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研究生:韓為華
研究生(外文):HAN, WEI-HUA
論文名稱:經理人過度自信對影音法人說明會特徵之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Managers’ Overconfidence on the Feature of Conference Call
指導教授:黃劭彥黃劭彥引用關係謝佳純謝佳純引用關係
指導教授(外文):SHAIO, YAN-HUANGXIE, JIA-CHUN
口試委員:卓佳慶鍾宇軒
口試委員(外文):JUO, JIA-CHINGCHUNG, YU-HSUAN
口試日期:2017-06-27
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計與資訊科技研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:法說會過度自信資訊揭露
外文關鍵詞:conference calloverconfidentinformation disclosure
相關次數:
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近年來法說會在國內越來越受重視,我國主管機關在102年強制公司上傳法說會的影音檔案,讓投資人可以更即時的觀看內容,迅速的從法說會中獲取資訊,更精準的預測市場未來走向。
本研究以過度自信經理人的角度探討其是否會對法說會的特徵造成影響,實證結果發現過度自信的經理人會更願意且更頻繁的召開法說會,並會對法說會中的正面用詞比例產生正向的影響,說明過度自信的經理人會更願意揭露資訊,主動降低企業與投資人間的資訊不對稱,並會使自己以及其經營團隊傳遞更正面的訊息給投資人。

Recently, Investors pay more attention to conference call information. In 2013, our competent authority mandatory require companies to upload their conference call content to company website. This enables investors to get more up-to-date information to predict the stock price more precisely.
The purpose of this study is to discuss whether overconfident CEOs affect the features of conference calls. We find that overconfident CEOs are more willing and more frequent to hold conference calls. They also use more positive language during the conference calls. Results of this studies revealed that overconfident CEOs are willing to reduce the information asymmetry between companies and investors. In addition, overconfident CEOs and their management team tend to convey more positive information to investors.

摘要 i
Abstract iii
第一章緒論 1
1.1研究動機與目的 1
1.2研究貢獻 3
1.3研究架構與流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
2.1法人說明會相關之新法規範 6
2.2影響法人說明會資訊之因素 9
2.3經理人過度自信 10
2.4過度自信經理人與法說會之關聯性 12
第三章 研究方法 14
3.1資料來源與樣本選擇 14
3.2資料分析方法 17
3.2.1敘述性統計 17
3.2.2相關係數分析 17
3.2.3迴歸分析 18
3.3因變數 19
3.4主要變數 22
3.5控制變數 23
3.5.1公司治理相關變數 23
3.5.2其他控制變數 24
3.6實證研究模型 26
第四章 實證結果分析 30
4.1敘述性統計 30
4.2相關係數分析 34
4.3迴歸分析 37
4.3.1過度自信經理人與法說會是否召開及召開頻率之關聯 37
4.3.2過度自信經理人法說會時間長度之關聯 40
4.3.3過度自信經理人法說會語調(tone)之關聯 43
4.4敏感性分析 45
第五章 結論與建議 51
參考文獻 53

中文文獻
李建然,廖秀梅,賴柏錚,(2005),法人說明會之資訊內涵及公平性,中華管理評論國際學報,第八卷第三期,1-17.
金成隆,林美鳳,梁嘉紋,(2008),公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究,管理學報,第二十五卷第二期,221-243.
張力,蔡函芳,林翠蓉,王禹軒,洪榮華 (2013),家族企業特性與經理人過度自信對其舉債決策之影響,中山管理評論,第二十五卷第1期,123-163.

英文文獻
Ahmed, A. S., & Duellman, S. (2013). Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(1), 1-30.
Ataullah, A., Vivian, A., and Xu, B. (2013). Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Optimistic Disclosure Tone, Insider Trading and Capital Structure. Merton H. Miller Doctoral Seminar Paper
Bowen, R., Davis, A., and Matsumoto, D. (2002). Do conference calls affect analysts’ forecasts? The Accounting Review, 77, 285–316.
Brown, S., Hillegeist, S., and Lo, K. (2004). Conference calls and information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 343–366.
Bushee, B., Matsumoto, D., and Miller, G. (2003). Open versus closed conference calls: the determinants and effects of broadening access to disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34, 149–180.
Davis, A. K., and TAMA‐SWEET, I. S. H. O. (2012). Managers’ use of language across alternative disclosure outlets: Earnings press releases versus MD&A, Contemporary Accounting Research, 29(3), 804-837.
Davis, A. K., Ge, W., Matsumoto, D., and Zhang, J. L. (2015). The effect of manager-specific optimism on the tone of earnings conference calls, Review of Accounting Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, 639-673.
Demers, E. A., and Vega, C. (2014). Understanding the role of managerial optimism and uncertainty in the price formation process: evidence from the textual content of earnings announcements, Available at SSRN 1152326.
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Frankel, R., Mayew,W, Yan Sun.(2010).Do pennies matter? Investor relations consequences of small negative earnings surprises. Review of Accounting Studies, Volume 15, Issue 1, 220-242.
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Hackbarth, D., 2008, Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions, Journal of
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Heaton, J. B. (2002). Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, Financial
Management, Vol. 31, No. 2, 33-45.
Healy, P., and Palepu, K. (2001). Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and
the Capital Markets: a Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, No. 1-3, 405-440.
Hribar, P., and Yang, H. (2016). CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting,
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, 204-227.
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and the Market’s Reaction, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89, No.
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Price, S., J. Doran., D. Peterson, B. Bliss. (2012). Earnings conference calls and stock
returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone. Journal of Banking and Finance 36(4) 992-1011
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Entrepreneurs: Theory and Evidence, Working Paper.
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