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研究生:江朝峯
研究生(外文):CHIANG,CHAO-FENG
論文名稱:台灣產險行銷通路選擇之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the Selection of Marketing Distribution of Non-Life Insurance Industry
指導教授:吳瑞雲吳瑞雲引用關係劉俊廷劉俊廷引用關係
指導教授(外文):WU,JUI-YUNLIU,CHUN-TING
口試委員:張吉宏劉俊廷張瑞益高棟梁吳瑞雲
口試委員(外文):CHANG,CHI-HONGLIU,CHUN-TINGCHAN,JUI-IKAO, TONG-LIANGWU,JUI-YUN
口試日期:2017-05-25
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:金融博士學位學程
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:81
中文關鍵詞:Part-1產品品質假說直接簽單通路車商保代通路一般保經代通路Part-2產品品質假說直接簽單通路產險經紀人通路Part-3品質假說直接通路產險經紀人通路商業性保險產險代理人通路金融保經代通路其他保經代通路
外文關鍵詞:Part-1Product quality hypothesisIndependent agent systemDirect writer systemGeneral agent or broker channelDealer-owned agentPart-2Product quality hypothesisInsurance brokerUnderwriting director
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Part-1
產品品質假說宣稱無效率的保險經代人制度何以能與直接簽單制度並存在於保險市場,乃因保險經代人能提供顧客較佳的服務品質。有別於過去文獻的供給面觀點,本文嘗試從顧客需求面角度,以投保前諮詢服務、保險期間中的協助與理賠信任程度以及保險期間到期後的依賴程度等三個面向來衡量服務品質。從858份分別向直接簽單通路、一般保經代通路與車商保代通路投保汽車保險的問卷資料中,研究結果顯示,顧客對於一般保經代通路於投保前的諮詢服務、保險期間的協助以及保單到期後的依賴程度評價最高,而車商保代通路則能獲得顧客較佳的理賠信任程度。
Part-2
探討產險業行銷通路的研究向來是財產保險學術上的重要議題之一,其中產品品質假說認為相對高成本的獨立代理人通路之能與直接業務員通路並存於保險市場,乃因獨立代理人通路能提供顧客相較於直接業務員通路較佳的服務品質,而台灣地區千大企業占有商業性保險相當高的比重,其長久以來透過產險經紀人與直接業務員的比例約占各半,其通路運用的未來發展關係到台灣產險業的發展至巨,這也是本研究的目的,即在檢驗其通路的選擇是否符合品質假說。到目前為止本研究取得245份台灣千大企業回覆的有效問卷,本篇論文以投保前諮詢服務與保險期間到期後的依賴程度等兩個面向來衡量服務品質,經次序(order)迴歸分析檢驗研究假說,結果顯示,採用產險經紀人通路的千大企業於投保前的財務與服務諮詢服務、投保諮詢需求服務、保險價格諮詢服務、保單條款解說服務、專業能力服務、額外服務與投保後的轉保服務明顯高於採用直接簽單通路的千大企業,其服務品質顯然支持產品品質假說。
Part-3
商業性保險究竟應該採取直接通路或間接通路,產險業各有不同的角度或經營觀點去做選擇,可以從服務品質的觀點、成本的角度、行銷體系的掌握度等等方面來加以觀察,其中品質假說認為相對高成本的間接通路之能與直接通路並存於保險市場,乃因間接通路能提供顧客相較於直接通路較佳的服務品質,本研究係透過行銷通路對顧客各險種的推薦、承保範圍的規劃、保險金額的釐訂方式、專業能力與價格等面向,運用OLS迴歸來驗證千大企業對保險通路的選擇。本研究一共取得255份台灣千大企業回覆的有效問卷,經迴歸分析檢驗研究假說,結果顯示,無論是協助千大企業的顧客投保多種商業保險、協助千大企業的顧客規劃承保範圍在專業能力與服務的肯定方面,採用產險經紀人通路的千大企業於明顯高於採用直接簽單通路的千大企業,其整體服務品質顯然支持品質假說,但是對於其他間接通路來說,包括產險代理人、金融保經代通路等則顯然不支持品質假說,顯示其服務品質與直接通路無法分辨出好壞;至於協助千大企業的顧客釐訂保險金額方面,無論是產險經紀人通路或者其他保經代通路,與直接業務員通路相比較都沒有明顯的差異。
Part-1
The product quality hypothesis contends that the inefficient insurance agent and the direct writer systems coexist in the insurance market because insurance agents can provide clients with high-quality services. In contrast to previous related studies conducted from a supply-side perspective, this study assesses the service quality view from the demand-side angle by exploring the interaction between customers and insurance agents in three stages of insurance purchase: the consultation process that occurs during the pre-purchase period, assistance and trust in claims settlement during the in-force period, and the level of reliance after expiration of the policy. Using 858 questionnaires on auto insurance collected from the general agent or broker, dealer-owned agent, and direct writer channels, we find that customers most valued pre-purchase consultations, assistance during the in-force period, and the post-expiration reliance provided by the general agent or broker. The dealer-owned agent, on the other hand, receives a higher valuation on the trust in claims settlement.

