臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

電信營運商可以透過簽訂無線接取網路共享合約來減少資本支 出 (Capital Expenditure) 和營運成本 (Operational Expenditure) 上的開銷。 雖然共享的方針可能依據實際上分享資源的程度而有所不同,但電信 營運商們都將處在一個彼此互相合作卻又同時競爭的狀態。因此,共 享資源的分配結果需要能確保所有參與其中的電信營運商都能有所獲 益。此外,訂閱電信服務的訂閱者們也可能對於不同來源的無線電資 源有所偏好,然而這個偏好卻是不被他人所知的。當我們假設所有的 參與者 (包含所有的電信營運商以及服務訂閱者) 都會優先考慮自身的 利益,而且僅追求自身利益;那一旦服務訂閱者們被要求要揭露自己 的偏好時,他們將會以最大化自身利益為前提來回答問題,而且即使 角色換成了電信營運商們也是一樣的。所以,在這篇論文中,我們提 出了一個「策略防範的資源分配機制」來解決參與者用策略性的回報 資訊以增加自身利益的問題。透過這個分配機制,我們能確保所有的 資訊將會被正確、真實的收集起來,同時所有的參與者們 (包含電信營 運商們以及服務訂閱者們) 都會因有利可圖而積極主動的加入這個資源 分配機制。

Operators could alleviate their Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Opera- tional Expenditure (OPEX) by signing up RAN sharing contracts with other operators. Although the sharing scheme could be various according to the de- gree of the sharing, operators would cooperate and compete with each other at the same time. Therefore, the resource allocation results should always be guaranteed to be profitable for every operator. Besides that, the subscribers would also have their preference to the resources from different radio access network (RAN). However, the preference is kept by subscribers themselves. If all entities are assumed to be selfish, and tend to pursue the benefit for themselves, then once the subscribers are asked to reveal their preference, they sought to reply with the answer, which maximizes their utilities, and so do op- erators. Thus, a strategy-proof resource allocation mechanism is proposed in this thesis to tackle these issues. With this mechanism, the information could be truly gathered, and both operators and subscribers would be proactive to join this mechanism.

口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Literature Review.............................. 2
1.2 Contributions ................................ 4
2 System Model 7
2.1 User Equipment............................... 7
2.2 Operator................................... 9
2.3 Service Broker ............................... 10
2.4 System Description............................. 12
3 Design Challenges of RAN Sharing Mechanism 13
4 RAN Sharing Mechanism 15
4.1 Resource Allocation Rule.......................... 15
4.2 Transfer Rule ................................ 17
5 Strategy-Proofness and Desirable Properties 19
5.1 Incentive Compatibility of OP .......................
19 5.2 Incentive Compatibility of UE ....................... 23
5.3 Individual Rationality of OP ........................ 26
5.4 Budget Balance of SB............................ 28
5.5 Individual Rationality of UE ........................ 29
5.6 Weakly Budget Balance of OP ....................... 30
6 Resource Allocation and Payment Algorithm 32
7 Simulation Results 37
7.1 Incentive Compatibility of OP ....................... 37
7.2 Incentive Compatibility of UE........................ 38
7.3 Individual Rationality of OP and UE.................... 41
7.4 Weakly Budget Balance of OP ....................... 42
7.5 Social Welfare................................ 42
8 Future Application 47
9 Conclusion 49
10 Appendix 50
10.1 Problem................................... 50
10.2 Idea..................................... 52
10.3 Modified Allocation Rules ......................... 54
10.4 properties .................................. 55
Bibliography 56

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