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研究生:余逢銘
研究生(外文):YU, FENG-MING
論文名稱:探討公司高層的過度自信行為對併購交易特性與績效的影響
論文名稱(外文):To Explore The Impact of Managers' Overconfidence on The M&A Deal Characteristics and Performance
指導教授:顏子瑜顏子瑜引用關係
指導教授(外文):YEN, TZE-YU
口試委員:何加政周淑卿
口試委員(外文):HO, CHIA-CHENGCHOU, SHU-CHING
口試日期:2017-06-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:過度自信併購案交易特性短期併購績效
外文關鍵詞:overconfidenceM&Adeal characteristicsshort-term performance
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過度自信是目前被用來解釋各種財務決策行為與金融現象最為廣泛的觀念之一,若這樣的偏誤存在於公司高層人士中,就有可能導致投資決策偏誤發生,進一步影響整體公司價值。本論文研究2009年至2015年期間,19個國家的併購樣本(包含成熟市場和新興市場),旨在探討管理者的過度自信行為對併購案交易特性與短期績效的影響。而本文採用的過度自信衡量指標是從投資支出面向為出發點,並以併購宣告日前後二十天的累積股價超額報酬作為短期併購績效之衡量值。
本論文的研究得到以下幾點結論:
(1)管理階層過度自信程度對併購交易的影響,在成熟市場與新興市場間呈現顯著的差異。
(2)成熟市場的主併公司管理階層過度自信程度愈高時,併購案失敗的機率會愈高;新興市場下則無顯著關係。
(3)管理階層過度自信行為與併購溢價呈現正相關但並不顯著。成熟市場的主併公司管理階層過度自信程度愈高時,則在併購案中較傾向採取股權支付方式;新興市場下則無顯著關係。
(4)成熟市場的主併公司管理階層過度自信程度愈高時,併購宣告期間的累積異常報酬會愈低;新興市場下則無顯著關係。
(5)成熟市場下,投資人對於管理者過度自信程度與市場績效的關聯性,受到併購案中是否有溢價存在的影響,但併購支付方式對於管理者過度自信程度與市場績效的關聯性則無顯著的影響力。
(6)國家法律環境變數對抑制過度自信行為所帶來的負面市場報酬並無顯著影響力。
Overconfidence (OC) is one of the most widely concept currently used to explain various financial decision-making behaviors and phenomena. If the psychological bias exists in the management of a company, it may lead to investment decision-making errors, and thus affects the overall firm value. Based on the samples of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals in nineteen countries (including developed markets and emerging markets) during the period from year 2009 to 2015, this paper aims to explore the impacts of management overconfidence on deal characteristics and short-term market performance,. The OC indexes are measured from the aspects of investment expenditure by management decisions. Forty-one day (-20, 20) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around M&A announcement date are regarded as short-term market performance measures. The main results of this paper are as follows:
(1) The impacts of management overconfidence on short-term market performance present significant differences between developed markets and emerging markets. (2) For developed market acquirers, the higher degrees of self-confidence their management have, the higher probability of failure in M&A deals they conducted; however, this influence of management overconfidence on deal success does not exist in emerging market acquirers. (3) Although not significant, the degree of management overconfidence is positively correlated with the existence of premium. For developed market acquirers, management with higher degrees of self-confidence will be more likely to set equity payment deals; however, this effect of management overconfidence on payment type choice does not exist in merging market acquirers. (4) For developed market acquirers, management with higher degrees of self-confidence will lead to lower CARs; however, this negative OC-CAR link does not exist in emerging market acquirers. (5) When overconfident management of developed market acquirers are willing to pay for premium, investors will take this behavior as a strong signal for the improvements of post-merger financial performance expected by overconfident management, and thus give a positive response. (6) Legal environment cannot moderate the negative expectations of market investors regarding management overconfidence.
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究背景與動機 1
1.2研究目的 3
1.3研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討與回顧 4
2.1過度自信的衡量指標 4
2.2過度自信與併購完成度之間的關係 6
2.3過度自信與併購交易特性之間的關係 7
2.4過度自信與併購績效 8
2.5公司治理機制和國家法律環境與併購案 13
第三章 研究方法 15
3.1樣本選擇與資料來源 15
3.2研究變數 16
3.3實證研究模型 23
第四章 實證結果 28
4.1敘述性統計與單一樣本檢定 28
4.2獨立樣本T檢定與相關係數 31
4.3迴歸結果 38
第五章 結論與建議 48
5.1研究結論 48
5.2後續建議 50
參考文獻 51
一、英文部分
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二、中文部分
王宛婷(2011),「管理者過度自信與購併決策之相關性研究」,輔仁大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
王祝三、周德瑋、陳弘榮(2006),「企業併購支付方式決定因素與股價反映之探討」,證券市場發展期刊,第3期,1–45頁。
孫鳳玲和肖振紅(2012),「管理者過度自信行為對國有上市公司併購融資績效的影響」,學習與探索期刊,第6期,109–112頁。
高于婷(2012),「管理者過度自信、投資者過度自信、與購併成功機率與績效之關係」,輔仁大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
黃瑋菱(2011),「過度自信管理者對股票併購意願及績效之影響」,國立台灣大學財務金融學所碩士論文。
楊廷芳(2009),「經理人的過度自信與購併績效」,銘傳大學國際企業學系碩士論文。
廖俊杰、陳家妤(2009),「外部治理機制是否足以抑制主併公司傲慢自大的價值破壞?」,輔仁管理評論,16卷3期,59–98頁。
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