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研究生:蔣思彬
研究生(外文):Si-Bin Jiang
論文名稱:為利維坦立界線:不確定性與權力分立憲政抉擇
論文名稱(外文):Boundaries for Leviathan: Uncertainty and Constitutional Choices on Separation of Powers
指導教授:童涵浦童涵浦引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hans Hanpu Tung
口試委員:童永年蘇彥圖
口試委員(外文):Chris Y. TungYen-Tu Su
口試日期:2016-07-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:政治學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:政治學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:84
中文關鍵詞:不確定性權力分立憲政抉擇選舉談判途徑跨國時間序列迴歸模型
外文關鍵詞:uncertaintyseparation of powersconstitutional choiceselectoral bargaining approachtime- series cross-sectional regression model
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本文實證地檢驗不確定性對各國憲法制定不同權力分立程度的效果。本文參照選舉談判途徑打造理論架構,以闡明不確定性和權力分立憲政抉擇的關係,再從中推演出尚待經驗資料檢證的基本假設:不確定性與憲法制定的權力分立程度成正比。為了經驗地檢定此一假設,本文以「行政權力指標」測量權力分立程度,並以「選舉競爭程度」及「前三年平均經濟成長率」作為測量不確定性的代理變項,而且控制了其他的干擾變項,包含歷史地理因素、社會經濟條件、國內外政治因素與時間趨勢。基於一般最小平方法和跨國時間序列迴歸模型的結果,本文發現,行政權力指標與選舉競爭程度呈負相關,和前三年平均經濟成長率呈正相關,且兩者的迴歸係數達到統計上顯著。這一結果吻合理論預期,顯示基本假設未被證偽。因此,本文可以有信心地暫時接受這一命題:制憲者面臨的不確定性會系統地影響權力分立憲政抉擇的結果。

This thesis empirically examines the effect of uncertainty on the degree of separation of powers stipulated by national constitutions. It offers a theoretical framework drawing on an electoral bargaining approach to illustrate the relationship between uncertainty and constitutional choices on separation of powers, and then deduces the basic hypothesis from the theory. The basic hypothesis, which would later be examined by empirical data, is that uncertainty is directly proportional to the degree of separation of powers stipulated by constitutions. To empirically test this hypothesis, this thesis measured the degree of separation of powers with “executive power index,” and used “electoral competitiveness” as well as “three-year average economic growth rate” as the proxy variables for measuring uncertainty, and then controlled other disturbing variables including historical and geographical factors, socio-economic conditions, international and domestic political factors, and time trends. Based on the results of ordinary least squares and time-series cross-sectional regression models, this thesis found that executive power index was negatively related to electoral competitiveness and positively related to three-year average economic growth, while the regression coefficients were statistically significant. The results fit the prediction of the theory and indicate that the basic hypothesis is not falsified. Therefore, this thesis can confidently yet tentatively accept this proposition: uncertainty faced by constitution drafters can systematically affect the outcomes of constitutional choices concerning the question of separation of powers.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究問題與目的 1
第二節 章節安排 4
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 權力分立憲政設計 7
第二節 綜合評論 11
第三章 不確定性與憲政抉擇:理論與假設 15
第一節 理論架構 15
第二節 研究假設 18
第三節 小結 18
第四章 研究設計 21
第一節 變項測量與資料來源 21
第二節 分析方法 29
第五章 研究結果 31
第一節 敘述性統計 31
第二節 迴歸結果 36
第三節 穩健度檢查 47
第四節 小結與討論 51
第六章 結論 53
參考文獻 57
附錄一 編碼書 67
附錄二 行政權力指標的編碼規則 71
附錄三 比較憲法計畫選用題目 73
附錄四 樣本一覽表 79



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