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研究生:簡文峯
研究生(外文):CHIEN, WEN FENG
論文名稱:所有權集中對執行長特權消費和股價同步運動關聯性之研究:以中國上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The Study of Concentrated Ownership on the Relationship between CEOs Perquisite and Stock Price Synchronicity:The Case of Chinese Listed Company
指導教授:王睦舜王睦舜引用關係
口試委員:林玲圓許君毅王睦舜
口試日期:2017-06-07
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:開南大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:「私有利益」「所有權集中度」「股價非同步運動」「管理者相互制衡」「執行長特權消費」
外文關鍵詞:private benefitsownership concentrationstock price synchronicitymutual monitoringexecutive perquisites
相關次數:
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本文主要在探討中國資本市場的特殊現象,也就是大多數公司是從非流通股經過股權分置改革之後轉型為流通股,但仍保有國有股的特徵,這些公司普遍存在著管理者特權消費,且這些特權消費可以視為私有利益,會很快地被反應在股價非同步運動上。當股價具有非同步運動現象時,掌握訊息的控制股東可以獲取利益,因此控制股東會鼓勵執行長減少風險趨避的行為而佔據外部股東利益以得到較高的價格非同步運動,我們研究期間在2005年到2014年。我們的實證結果發現可以更穩健地納入其他關鍵變數以解釋股價非同步運動的現象。我們建立在9,022個帶有私有利益的執行長觀測值,本文發現個股特有波動度(以R平方進行羅吉斯轉換的相關係數)在管理者相互制衡與股權集中度同時考量下,較僅考慮股權集中度時為少。如果我們將股價同步運動與執行長特權消費同時視為內生因素,運用聯立方程組的實證分析發現管理者相互制衡可以限制潛在的管理者自私牟利行為,且當所有權集中度傾向於與外部股東控股時,是可以降低股價非同步運動,可成為公司治理之最佳機制。
This paper investigates the effects of executive perquisites and CEO ownership concentration as the amount of private information on share prices and as the means to reduce the risk-aversion effect in the place of higher stock price synchronicity for Chinese-listed firms over the period from 2005-2014. In addition, the positive relation of the wealth effect to mutual monitoring is also examined. Based on data for 9,022 CEOs with private benefits (PERK), we find that there is a greater reduction in idiosyncratic volatility (estimated by taking the logit transformation of the R-square statistic) when both mutual monitoring and ownership concentration are present than if only ownership concentration exists. Both stock price synchronicity and executive perquisites are treated as endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations approach. We find that mutual monitoring can constrain potentially self-servicing behavior and substitute for other governance mechanisms in case of concentrated ownership with the inclination to offer perquisites for CEO compensation.
目次
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究流程
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 執行長特權消費與股價非同步運動是共同決定的
第二節 動態因子模型與資訊對股價的關係
第三節 相互監督在股價同步運動的調節作用
第四節 特權消費和公司特有波動
第三章 研究設計
第一節 假說形成
第二節 操作性定義
第四章 實證結果分析與建議
第一節 描述性統計
第二節 特權消費和公司特有波動度
第三節 從動態因子探討特權消費與公司特有波動度的關係
第四節 公司特有波動度與特權消費之間的調和效果
第五節 穩健性測試
第五章 結論與建議
參考文獻
附錄


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