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研究生:林玉婷
研究生(外文):LIN, YU–TING
論文名稱:薪酬差距與公司價值關係之研究─兼論公司治理的調節效果
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Compensation Gap on Corporate Value:The Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance
指導教授:沈文華沈文華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shen,Wen–Hua
口試委員:方俊儒、林宗輝
口試委員(外文):Fang,Chun-Ju、Lin,Tzong-Huei
口試日期:2017-06-30
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄應用科技大學
系所名稱:會計系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:61
中文關鍵詞:薪酬差距公司治理公司價值
外文關鍵詞:Compensation Gap、Corporate Governance、Corporate Value
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:218
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:36
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本研究以2005年至2015年台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本,探討薪酬差距與公司價值之間的關係,並檢驗公司治理機制對薪酬差距與公司價值之間的關係是否具有調節效果。實證結果顯示:(1)薪酬差距與公司價值具有非線性關係,雖然增額解釋力較為薄弱,但仍達顯著水準。(2)公司治理機制對公司價值具有正向影響,顯示公司治理較佳之公司,其公司價值較高。(3)加入公司治理作為調節變數後,薪酬差距與公司價值呈顯著正相關,表示當公司治理機制較佳,會更強化薪酬差距與公司價值之間的關係。

The study examines the relationship between compensation gap and corporate value from 2005 to 2015 for public companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange or Taipei Exchange, and explores whether the relationship is moderated by corporate governance mechanism. The empirical results show that: (1) there exists a nonlinear relationship between compensation gap and corporate value, although the increase in the adjusted coefficient of multiple correlation is tiny. (2) Corporate governance mechanism has a significant impact on corporate value. It means that a company with a better corporate governance indicator will enjoy a higher corporate value than those with a worse indicator. Finally, (3) After incorporating corporate governance mechanism as a moderating variable into the first order model, the relationship between compensation gap and corporate value will be reinforced significantly, indicating that a better corporate governance mechanism will enhance the relationship above.
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
誌 謝 III
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討及假說發展7
第一節 經理人薪酬7
第二節 薪酬差距與公司價值8
第三節 公司治理與公司價值11
第四節 公司治理、薪酬差距與公司價值13
第三章 研究方法 16
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源16
第二節 實證模型 18
第三節 研究變數定義20
第四章 實證結果與分析25
第一節 敘述性統計25
第二節 相關性分析27
第三節 迴歸分析 29
第四節 敏感性分析40
第五章 結論與建議46
第一節 研究結論 46
第二節 研究限制與建議47
參考文獻 48

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