臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

家族企業在世界各國中一直扮演著重要的角色，在西方社會，家族公司是最常見的企業組織形態，追求企業的永續存在與經營發展仍是家族企業治理上努力的目標。若能加強公司治理透明度與公開程度、善盡企業社會責任(CSR)、致力於永續經營目標等，輔以政府良善及積極的監督；進而提升公眾對企業經營及政府監督的認同，必能帶來改革之正向力量。企業如何在追求良好公司治理的同時，透過對社會面及環境面的提升，善盡CSR與落實永續目標，是追求經濟利益外十分重要的課題。
社會情感財(SEW)被視為家族企業相當願意尋找可作為延續家族情感與價值之理論基礎；目前研究文獻中可見的是CSR及家族企業已被廣泛討論。國內永續議題及SEW在國內鮮少被探討，且台灣企業在推動企業永續發展尚有許多進步空間，故本研究有異於CSR之研究，而以家族企業在累積SEW之追求緊密社會關係及較強企業世代傳承動機下，並不全然以追求經濟利益為考量之基礎，探討其永續投入與經營績效之關聯性。本研究並以在經濟市場中佔有較高比例之國內家族企業為樣本，進一步探討在永續投入下，就不同之家族結構特性，推論家族企業在強烈追求企業永續經營與社會認同之動機下，是否不僅以短期利益為所宗，而對經營績效有不同影響。
本研究認為家族企業在追求利潤目標的同時，傾向追求SEW社會關係之意念較強，並以企業在永續獲獎為企業永續投入之衡量指標；另以ROA、ROE及MTB三種績效變數為企業經營績效之衡量指標，檢測家族企業永續投入與經營績效之關聯性；並探討家族企業在永續投入下，股份控制權、董監席次控制權、股份控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度、董事長與總經理內部化及單一家族主導等不同特性下，對該企業經營績效之影響；實證結果顯示，家族企業之永續投入對經營績效有顯著的正相關，可增加其他企業追求永續投入的誘因，進一步為社會與環境帶來正向的影響。在永續投入之情況下，以及家族企業累積SEW甚於追求利潤之理論基礎下，股份控制權、董監席次控制權及單一家族主導之家族結構特性皆與企業經營績效呈顯著負相關。
本研究的貢獻除了增加對家族企業永續投入及經營績效關聯性的實證研究，也可以提供未來永續議題與SEW之研究參考；在管理實務面，則可提供利害關係人及社會大眾，依不同之家族結構特性，預測該企業在永續投入的狀況下，其經營績效之表現；綜此，希冀本研究對學術理論與實務意涵均能有所貢獻。

Family firms, the most common form of corporate organization in the West, have played an important role globally. The main goal of corporate governance for family firms is continual sustainability and business development. If corporate entities can strengthen the transparency and openness of their corporate governance, and focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable business objectives, besides government supervision, it could positively affect society as a whole and enhance public recognition of business. Determining how we can improve CSR and sustainability management besides the simple pursuit of economic progress in enterprises is an extremely important goal.
Social Emotional Wealth (SEW) is the theoretical basis which suggests that family firms have a high aspiration to look for methods that could be used to continue the family emotional attachments and values. While a large body of literature has explored CSR and family firms, few studies have examined the sustainability and SEW, and the development of sustainability also needs to be promoted. Differing significantly from prior research on CSR, this research is based on assumptions that family firms have strong motivations linked to heritage and accumulate SEW in the pursuit of close social relations, and not entirely in the pursuit of economic interests, thus the focus is on the exploration of the development of sustainability and business performance. We use family firms as the sample study since they occupy a high proportion in the economic market, and inferred that family firms will strongly pursue sustainable operation and social recognition, to further explore how the business performance of family firms is affected according to several characteristics of family firms in the case of sustainable development.
In this study, we regard the Taiwan Corporate Sustainability Awards (TCSA) as the objective measurement indicator of the development of sustainability; it is based on SEW pursuit of close social relations, and we use return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Market Value to Book Value (MTB) measurement indicators as the variables for business performance. Then, we could examine the relations between them. After controlling for firm characteristics and control variables, we detected several characteristics of family firms, i.e. ownership control, deviance of control and distribution, and single family directors board, and how they are related to business performance when firms received TCSA. The empirical results show that sustainability and business performance have a significant positive correlation; it would increase the incentive for other enterprises to pursue sustainable development. Consequently, it benefits society and the environment. With this study, we also suggest that in the case of developing sustainability, factors such as ownership control, seats control and direction by a single family are negatively correlated with the business performance in family firms according to the theoretical foundation of preferring SEW accumulation rather than profits.
The contribution of this study not only lies in increasing the empirical research on family firms and sustainability, but also in providing a reference for future research on sustainability issues and SEW. The contribution to management practices is that the results can reveal some perception about continuity operations of enterprises, and the prediction of business performance of enterprises induced by sustainable development as well as different characteristics of family firms for the public or stakeholders. We wish this study could make several contributions to the literature and the practice of management.