Part-2
Previous studies have shown that more costlyinsurance intermediaries can provide better service quality to clients in personal insurance. From an alternative perspective, this study attempts to verify the product quality hypothesis in commercial insurance with 245 effective questionnairesfrom Taiwan’s top 1,000 manufacturing firms. By employing order regression analyses, we test the impact of different distribution channels and the specific characteristics of firms on seven input as well as output dimensions related to service quality.We find mixed evidence for the product quality hypothesis. The findings support thattheinsurance broker dominates over theunderwritingdirectorin terms of consulting service. However, this is not the casein terms of renewal willingness due to the price concern.



壹、論文背景與概要

貳、Part-1:台灣汽車保險市場行銷通路共存現象之探討-服務品質觀點

參、Part-2:A Reexamination of the Service Quality Differential between Distribution Systems in Commercial Insurance

肆、Part-3 :千大企業保險通路選擇之探討

Part-1
Barrese, J. and J. M. Nelson, 1992, Independent and Exclusive Agency Insurers: A Reexamination of the Cost Differential, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59: 375-397.
Barrese, J., H. Doerpinghaus, and J. M. Nelson, 1995, Do Independent Agent Insurers Provide Superior Service? The Insurance Marketing Puzzle, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62: 297-308.
Berger, A., D. Cummins, and M. Weiss, 1997, The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance, Journal of Business, 70: 515-546.
Blair D, and B. Herndon, 1994, A Survivor Test of the American Agency System of Distributing Property Liability Insurance, Journal of Economics of Business, 1: 283-290.
Cummins, J. D, and N. A. Doherty, 2006, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 359-396.
Cummins, J.D., and J. VanDerhei, 1979, A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems, Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 709-719.
Eckardt, M., and S. Räthke-Döppner, 2010, The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services-Empirical Evidence for Germany, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77, 667-701.
Etgar, M., 1976, Service Performance of Insurance Distribution, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 43: 487-499.

