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研究生:劉芳瑄
研究生(外文):LIU,FANG-HSUAN
論文名稱:家族企業之公司治理與公司績效之關係
論文名稱(外文):On The Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Performance for Family -Controlled Firms
指導教授:何加政何加政引用關係
指導教授(外文):HO, CHIA-CHENG
口試委員:蔡佩蓉林岳喬
口試委員(外文):TSAI, PEI-JUNGLIN, YUAH-CHIAO
口試日期:2017-06-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:家族企業公司治理公司績效
外文關鍵詞:Family controlled firmsCorporate Governancecorporate Performance
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台灣上市櫃公司大多為家族企業,因此討論家族企業的公司治理對公司績效的影響,希望更加了解公司治理在家族企業所扮演的角色。本論文研究期間為1996年到2015台灣上市櫃公司,並且分別採用所有權、控制權以及董事會特性之變數與公司績效間的關係。研究結果發現,當家族企業控制股東所有權越集中,則公司績效越好;家族企業的控制權與現金流量權偏離越大,則公司績效越差;家族企業董事會規模越大,則公司績效越差;家族企業外部董事席次比例越大,則公司績效越好;家族企業的董事會主席兼任董事長時,則公司績效越差。
除此之外,本研究進一步利用市值與股票週轉率作為資訊不對稱的指標,探討是否資訊不對稱對於家族企業的公司治理與公司績效的影響。研究結果發現,當以市值作為衡量變數時,家族企業的資訊揭露程度越多(市值越大),則公司績效越好;而以股票週轉率作為衡量變數時,卻無法證實資訊揭露程度對於家族企業公司績效影響力。

Most of Taiwan listed companies are family controlled, which provides us motivations to investigated whether family ownership plays a role in the relationship between a firm ‘s corporate governance and performance. We use data of Taiwan listed companied for the period from 1996 to 2015.The results of the study show that family controlled firms with more concentrated ownership tend to have better performance. For family controlled firms, deviation of control rights from cash flow rights tend to worsen the corporate performance. Family controlled firms with large board of directors tend to perform poorly. Family controlled firms with more independent directors are likely to have better performance. Finally, if the CEO of a family controlled firm is also the chairman of the board, the corporate performance is worse.
In addition, we further examine whether information asymmetry, proxied by either of stock turnover and market equity, can affect the relationship between corporate governance and performance for family controlled firms. We find that when information asymmetry is proxied by a firm’s market equity ,transparency equity ,transparency( ie.,larger market equity ) can enhance the relationship between corporate governance and performance. The effect, however, is not apparent when information asymmetry is provided by stock turnover rate.

目錄
壹 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
貳 文獻探討與研究假說 4
第一節 所有權與控制權對於公司績效 4
第二節 董事會特性與公司績效 5
第三節 資訊透明度與公司績效 8
參 研究方法 9
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 9
第二節 變數定義及實證模型 11
肆 實證結果 17
第一節 敘述性統計 17
第二節 一般迴歸分析 20
伍 結論 38
第一節 研究結論 38
第二節 研究缺失與建議 40
參考文獻 41


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