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
1.2 The Purpose of the Study
1.3 Structure of the Study
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1 Social Emotional Wealth (SEW)
2.2 Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)
2.3 Business Performance of Family Firms
2.4 Hypotheses Development
2.4.1 Family Ownership and Controlling Shareholder
2.4.2 The Deviation from Family Control & Ownership
2.4.3 The Governance Centralization of Family Firms
Chapter 3 Research Methodology
3.1 The Framework of the Study
3.2 Sources and Sample Selection
3.3 Variables
3.4 The Research Model
Chapter 4 Empirical Results and Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
4.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficient Analysis
4.3 The Analysis of Empirical Results for the relation between the Business Performance and the Development of Sustainability in Family Firms
4.4 Analysis of the Empirical Results for the relation between Business Performance and the Characteristics of Family Firms Which Have Developed Sustainability
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Research Conclusions
5.2 Research Limitations and Recommendations
References

Agrawal, A. and C. Knoeber. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31: 377-397.
Agrawal, A. and G. Mandelker. 1990. Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: the case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25: 143-161.
Anderson, R. and D. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58:1301–1328.
Anderson, R. C. and Bizjak, J. M.. 2003. “An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1323-1348.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M., 2003.“Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2, 263-286.
Andres, C. 2008. Large shareholders and firm performance - an empirical examination of founding-family ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance 14: 431-445.
Arrow, K. J..1973. "Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency" Public Policy, 21, 303-317.
Arya, B., and G. Zhang. 2009. Institutional reforms and investor reactions to CSR announcements: Evidence from an emerging economy. Journal of Management Studies 46 (7): 1089-1112.
Barnes, L. B. and Hershon, S. A. 1976. Transferring power in the family business. Harvard Business Review, 53(4): 105-114.
Berle, A. and G.Means.1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2012. Socioemotional wealth in family firms theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review, 25(3), 258-279.
Berrone, P., Gomez-Mejia, L., Cruz, C., & Cennamo, C. (in press). Socioemotional wealth and proactive stakeholder engagement: Why family controlled firms care more about their stakeholders. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.
Booth, J., M. Cornett, and H, Tehranian. 2002. Boards of directors, ownership, andregulation. Journal of Banking and Finance 26: 1973-1996.
Breton‐Miller, L., & Miller, D. 2013. Socioemotional wealth across the family firm life cycle: A commentary on「Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards」. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(6), 1391-1397.
Brickley, J. and C. James. 1987. The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: the case of banking. Journal of Law and Economics 30: 161-180.
Chami, R. 1999. What’s different about family business?. Computer World 17: 67-69.
Chang, S., W. Wu and Y. Wong. 2009. Family control and stock market reactions to innovation announcements. British Journal of Management 10: 1-18.
Chapple, W., and J. Moon. 2005. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Asia: A seven-country study of CSR web site reporting. Business and Society 44: 415-441.
Chrisman, J., J. Chua and R. Litz. 2004. Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 28: 335-354.
Christman Jr, W. M. 2012. U.S. Patent No. 8,201,509. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentives and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57: 2741-2771.
Combs, J. G., Penney, C. R., Crook, T. R., & Short, J. C. 2010. The impact of family representation on CEO compensation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(6), 1125-1144.
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M. 2007. Does agency theory have universal relevance? A reply to Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and Very. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 28(1), 81-88.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Hoskisson, R. E., Makri, M., Sirmon, D. G., & Campbell, J. T. 2011. Innovation and the preservation of socioemotional wealth: the paradox of R&D investment in family controlled high technology firms. Unpublished paper, Management Department, Texas A&M University.
Cruz, C. C., Gómez-Mejia, L. R., & Becerra, M. 2010. Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 53(1), 69-89.
Cruz, C., Justo, R., & De Castro, J. O. 2012. Does family employment enhance MSEs performance?: Integrating socioemotional wealth and family embeddedness perspectives. Journal of Business Venturing, 27(1), 62-76.
Daily, C. and M. Dollinger. 1991. Family firms are different. Review of Business 13: 3-5.
Davis, K.1960. Can business afford to ignore social responsibilities? California Management Review, 2(3),70-76.
DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo. 2000. Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: A study of the Times Mirror Company. Journal of Financial Economics 56: 153-207.
Fama, E. and M. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325.
Fama, E. and M. Jensen. 1985. Organizational forms and investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 14: 101-119.
Fan, P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (August): 401-425.
Fredrick, W.C.(1960).The growing concern over business responsibility. California Management, 2(4),54-61.
Friedman, M. 1970. The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. NewYork Times Magazine 33: 122-126.
Gadhoum, Y. 2006. Power of ultimate controlling owners: a survey of Canadian landscape. Journal of Management and Governance10: 179-204.
Gimeno, J., Folta, T. B., Cooper, A. C., & Woo, C. Y. 1997. Survival of the fittest? Entrepreneurial human capital and the persistence of underperforming firms. Administrative science quarterly, 750-783.
Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nunez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal 44: 81-95.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. 2003. The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2), 226-237.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J. 2011. The bind that ties: Socioemotional wealth preser- vation in family firms. Academy of Management Annals, 5, 653-707.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Hoskisson, R. E., Makri, M., Sirmon, D. G., & Campbell, J. T. 2011. Innovation and the preservation of socioemotional wealth: the paradox of R&D investment in family controlled high technology firms. Unpublished paper, Management Department, Texas A&M University.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K., Nuñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. Socio- emotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 106-137.
Goodpaster, K. E.,1991. Business ethics and stakeholder analysis. Business Ethics Quarterly, 53-73.
Handler, W. C. 1994. Succession in the family business: A review of the research. Family Business Review, 7: 133-157.
Hart, S. L., and M. B. Milstein. 2003. Creating sustainable value. Academy of Management Executive 17 (2): 56-69.
Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach. 1991. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20: 101-112.
Huson, M., R. Parrino, and L. Starks. 2001. Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: a long-term perspective. Journal of Finance 56: 2265-2297.
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Jose, A., and S. M. Lee. 2007. Environmental reporting of global corporations: A content analysis based on website disclosures. Journal of Business Ethics 72 (4): 307-321.
Manne, H,& Wallich ,H.C., 1972. The Moder Corporation and Social Responsibility. Washington D.C :American Enterprise Institute.
Maury, B. 2006. Family ownership and firm performance: empirical evidence from Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance12: 321-341.
McConaughy, D., M. Walker, G. Henderson, and M. Chandra. 1998. Founding family controlled firms: efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics 7: 1-19.
McConaugby, D. L., Matthews, C. H., & Fialko, A. S. 2001. Founding family controlled firms: Performance, risk, and value. Journal of Small Business Management, 39(1), 31-49.
McGuire, J. W.,1963. Business and Society. New York: McGraw Hill.
Miller, D., I. Breton-Miller, R. Lester, and A. Cammella Jr. 2007. Are family firms really superior performers?. Journal of Corporate Finance13: 829-858.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2013. Family firm governance, strategic conformity, and performance: Institutional vs. strategic perspectives. Organization Science, 24(1), 189-209.
Orck, R., D. Strangeland, and B. Yeung. 2000. Inherited wealth, corporate control, and economic growth: The Canadian disease. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ng, W. and J. Roberts. 2007. Helping the family: the mediating role of outside directors in ethnic Chinese family firms. Human Relations 60: 285-314.
Pascual Berrone, Cristina Cruz, and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia.2012. Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future Research. Family Business Review 25(3) 258-279.
Peter Jaskiewicz, Katharina Heinrichs, Sabine B. Rau & Trish Reay. 2015. To Be or Not to Be: How Family Firms Manage Family and Commercial Logics in Succession. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2015 January.
Rechner, P. L. Schweiger, D. M., & Sandberg, W. R., 1989. Experiential effects of dialectical inquiry, devil's advocacy and consensus approaches to strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 32(4), 745-772.
Rosenblatt, P. C., DeMik, L., Anderson, R. M. and Fohnson, P. A. 1985. The Family in Business: Understanding and Dealing with the Challenges Entrepreneurial Families Face. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rosenstein, S. and J. Wyatt. 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 26: 175-191.
Saito, T. 2008. Family firms and firm performance: Evidence form Japan. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 620-646.
Schulze, W., M. Lubatkin, and R. Dino. 2003. Dispersion of ownership and agency in family firms. Academy of Management Journal 46: 179-194.
Schulze, W., M. Lubatkin, R. Dino, and A. Buchholtz. 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: theory and evidence. Organization Science 12: 99-116.
Sethi, S. P.1975.Dimension of corporate social performance: An analytical satisfaction and loyalty judgments. Journal of Academy of Marketing Science, 28(1),150-167.
Shleifer, A. and R.Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: 737-783.
Sraer, D. and D. Thesmar. 2007. Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence from the French stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association 5: 709-751.
Stern, M. H. 1986. Inside the Family Business. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Villalonga, B. and R. Amit. 2006. How do family ownership, management and control affect firm value?. Journal of Financial Economics 80: 385-417.
Ward, J. L. 2004. Perpetuating the family business: 50 lessons learned from long-lasting, successful families in business. Palgrave Macmillan.
Wilson, N., Wright, M., & Scholes, L. 2013. Family business survival and the role of boards. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(6), 1369–1389.
Zahra, S. A., Hayton, J. C., & Salvato, C. 2004. Entrepreneurship in family vs. Non‐Family firms: A Resource‐Based analysis of the effect of organizational culture. Entrepreneurship theory and Practice, 28(4), 363-381.
Zellweger, T. M., & Nason, R. S. ,2008. A stakeholder perspective on family firm performance. Family Business Review, 21(3), 203-216.