王睦舜. (2015). 從公司治理角度探討執行長涉險決策與個股私有資訊的關聯性. 兩岸金融季刊, 3(4), 95-132.Acharya, V. V., Myers, S. C., & Rajan, R. G. (2011). The internal governance of firms. The Journal of Finance, 66(3), 689-720.
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (2003). Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered. Journal of Finance, 71-118.
Aman, H. (2011). Firm-specific volatility of stock returns, the credibility of management forecasts, and media coverage: Evidence from Japanese firms, Japan and World Economy, 23:28-39.
Andrews, A. B., Linn, S. C., & Yi, H. (2009, March). Corporate governance and executive perquisites: evidence from the new SEC disclosure rules. AAA.
Baixauli-Soler, J. S., & Sanchez-Marin, G. (2015). Executive compensation and corporate governance in Spanish listed firms: a principal–principal perspective. Review of Managerial Science, 9(1), 115-140.
Barclay, M. J., & Holderness, C. G. (1989). Private benefits from control of public corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 25(2), 371-395.
Baruch, S., Andrew Karolyi, G., & Lemmon, M. L. (2007). Multimarket trading and liquidity: theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 62(5), 2169-2200.
Baruch, S., & Saar, G. (2009). Asset returns and the listing choice of firms. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2239-2274.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2), 409-433.
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Saffar, W. (2013). The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 641-658.
Cai, H., Fang, H., & Xu, L. C. (2008). Eat, Drink, Firms and Government: An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures of Chinese Firms. Available at SSRN 594961.
Chan, K., & Chan, Y. C. (2014). Price informativeness and stock return synchronicity: Evidence from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of financial economics, 114(1), 36-53.
Chan, K., Hameed, A., & Kang, W. (2013). Stock price synchronicity and liquidity.
Journal of Financial Markets, 16(3), 414-438.
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.
Chen, L., Da, Z., & Zhao, X. (2013). What drives stock price movements? Review of Financial Studies, 26(4), 841-876.
Chidambaran, N. K., & Prabhala, N. R. (2003). Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1), 153-189.
Cronqvist, H., Fahienbrach, R. (2009). Large shareholders and corporate policies, The Review of Financial Studies. 22(10):3941-3976.
Dasgupta, S., Gan, J., & Gao, N. (2010). Transparency, stock return synchronicity, and the informativeness of stock prices: Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(5), 1189-1220.
Durnev, A., & Kim, E. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1461-1493.
Durnev, A., Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (2004). Value‐enhancing capital budgeting and firm‐specific stock return variation. The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 65-105.
Durnev, A., Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zarowin, P. (2003). Does Greater Firm‐Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(5), 797-836.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The journal of political economy, 288-307.
Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2007). Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms. Journal of financial economics, 84(2), 330-357.
Fernandes, N., & Ferreira, M. A. (2008). Does international cross-listing improve the information environment. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(2), 216-244.
Fernandes, N., & Ferreira, M. A. (2009). Insider trading laws and stock price informativeness. Review of Financial Studies, 22(5), 1845-1887.
Ferreira, M. A., & Laux, P. A. (2007). Corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, and information flow. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 951-989.
Flannery, M. J., & Hankins, K. W. (2013). Estimating dynamic panel models in corporate finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 19, 1-19.
Gadhoum, Y. (1999). Potential effects of managers' entrenchment and shareholdings on competitiveness. European Journal of Operational Research, 118(2), 332-349.
Goel, A. M., & Thakor, A. V. (2008). Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2737-2784.
Guay, W. R. (1999). The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 43-71.
Gul, F. A., Kim, J. B., & Qiu, A. A. (2010). Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China. Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 425-442.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Jennings, R. H., & Mazzeo, M. A. (1991). Stock price movements around acquisition announcements and management's response. Journal of Business, 139-163.
John, K., Litov, L., & Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk‐taking. The Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1679-1728.
Kale, J. R., Reis, E., Venkateswaran, A. (2009). Rank-order tournaments and incentive alignment: The effect on firm performance, Journal of Finance, 64:1479-1512.
Kato, T., & Long, C. (2006). Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Economic development and Cultural change, 54(4), 945-983.
Kau, J. B., Linck, J. S., & Rubin, P. H. (2008). Do managers listen to the market?.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 347-362.
Kelly, P. J. (2014). Information efficiency and firm-specific return variation. The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 4(04), 1450018.
Kim, E. H., & Lu, Y. (2011). CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking.
Journal of Financial Economics, 102(2), 272-292.
Kim, J. B., & Yi, C. H. (2006). Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing status, and earnings management: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(2), 427-464.
Kim, J. B., & Shi, H. (2012). IFRS reporting, firm-specific information flows, and institutional environments: International evidence. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(3), 474-517.
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012). Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 350-376.
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. Journal of corporate Finance, 10(5), 703-728.
Laffont, J. J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. MIT press.
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. The journal of finance, 52(3), 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of financial economics, 58(1), 3-27.
Li, Z. F. (2014). Mutual monitoring and corporate governance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 45, 255-269.
Lin, B. X., & Lu, R. (2009). Managerial power, compensation gap and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese public listed companies. Global Finance Journal, 20(2), 153-164.
Liu, Y., & Mauer, D. C. (2011). Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(1), 1898.
Lo, A. W., Wong, R. M., & Firth, M. (2010). Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(2), 225-235.
Low, A. (2009). Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(3), 470-490.
Luo, J. H., Wan, D. F., & Cai, D. (2012). The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(2), 499-518.
Luo, W., Zhang, Y., & Zhu, N. (2011). Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(2), 352-370.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20, 293-315.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., Shapiro, M., & Poterba, J. M. (1990). The stock market and investment: is the market a sideshow?. Brookings papers on economic Activity, 1990(2), 157-215.
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W. (2000). The information content of stock markets:
why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements?. Journal of financial economics, 58(1), 215-260.
Naveen, L. (2006). Organizational complexity and succession planning, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41:661-683.
Piotroski, J. D., & Roulstone, D. T. (2004). The influence of analysts, institutional investors, and insiders on the incorporation of market, industry, and firm-specific information into stock prices. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 1119-1151.
Rajan, R. G., & Wulf, J. (2006). The flattening firm: Evidence from panel data on the changing nature of corporate hierarchies. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 759-773.
Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002). Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), 145-171.
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of business, 197-216.
Rubin, A., Smith, D. R. (2009). Institutional ownership volatility and dividends, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33:627-639.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging policies.
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 20(04), 391-405.
Vickers, J., & Yarrow, G. (1988). Regulation of privatised firms in Britain. European Economic Review, 32(2-3), 465-472.
Vickers, J., Yarrow, G., Walthers, S. A., Johnson, M. B., MacGregor, S. J. (1989), Privatization and State-owned Enterprise, Chapter 6, Privatization in Britain, the series of Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy issuers, pp. 209-272.
Wang, M. S. (2016). Idiosyncratic volatility, executive compensation and corporate governance: examination of the direct and moderate effects. Review of Managerial Science, 10(2), 213-244.
Wurgler, J. (2000). Financial markets and the allocation of capital. Journal of financial economics, 58(1), 187-214.
Xu, N., Li, X., Yuan, Q., & Chan, K. C. (2014). Excess perks and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, 419-434.
Yermack, D. (2006). Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 80(1), 211-242.