臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
法理學家認為那個考慮法律效果的實證法理學為一個自給自足而且具自我
成效的法學體系，其實證法權規定著每位個體要做什麼（what is done）的行為。
根據實際經驗的當代法理學關注在闡明有效強制的法律上，因此，採用科學方法
的法理學有一個明顯的趨勢是在法律領域中逐漸排除個體的自由意志。然而，如
果法律不是保障每位個體的自由意志，而只是命令他們要做什麼，那麼法權的理
想如何能夠成為實際的律法，例如解除種族隔離以及奴隸解放？雖然法理學強調
經驗事實，但是它既無法完整解釋像自由和財產這些天賦人權的概念，也無法使
這些抽象的理念成為真實，然而這些人權概念是種建基於純粹非經驗性理想的預
設。因此，主張人權理想的自然法能夠作為實證法理學的根據。古典自然法──
例如，格老秀斯、霍布斯、洛克及盧梭等的學說──闡述法律如何能夠傳遞法權
的理想，而且如何成為個體間，以及個體與政府間的規範。由於自然法的本質在
於能定義我們應該做什麼（what ought to be done）──這屬於道德領域──，以
及能決定何謂正義，因此，道德哲學能夠當作法理學的規定根據。不過，古典自
然法學者形成的理論還都是基於原初自然狀態和經驗的想像，其所制定的法律和
判決的法律案件都是偶然，因為它們總是依賴幸福的原則。為解決這偶然性問題，
我的論文預設屬於自然法之一的康德的道德哲學能作為實證法理學的規定根
據。
取代自然的原初自然狀態和經驗的想像，康德的道德哲學給予道德律是源於
理性。康德從法權科學──它根據於道德形上學──推述出法理學，這種源於理
性的推述確保規則（法律）具有普遍及必然性。然而，康德的法哲學專注於尋求
普遍性與必然性，而形成純粹「形式性」的規則，它忽略個體間的差異性，因此
也喪失解釋個體自我完善的可能──這種自我完善包含經驗上的自我滿足的完
善和道德目的的完善，其中前者是關於個體如何給予其幸福的價值，後者是關於
道德理想的價值。換言之，唯有處於時間序列的人格能夠給予自身以幸福的和道
德理想的價值。為解決這問題，我們必須考量實證法權對自由的效用性，它影響
經驗世界日常生活中的個體。然而，我們並不考慮把實證法權當作道德律的規定
根據，而只是用來激起個體的權利意識，以便重新思考以康德的道德律作為實證
法權再制定的根據。因此，我提出「目的命題」以解決此難題，同時為闡明此命
題我採用循環論述的方法──「推述」、「回歸」及「匯入」（其相應的原理為
「規定根據原理」、「可逆原理」及「價值動力原理」）──以嘗試建立一個動
態的法權科學，以補充康德靜態式的法權科學，這種論述的方法確保實證的公民
法權能夠根據康德道德哲學持續的制定和修正。

Abstract
The jurists think that positivistic jurisprudence, considering the effect of laws, is
self-contained and self-sufficient legal system. Positivistic rights regulate how each
individual behaves in accordance with what is done. Based on the actual experiences,
contemporary jurisprudence explores the effectively constrained laws. With the use of
scientific method, the jurisprudence has a growing trend in excluding each individual
free will from the legal region. If the laws, however, do not preserve any individual
free will but merely has him what to do, then how can the ideals of rights turn into
real ones like desegregation and the emancipation of slaves? Although the
jurisprudence emphasizes the empirical facts, it neither fully explains the concept of
the innate human rights like liberty and property nor makes such an abstract idea
become the real fact. These concepts of human rights are purely founded on the
postulates of non-empirical ideal. Since the natural law insists on the ideals of human
rights, it can provide the ground of positivistic jurisprudence. Accordingly, the classic
natural law ─ the doctrines of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and so on ─ explicates how the law can convey the ideals
of rights and be the norms either for the individuals, or for the individuals and
government. The essence of nature law can define what ought to be done related to
the moral region and can thus determine what the justice is. Consequently, moral
philosophy can be regarded as the determining ground of jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
the theories raised by the classic natural law scholars are also based on the
imaginations of the nature status and experiences. Therefore, enacting bills and
judging the legal cases are contingent because they always depend on the principles of
happiness. To solve the contingent problem, my dissertation proposes the positivistic
jurisprudence be the determined ground for Kant’s moral philosophy, one kind of
nature law.
Kant’s moral philosophy does not give the moral law originating from the
imaginations of nature status and experiences but from reason instead. As Kant
deduces jurisprudence from the science of rights, which is grounded on the
metaphysics of morals, the deduction of reason ensures the rules (laws) are universal
and necessary. Yet, Kant’s legal philosophy focuses on the pursuit of the universal and
the necessary, which derives from the mere ‘form’ of rules; it neglects the distinction
between individuals, failing to explain the potentiality of any individual utmost
perfection in terms of self-satisfied experiences and moral ends. The former
self-satisfied is about how the value of happiness is conferred on an individual; the
latter is concerning the value of moral ideals ─ i.e. merely the personality, lying in
time series, can confer himself values of happiness and moral ideals. To solve this
problem, we must also consider the efficacy of the freedom of positivistic rights,
which affects each individual’s empirical world in the daily life. Nevertheless, we do
not consider positivistic rights as the determining ground of moral laws, for they
merely ignite the consciousness of rights, by which we can reconsider revised
positivistic rights grounded on Kant’s moral law. Therefore, I give a “proposition of
ends” ─ insofar as people are the beings of experiences in nature, each individual
with a view to representing his freedom in community, seen as the civil personality,
acts relying on the moral laws for the ends that the human race will last forever and
that the positivistic rights of all citizens will progress gradually ─ to expound this
problem. For explicating this proposition, I adopt the approach of the circulative
discourse ─ ‘deduction’, ‘feedback’, and ‘import’ ─ corresponding with three
theorems ─ “theorem of determinant ground”, “theorem of reversibility”, and
“theorem of value-motivation” ─ to construct a dynamic science of rights, instead
of Kant’s static one of rights. This discursive method ensures the positivistic civil
rights, grounded on the Kant’s moral philosophy, can enact and revise constantly.

