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研究生:楊文博
研究生(外文):Yang,Wen-Bo
論文名稱:高管人員薪酬存續期間對公司風險之影響 -以中國上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship of Executive Pay Duration and company risk – Evidence from China
指導教授:楊雅薇楊雅薇引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yang, Ya-Wei
口試委員:高銘淞沈信漢楊雅薇
口試委員(外文):Gao,Ming-SongShen,Xing-hanYang, Ya-Wei
口試日期:2017-06-09
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:38
中文關鍵詞:薪酬存續期間公司異質風險國營非國營產業分類
外文關鍵詞:Pay Durationcompany riskstated-runIndustry classification
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本研究主要探討管理者薪酬存續期間對公司異質風險之影響。此外,本文也試圖探究中國上市公司國營企業和非國營企業的管理者薪酬存續期間對公司風險之影響是否有明顯差異。最後,本文將中國上市公司樣本進行產業樣分類,同時觀察不同產業下高管薪酬存續期對於公司異質風險的影響差異。
本研究以2006年至2015年中國深圳及上海證券交易所上市公司為研究對象,樣本包含2,729家上市公司,總觀測值17178筆,匹配樣本數550筆。透過 Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor(2013) 衡量存續期間之方法計算薪酬存續期間,進而探討薪酬存續期間與公司異質風險之關係。除了檢驗完整樣本外,我們還探討薪酬存續期間對中國大陸國營企業以及非國營企業間的影響差異。此外,我們也通過產業分類切割樣本,探討薪酬存續期間對不同產業的影響以進一步討論薪酬存續期間對公司風險的影響。
我們發現,薪酬存續期間與公司異質風險呈正向關係,即薪酬限售期訂的愈長,則公司異質風險愈高。若薪酬存續期間提高,公司管理者限制型股票、選擇權等薪酬期限增加,高管會傾向於高風險高收益的投資,公司風險上升,與高管薪酬呈現正相關。而在分割樣本後,我們發現在非國營企業與國營企業並沒有顯著的差別。從產業上來看,服務業、房地產、工商產業的薪酬存續期間對公司風險的影響並不明顯,工業製造業對於薪酬存續期間具有很強的敏感性。

This paper mainly discusses the influence of executive pay duration on the idiosyncratic risk of the company. In addition, this article also attempts to explore whether there is a significant difference in the impact of corporate risk during the state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises. Finally, the sample of Chinese listed companies will be sorted by industry to observe the differences in the executive pay duration in the different industries.
The paper is based on the listed companies in Shenzhen, China and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2015. The sample contains 2,729 listed companies with a total of 17,178 samples and 550 match samples. We study the relationship between remuneration and company idiosyncratic risk by measuring the duration through Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2013). In addition to examining the complete sample, we also discuss the difference impact between the state-owned enterprises and the non-state enterprises. In addition, we also cut samples from industry categories to explore the impact of executive pay over the different industries during the executive pay duration to further discuss the impact of remuneration on corporate risk.
We find that executive pay duration is positively related to the idiosyncratic risk of the company, that means the longer the salary limit is, the higher the idiosyncratic risk of the company. If the executive pay duration increases, time of corporate managers' limited stock and options will increase, and executives will tend to invest in high-risk, high-yield investments, and the company's risk is positively correlated with executive pay. After dividing the samples, we found that there was no significant difference between non-state enterprises and state enterprises. From the industry point of view, the service industry, real estate, industrial and commercial industries during the remuneration of the company's risk is not obvious, but the industrial manufacturing industry for the duration has a strong sensitivity.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究貢獻 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 5
第一節 薪酬存續期間 5
第二節 激勵薪酬與權益誘因 6
第三節 高管薪酬與公司風險衡量 8
第四節 假說建立 9
第三章 研究方法 10
第一節 研究樣本與期間 10
第二節 變數定義 12
第三節 研究設計 15
第四章 實證結果與分析 17
第一節 敘述性統計分析 17
第二節 迴歸結果與分析 24
第五章 結論 33
參考文獻 35
附錄 38


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