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研究生:古芳如
研究生(外文):GU, FANG-RU
論文名稱:政府持續高生育補助與人民生育選擇-具聲譽效果之重複賽局的論點
論文名稱(外文):Birth Subsidy and Birth Choice–A View from Reputation Effect of Repeated Game
指導教授:劉念本劉念本引用關係
口試委員:林啟智楊奕祐劉念本
口試日期:2017-03-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:真理大學
系所名稱:經濟學系財經碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:23
中文關鍵詞:生育率生育補助重複賽局聲譽效果
外文關鍵詞:Total Fertility RateBirth SubsidyRepeated GameReputation Effect
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  台灣正面臨超低生育率的危機,將會對社會結構、經濟發展等面向產生重大的影響。因此近年我國政府對生育提供補助,希望藉由生育津貼刺激夫妻生育的意願,以提高總生育率。
  本研究利用具聲譽效果的重複賽局模型來探討發放生育補助金,對夫妻生育意願的影響為何。當人民有一定機率認為政府會持續高生育補助,發現政府有誘因持續發放高補助,人民每期都不生的結果不會發生。接著考量實際狀況的因素,加入政府財政困難的風險後,分析夫妻生育的意願。聲譽效果仍然顯著地呈現,仍可預期人民會選擇生育。

In recent years, total fertility rate (TFR) has significantly declined in most countries. Hence, the governments executed some policies to boost total fertility rate, such as birth subsidy.
This study is to explore how reputation effects can affect birth behavior with birth subsidy via the model of repeated game. We find the strategy profile that the government provides high subsidies and people give birth to a child in every stage is a Nash equilibrium. Most importantly, the strategy profile that the government provides low subsidies and people don’t give birth to a child in every stage doesn’t exist in any Nash equilibrium.

目錄
壹、緒論......................1
貳、文獻探討...............5
參、模型設定與分析....8
 一、靜態賽局............8
 二、動態重複賽局...10
 三、聲譽效果..........14
 四、財政困難..........18
肆、結論.....................21
伍、參考文獻.............22



施雅庭 (2016), 政府的生育津貼對生育率及人口遷移的影響分析,中正大學經濟系國際經濟學研究所碩士論文

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Becker, G.S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press.

Fudenberg, D. and Levine D.K. (1980), Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player, Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 759-778.

Friedman, J. (1971), A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames, Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1): 1–12.

Honig, M (1974), AFDC income, recipient rates, and family dissolution, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 303-322.

Hong, S.C., Kim, Y.I., Lim, J.Y., & Yeo, M.Y. (2015), Pro-natalist cash grants and fertility: a panel analysis, mimeo, Sogang University.

Huang, JR-T (2002), Personal Tax Exemption: the effect on fertility in Taiwan, The Developing Economies, XL-1: 32–48.

Kreps, D.M. and Wilson, R. (1982), Reputation and imperfect information, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 253-279.

Kreps, D.M, Milgrom, P., Robert, J. and Wilson, R., (1982), Rational cooperation in the finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27 pp, 245-252.

Schelling, T.C. (1956), An essay on bargaining, The American Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 281-306.

Whittington, L.A., Alm, J. and Peters, H.E. (1990), Fertility and the personal exemption: implicit pronatalist policy in the United States, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 545-556.

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