本文主要探討在不同生命週期下，企業從事實質盈餘管理之誘因與會計師收取審計費用多寡（總公費、審計公費及非審計公費）及實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性，並進一步控制公司治理變數以探討各項變數之間的關聯性。本文參考Cohen等人(2008)的作法，將實質盈餘管理更細分為：異常現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性支出，以上列之綜合評量指標進行衡量，用以探討當企業處於不同生命週期及公司治理嚴謹度不同時，其實質盈餘管理行為之變化。

本文實證結果為：(一)全時期、成長期、成熟期及衰退期，盈餘管理誘因與實質盈餘管理具有顯著正相關；（二）全時期及成熟期階段，實質盈餘管理與審計公費呈顯著負相關；（三）成熟期，實質盈餘管理與非審計公費呈顯著負相關；（四）衰退期，實質盈餘管理與審計公費及非審計公費未達顯著相關；（五）當公司治理嚴謹度不同時，全時期、成長期、成熟期及衰退期之盈餘管理誘因與實質盈餘管理具關聯性不存在。

This study discusses the different life cycles, enterprises engaged in incentives of real earnings management and audit fees charged amount (total audit fees, audit fee and non-audit fee) and real earnings management and further added corporate of governance to the control variables discussion of the connection between variables. In this study, with reference to Cohen et al. (2008) approach, the substance of earnings management more subdivided into: the use of Abn_ CFO, Abn_PROD and Abn_ Discexp of the measure, to explore when companies are at different life cycle and corporate of governance is not the same, change the essence of the real earnings management behavior.
The empirical results of this study :(1) the whole period, growth period,maturity period and decline period of earnings management incentives and real earnings management has a positive correlation (2) the whole period and maturity period, the real earnings management and audit fees was a significant negative related (3) maturity period, the real earnings management and non-audit fees was a significant and negative correlation (4) decline period, the real earnings management and audit fee and non-audit fees was a significant and positive correlation (5) when corporate governance is not the same ,the whole period ,growth period, maturity period and decline period of the management incentives and earnings management with the substance of association does not exist.

摘要 I
AbstractII
目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節研究動機 1
第二節研究目的 3
第三節研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節實質盈餘管理 6
第二節審計公費 8
第三節公司治理 10
第四節企業生命週期 12
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節研究假說 13
第二節樣本選取與資料來源 18
第三節變數設計與定義 19
第四節實證模型 27
第四章 實證結果與分析 33
第一節敘述性統計分析 33
第二節實證結果與分析 42
第五章 結論 64
參考文獻 66
中文部分 66
英文部分 68

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