臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文旨在分析混合雙占市場中，兩廠生產異質性產品，公營廠的私有化程度對兩廠經營策略的影響，其中，廠商的經營策略，我們分別以廠商的策略性管理授權 (srategic delegation) 及競爭模式進行討論。
第一章討論本論文的研究動機、提供文獻回顧，以及研究架構與使用的分析概念。
在第二章中，我們分別在數量競爭及價格競爭下，探討公營廠的私有化程度，如何影響兩廠的最適策略性管理授權。研究發現，在數量競爭下，無論公營廠的私有化程度高低，私營廠的優勢策略為選擇雇用經理人；對於公營廠商而言，只有在私有化程度足夠高時，才會選擇雇用經理人。在價格競爭下，無論公營廠的私有化程度高低，私營廠的優勢策略同樣為選擇雇用經理人；公營廠商選擇雇用經理人與否，則取決於私有化程度與產品異質性的高低。
在第三章中，我們探討競爭模式與公營廠私有化程度的關係。研究發現，當公營廠私有化程度較低時，兩廠皆選擇價格競爭；相反地，當公營廠私有化程度較高時，兩廠皆選擇數量競爭。當公營廠私有化程度適中時，有三種情況：首先，公營廠較在乎社會福利時，私營廠選擇數量競爭，公營廠選擇價格競爭；再者，公營廠較在乎利潤時，私營廠選擇價格競爭，公營廠選擇數量競爭；最後，當公營廠對社會福利或利潤的考量無明顯差異時，兩廠在選擇競爭模式上，存在極小的參數區間，沒有純策略的 Nash 均衡。
第四章為本論文的結論整理。

In this thesis we consider a mixed duopoly market in which two firms produce differentiated products and the public firm is a partially privatized firm. We analyze how the degree of privatization of the public firm affects two firms’ strategic delegation and the mode of competition.
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation of the study, provides a literature review, and describes the analytical framework as well as solution concept used in the thesis.
In chapter 2, we investigate how the degree of privatization of public firm affects two firms’ strategic delegation under Cournot and Bertrand competition, respectively. We find that under Cournot competition, hiring manager is the private firm’s dominant strategy regardless of the degree of privatization, while the public firm hires manager only if the degree of privatization is high enough. Under Bertrand competition, hiring manager is still the private firm’s dominant strategy, while the public firm’s hiring decision depends on the degree of privatization and the degree of product differentiation.
In chapter 3, we investigate the relation between the degree of privatization and the node of competition. We find that both firms choose price competition when the degree of privatization is high enough. By contrast, both firms choose quantity competition when the degree of privatization is low enough. When the degree of privatization is in the intermediate range, there are three sub-cases. First, the private firm chooses quantity competition and the public firm chooses price competition when the public firm cares relatively more about social welfare. Second, the private firm chooses price competition and the public firm chooses quantity competition when the public firm cares relatively more about its own profit. Finally, there exists a small parameter space in which there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium regarding the choice of competition mode when the public firm does not have a clear inclination toward social welfare or own profits.
Chapter 4 concludes with some remarks.

1　緒論 3
　1.1　研究動機 3
　1.2　文獻回顧 5
　1.3　研究方法與架構 10
2　私有化程度如何影響策略性管理授權 11
　2.1　簡介 11
　2.2　模型設定 14
　2.3　數量競爭 17
　　2.3.1　兩廠皆未雇用經理人 17
　　2.3.2　僅私營廠雇用經理人 18
　　2.3.3　僅公營廠雇用經理人 21
　　2.3.4　兩廠皆雇用經理人 23
　　2.3.5　兩廠所有人決定是否雇用經理人 26
　2.4　價格競爭 29
　　2.4.1　兩廠皆未雇用經理人 30
　　2.4.2　僅私營廠雇用經理人 31
　　2.4.3　僅公營廠雇用經理人 33
　　2.4.4　兩廠皆雇用經理人 36
　　2.4.5　兩廠所有人決定是否雇用經理人 38
　2.5　結論 42
3　私有化程度如何影響競爭模式 44
　3.1　簡介 44
　3.2　模型設定 45
　3.3　第二階段的市場競爭 48
　　3.3.1　兩廠皆進行數量競爭 48
　　3.3.2　兩廠皆進行價格競爭 51
　　3.3.3　私營廠進行數量競爭，公營廠進行價格競爭 53
　　3.3.4　私營廠進行價格競爭，公營廠進行數量競爭 55
　3.4　第一階段競爭模式之選擇 57
　　3.4.1　私營廠之決策 57
　　3.4.2　公營廠之決策 59
　3.5　數值模擬分析 61
　3.6　結論 65
4　結論 67

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