目次
摘要 ──────────────────────────── i
Abstract ─────────────────────────── iii
目次 ──────────────────────────── v
康德著作縮寫表 ─────────────────────── vii
第一章 導言 ───────────────────────── 1
第二章 康德論人類在法權上的目的 （目的命題成立的各元素） ─── 18
第一節 文明化：以整體人類為目的使成為律法共同體的必要條件 ─ 18
第二節 民主共和政體──律法共同體可以自我完善的體制 ──── 33
第三章 公民法權的推述 ──────────────────── 50
第一節 實證法學與古典自然法 ─────────────── 50
第二節 「目的命題」的推述 ────────────────── 70
第三節 康德的理論法權推述 ───────────────── 81
第四章 推述道德律作為實證法權的規定根據（「規定根據原理」） ── 102
第一節 道德律作為規定根據的推述 ────────────── 102
第二節 道德律藉創造性實存而應用於法哲學 ────────── 116
第三節 道德律在實踐運用上的限制 ────────────── 126
第五章 可回歸性立法的實證法權及其效用性（「可逆原理」） ───── 140
第一節 「可逆原理」的先驗必然性 ────────────── 140
第二節 規範式實證法權對自由的效用性 ──────────── 153
第三節 實證法權下的正義與不正義 ────────────── 164
第六章 人格作為實證法權匯入道德律的元素（「價值動力原理」） ─── 178
第一節 人格作為進行規定與判斷的主體 ─────────── 178
第二節 公民人格價值作為法權制定的動力 ─────────── 191
第三節 個體權利訴諸立法的三個意念格準 ─────────── 206
第七章 結論 ───────────────────────── 212
中文書目 ───────────────────────── 215
Bioliography ───────────────────────── 217

中文書目
康德作品
康德，《法的形而上學原理 : 權利的科學》，沈叔平譯，（北京：商務出版，1991）
──《純粹理性批判》，鄧曉芒譯，（台北：聯經，2004）
──《實踐理性批判》，鄧曉芒譯，（台北：聯經，2004）
──《判斷力批判》，鄧曉芒譯，（台北：聯經，2004）
──《康德歷史哲學論文集》，李明輝譯，（台北：聯經，2002）
──《道德底形上學之基礎》，李明輝譯，（台北：聯經，1990）
──《單純理性限度內的宗教》，李秋零譯，（台北：商周，2005）
──《實用人類學》，鄧曉芒譯，（上海：上海人民出版社，2005）
──《邏輯學講義》，許景行譯（北京：商務，2010）

其他學者作品
方迪啟，《價值是什麼》黃藿譯（台北：聯經，1991）
沈清松，〈從現代到後現代〉收於《哲學雜誌》第4期，（台北市：業強1993）
孟德斯鳩，《論法的精神》，張雁深譯（台北：台灣商務，1998）
洛克，《政府論》，（台北：怕米爾，1969）
格老秀斯，《戰爭與和平法》，何群華等譯（上海：上海人民出版社，2005）
韋伯《經濟與社會》，林榮遠譯，(北京：商務印書，1997)
──《社會學的基本概念》，顧忠華譯 (台北：遠流，1993)
──《支配的類型》(韋伯選集Ⅲ)，康樂編譯 (台北：遠流，1989)
梭羅，《公民，不服從》，劉粹倫譯，（台北：紅桌文化，2012）
普拉特納，《盧梭的自然狀態：《論不平等的起源》釋義》，尚新建、余靈靈譯（北京：華夏出版社，2008）
登特列夫，《自然法：法律哲學導論》，李日章譯（台北巿：聯經 1992）
傅偉勳，《西洋哲學史》，（台北：三民，1990）
傅柯，《規訓與懲罰－監獄的誕生》，劉北成、楊遠嬰譯，（台北巿：桂冠 1992）
費希特，《全部知識學的基礎》，王玖興譯，(北京：商務，1986)
──《自然法權基礎》，謝地坤，程志民譯，（北京：商務印書 2004）
凱爾森，《法律與國家》，雷崧生譯，（台北：正中書局 1976）
博登海默《法理學──法哲學及其方法》，（臺北市 : 漢興 1999）
漢娜‧鄂蘭，〈公民不服從〉收錄於《共和危機》，蔡佩君譯，（台北：時報，1996）
趙明，《康德《論永久和平》的法哲學基礎》，（上海：華東師範，2006）
鄺芷人，《康德倫理學原理》，（台北：文津，1992）
霍布斯，《利維坦》，朱敏章譯（台北：台灣商務，2002）
盧梭，《社約論》，徐百齊譯（台北：台灣商務，2000）
──《論人類不平等的起源和基礎》，李常山譯（台北：唐山，1986）
謝勒，《倫理學中的形式主義與質料的價值的倫理學》倪梁康譯（北京：商務，2011）
羅爾斯，《正義論》，黃丘隆譯，（台北：結構群，1990）

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