Part-2
Barrese, J., and J. M. Nelson,1992, Independent and Exclusive Agency Insurers: A Reexamination of the Cost Differential,Journal of Risk and Insurance59(3): 375-397.
Barrese, J., H.Doerpinghaus,and J. M. Nelson,1995, Do Independent Agent Insurers Provide Superior Service? The Insurance Marketing Puzzle,Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62(2): 297-308.
Berger, A., D. Cummins, and M. Weiss,1997,The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance,Journal of Business,70(4): 515-546.
Blair D., and B. Herndon, 1994,A Survivor Test of the American Agency System of Distributing Property Liability Insurance,Journal of Economics of Business,1(1): 283-290.
Cummins, J.D., and N. A. Doherty,2006,The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries,Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73(3): 359-396.
Cummins, J.D., and J. VanDerhei, 1979,A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems,Bell Journal of Economics10(2): 709-719.
Eckardt, M., and S. Räthke-Döppner,2010,The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services-Empirical Evidence for Germany,Journal of Risk and Insurance77(3): 667-701.
Etgar, M., 1976, Service Performance of Insurance Distribution,Journal of Risk and Insurance43(3): 487-499.
Hsieh, S.H., C. T. Liu, and L. Y. Tzeng, 2014, Insurance Marketing Channel as a Screening Mechanism: Empirical Evidences from Taiwan Automobile Insurance Market,The Geneva papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice,39(1): 90-103.
Joskow, P., 1973, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,4(2): 375-427.
Kim, W.,D. Mayers,and C. W. Smith, 1996, On the Choice of Insurance Distribution Systems,Journal of Risk and Insurance,63(2): 207-227.
Klumpes, P.J.M. 2004.”Performance Benchmarking in Financial Services: Evidence from the UK Life Insurance Industry,Journal of Business,77(2):257-273.
Klumpes, P. J. M., and S. Schuermann, 2011, Corporate, product and distribution strategies in the European life insurance industry, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice,36(1):50-75.
Marvel, H. 1982, Exclusive dealing, Journal of Law and Economics,25(1): 1–25.
Posey, L.L., and A. Yavas, 1995,A Search Model of Marketing Systems in Property-Liability Insurance,Journal of Risk and Insurance,62(4): 666-689.
Posey, L. L., and S. Tennyson, 1998,The Coexistence of Distribution Systems under Price Search: Theory and Some Evidence from Insurance,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,35(1): 95-115.
Regan, L., 1997, Vertical Integration in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Transaction Cost Approach,Journal of Risk and Insurance,64(1): 41-62.
Regan, L., and S. Tennyson, 1996, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Distribution System,Journal of Law and Economics,39(2): 637-666.
Regan, L., and L. Y. Tzeng, 1999, Organizational form in the property-liability insurance industry,Journal of Risk and Insurance,66(2): 253–273.
Sass, T. B., and M. Gisser, 1989, Agency cost, firm size, and exclusive dealing,Journal of Law and Economics,32(October): 381-400.
Seog, S. H., 1999,The coexistence of distribution system when consumers are not informed, The Geneva Papers on Risks and Insurance Theory,24(2): 173-192.
Trigo-Gamarra, L., 2008, Reasons for the Coexistence of Different Distribution Channels: An Empirical Test for the German Insurance Market,The Geneva papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice,33(3): 389-407.
Venezia, I., D. Galai, and Z. Shapira, 1999, Exclusive vs. independent agents: a separating equilibrium approach,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,40(4): 443-456.

Part-3
Barrese, J. and J. M. Nelson, 1992, Independent and Exclusive Agency Insurers: A Reexamination of the Cost Differential, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59: 375-397.
Berger, A., D. Cummins, and M. Weiss, 1997, The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance, Journal of Business, 70: 515-546.
Cummins, J. D, and N. A. Doherty, 2006, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 359-396.
Cummins, J.D., and J. VanDerhei, 1979, A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability Insurance Distribution Systems, Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 709-719.
Eckardt, M., and S. Räthke-Döppner, 2010, The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services-Empirical Evidence for Germany, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77, 667-701.
Etgar, M., 1976, Service Performance of Insurance Distribution, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 43: 487-499.
Joskow, P., 1973, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4: 375-427.
Mayers, D., and C. W. Smith, 1981, Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets, Journal of Business, 54: 407-434.
Pauly, M., H. Kunreuther, and P. Kleindorfer, 1986, Regulation and Quality Competition in the U.S. Insurance Industry, in: Jorg Finsinger and Mark 26Pauly, eds. The Economics of Insurance Regulation, 65-107.
Posey, L. L., and A. Yavas, 1995, A Search Model of Marketing Systems in Property-Liability Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62: 666-689.
Posey, L. L., and S. Tennyson, 1998, The Coexistence of Distribution Systems Under Price Search: Theory and Some Evidence from Insurance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35: 95-115.
Regan, L. and S. Tennyson, 1996, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Distribution System, Journal of Law and Economics, 39: 637-666.
Trigo-Gamarra, L., 2008, Reasons for the Coexistence of Different Distribution Channels: An Empirical Test for the German Insurance Market, The Geneva papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 33: 389-407.




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