臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　政府的債務問題是近年來備受關注的議題，尤其是近期世界各國陸續出現許多政府因無法負擔龐大債務，而面臨破產窘境的案例。我國地方政府的債務在近20年間快速成長，為了有效控管地方債務問題，應釐清造成債務積累的主要原因。
　　本研究蒐集國內外有關債務之理論與實證研究，將可能影響地方政府債務的原因劃分為財政因素與政治因素兩大類別。財政因素造成的債務較偏向政府施政作為中自然而然形成的債務積累，較可被接受；而政治因素造成的債務則偏向政府首長基於某些政治意圖或手段而產生的債務積累，應要被嚴加控管。
　　本研究蒐集台灣各地方政府1995年至2014年的追蹤資料(panel data)，並經過統計分析之後，發現財政因素(包括失業率、財政規模等)確實對地方政府債務有顯著影響，失業率越高則人均債務越高；地方政府財政規模越大，人均債務也較多。政治因素當中，則有部分項目呈現顯著、部分項目不顯著。選舉年本身和選舉年與失業率的交互作用變項(失業率×選舉年)兩個變數並未顯著，但經檢驗呈現聯合顯著，在選舉年時人均債務會微幅減少，若選舉年失業率較高，會使人均債務更低，此結果與預期相反，顯見台灣各地方政府債務並不符合政治預算循環論之預期會在選前擴張，這或許是因為地方首長受到民意代表、競爭對手，以及新聞媒體的監督，加上近年來民眾對於債務的感知程度增加，因而不敢在選前大肆舉債。
其餘顯著的政治因素還包括社福支出與連任預期。社福支出較高的縣市會有較高額的人均債務，顯示社福支出和地方政府債務有關，而地方政府首長若想增加社福支出，也常會透過舉債的方式支應；而無法再爭取連任的縣市長在最後一個任期當中會有較明顯的舉債情形，可能是因為不會再續任，故不用考量政府後續的債務狀況，也可能是因為希望卸任後能爭取更高政治地位而廣發紅利。
　　最後，討論的則是債限的設計。以過去20年的資料來看，多半的地方政府若剩餘舉債空間越小，其債務年增率也會越小，表示債限確實有發揮其約束力，使接近債限的地方政府能有所節制，但仍有少部份縣市(例如：宜蘭縣、苗栗縣等)為極端值，有幾年已無剩餘舉債空間，卻仍然持續舉債。
　　本研究建議應有效控管造成債務增長的政治因素。首先，若地方政府首長要增加社福支出，則應找到相應的財源，因為社福支出較不具自償性，後代子孫也不一定能蒙受其利，故較不適合以舉債方式支應；其次，應對無法再爭取連任的縣市長之財政作為有更多的監督，以免其留下爛攤子給繼任的首長；最後，民眾對於政府債務資訊的感知程度若能持續提升，則政府首長施政時便會考量民眾觀感，而不敢大肆舉債。若能對影響債務的政治因素做出適當的控制，對於台灣各地方政府財政將有所助益。

Government debt management has become an important issue in recent years, as many governments all over the world are now facing bankruptcy due to high levels of debt. In Taiwan, local government debt has grown significantly over the last 20 years. In order to efficiently manage the debt problem, the main causes of local debt must be examined.
This thesis collects theories and empirical studies related to public debt in order to classify possible causes of debt into fiscal determinants and political determinants. It is concluded that fiscal determinants of debt are acceptable, while political determinants should be well-controlled.
In determining the causes of debt, this thesis collects panel data from all Taiwanese local governments between the years 1995 and 2014. By conducting multiple regression analysis, this thesis concludes that fiscal determinants, including the unemployment rate and fiscal size, have a significant effect on local government debt. The higher the unemployment rate, the more debt per capita there will be. Similarly, if the local government’s fiscal size is larger, debt per capita will be higher.
As for political determinants, it is concluded that some are significant and some are not. The election year and the interaction variable, unemployment × election year, are not inherently significant. However, these two variables are significant when viewed in conjunction. In election years, local government debt might drop slightly. If the unemployment rate in election years is higher, the level of debt tends to be much lower. This illustrates that local government budgets and debts do not expand before elections. Because local governors are under the scrutiny of councilors, opponents, and the mass media, they dare not increase debt before elections.
Other significant political determinants include social welfare expenditure and the chance of reelection. If a local government has high social welfare expenditure, it tends also to have a higher level of debt, because increased social welfare expenditure is usually funded by borrowing. During a governor’s last term, debt is likely to increase; having already occupied power for the maximum number of terms allowed, the governor no longer seeks to preserve the government’s fiscal situation. Alternatively, he/she may seek a higher position (for instance, the legislator or the president) by giving his/her voters more treats.
The last part of this thesis discusses the debt ceiling. Analyzing data from the past 20 years, it is found that if local government debt approaches the debt ceiling, the growth rate of debt is likely to be lower. This implies that most local governments obey the debt ceiling rule. Nevertheless, some local governments, such as in Yilan County and Miaoli County, keep expanding their public debts despite having exceeded the debt ceiling.
This thesis suggests that political determinants of debt should be controlled in the following ways. Firstly, if local governors want to increase social welfare expenditure, they should find a corresponding financial resource to pay for it. Because social welfare expenditure is not a self-liquidating expenditure, it should not be funded by borrowing. Secondly, there should be stricter fiscal rules for governors in their last terms, so that they leave a better fiscal situation for their successors. Last but not least, voters should be well-informed about debt, so that governors take voters’ perceptions into consideration and do not borrow money that they cannot repay.

口試委員會審定書 I
謝辭 III
摘要 V
Abstract VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與目的 1
第二節 研究方法、範圍與流程 7
第二章 文獻回顧 13
第一節 公共債務相關議題 13
第二節 政府舉債的理由 17
第三節 先前實證研究結果 22
第四節 小結 25
第三章 研究假設與研究設計 27
第一節 研究假設 27
第二節 研究設計 29
第四章 統計結果分析 39
第一節 地方政府債務概況分析 39
第二節 變數觀察與相關分析 47
第三節 多元迴歸分析 50
第四節 小結 56
第五章 結論與建議 59
第一節 研究發現 59
第二節 研究限制與研究建議 62
參考文獻 65
附錄 69

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