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研究生:蔡尚育
研究生(外文):CAI,SHANG-YU
論文名稱:薪酬差距與應計項目盈餘管理關係之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Study of Compensation Gap on Accrual-Based Earnings Management
指導教授:沈文華沈文華引用關係
指導教授(外文):SHEN,WEN,HUA
口試委員:林宗輝方俊儒
口試委員(外文):LIN,TZONG-HUEIFANG,CHUN-JU
口試日期:2017-06-30
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄應用科技大學
系所名稱:會計系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:薪酬差距公司績效盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:Compensation gapCorporate performanceEarnings management
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:131
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
本研究以2005年至2015年台灣上市上櫃公司為研究樣本,目的在於檢驗薪酬差距與公司績效之關係,並探討薪酬差距與盈餘管理之關聯性。實證結果發現,薪酬差距與公司績效之間存在非線性關係,而薪酬差距與盈餘管理之間具有正向關係,顯示當薪酬差距愈大時,高階經理人為了維持自己的利益,會利用向上調整應計項目的手段來進行盈餘管理。
The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between compensation gap and corporate performance, and explore the association between compensation gap and accrual-based earnings management for public companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange or Taipei Exchange from 2005 to 2015. The empirical results show that there exists a quadratic nonlinear relationship between compensation gap and corporate performance. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the compensation gap between top managers and general employees has a positive association with the magnitude of discretionary accruals-based earnings management, which implies that top managers in companies with greater compensation gap are more likely to exploit discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings upward for the sake of their own interests.
摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
致謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展 5
第一節 代理理論 5
第二節 薪酬差距 7
第三節 盈餘管理與薪酬差距 10
第三章 研究方法 12
一. 資料來源與樣本選取 12
二. 實證模型與變數定義 14
三. 變數衡量方式 16
第四章 實證結果與分析 19
一. 樣本與敘述性統計分析 19
二. 相關性分析 19
三. 實證結果與分析 23
四. 敏感性分析 28
五. 額外測試 30
第五章 結論與建議 37
第一節 研究結論 37
第二節 研究限制 38
第三節 未來研究建議 38
參考文獻 40
一.中文部分 40
二.英文部分 41


參考文獻
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