效指標與公司治理是否有替代或是互補關
係，並且進一步在不同的產業條件下衡量上述的效果是否存在。

Research on executive compensation is extending from the agency theory that derived from Jensen and Meckling (1976). Corporate Governance began to receive attention because of Enron event outbreak in United States 2002,and after that, the native large-scale illegal Group scandal event like Procomp, Li-Bar Verdict and Summit Computer Technology occured.And Executive Compensation become the direction that native and abroad scholars explore for. By empirical research to understand the impact of the development of management compensation factor to interconnected interests between shareholders and managers. So that agents in the pursuit of personal gain and simultaneously taking into account profits maximization to achieve win-win goal.
Previous studies investigate more relevance of management compensation and corporate performance, such practices easily enable managers to pursue short-term performance, while ignoring the long-term development. Therefore, this study hopes to take Taiwan's Publicly Listed Companies as the research object.In view of the company to pursue long-term development,we put corporate governance in this study,to investigate the effect of short-term indicators and corporate governance of management compensation. Whether there exist positive relationship between Corporate governance and management compensation. And further measured under different industries that above-described effects still exist.

目 錄
誌謝............................Ⅳ
摘要............................Ⅴ
Abstract........................Ⅵ
目錄.............................Ⅶ
圖目錄...........................Ⅹ
表目錄...........................Ⅺ
第一章 緒論 ....................1
1.1 研究背景與動機................1
1.2 研究目的......................7
1.3 研究架構......................9
第二章 文獻探討...................11
2.1我國退撫基金制度與運作..............11
2.1.1基金的基本目標......................11
2.1.2基金撥繳及給付規定...................11
2.1.3退撫基金財務運用.....................12
2.2盈餘資訊、股價報酬與管理者薪酬相關文獻..14
2.2.1代理理論............................14
2.2.2獎酬制度..............................15
2.2.3 盈餘資訊與管理者薪酬.................18
2.2.4 股價報酬與管理者薪酬.................21
2.3公司治理與管理者薪酬相關文獻.............22
2.3.1公司治理............................22
2.3.2 公司治理與管理者薪酬.................25
第三章 研究方法............................28
3.1研究假說...............................28
3.2研究設計與模型..........................30
3.3變數定義與衡量..........................32
3.4研究期間、研究樣本及資料來源..............36
第四章 實證分析............................53
4.1實證模式分析...........................38
4.1.1敘述性統計...........................38
4.1.2相關分析.............................40
4.2實證模型分析...........................41
4.3研究模式與退輔基金績效之比較.............46
第五章 結論與建議..........................64
5.1研究實證之結論..........................50
5.2未來研究方向...........................51
參考文獻..................................52
中文部分..................................52
英文部分..................................55

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