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研究生:林淑娟
研究生(外文):LIN,SHU-CHUAN
論文名稱:公司治理機制對超額捐贈影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Corporate Governance on Excessive Donation
指導教授:李合龍李合龍引用關係
口試委員:謝宛庭黃鈺娟羅正忠
口試日期:2017-06-03
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄應用科技大學
系所名稱:會計系碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:46
中文關鍵詞:超額捐贈
外文關鍵詞:Excessive Donation
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近年來國際產業景氣變化迅速,國內產業也產業轉型過程中,企圖以成本降低作為追求獲利最大化因應策略,以犠牲社會環境外部成本,扭曲資源經營方式也帶來許多食安、環安、勞安及貧富不均族群對立的社會問題。這些問題讓國人開始對企業經營產生新的醒思,並期許企業在追求企業利益和社會責任之履行間取一平衡點,創造雙贏經濟。在2015年12月巴黎氣候協議正式簽署時,台灣企業CSR的挑戰已經責無旁貸,只有該如何做好的問題,企業必須確實履行CSR才能邁向永續,才能為大眾所接受。
企業捐贈是CSR的要項之一,企業受限於有限資源,須追求有效率有效果的營運,故其捐贈動機與目的除取得稅務利益外,不外揚善或隱惡。 而目前國內法令對公司捐贈決策僅採建議性,而未採性強制性規定, 採尊重企業內部治理程序及授權機制,企業捐贈之核准與否,原則上由董事會決定,亦可授權管理階層執行,造成捐贈的目的、對象及內涵較易受有心人左右,損及小股東利益。 且目前台灣大部份企業捐贈給由公司或其關係人成立基金會或學校,企業對這些捐贈資源仍具有支配權或影響力,倘若對基金會或學校運作資訊不對稱也不透明,難免令人對捐款運用產生疑慮。
在現行公司權力結構中,股東會選出董事會對經營負責,而董事會進用及監督管理階層,以董事會為經營決策單位,對公司捐贈決策有決定性關鍵。 故本文研究的重點,係以公司治理之角度,推估各企業的合理捐贈數額,計算出超額捐贈數額,並將公司治理中董事會規模及功能和股權結構等,分別探討公司治理是否對超額捐贈產生影響及影響情形,並分析其與公司治理關聯性,同時探討有關理論及實務現況。 實證分析結果顯示,捐贈受當年是否有賑災需求及行業景氣所影響。 超額捐贈與大股東持股比率呈負相關,表示大股東持股比率愈高之公司超額捐贈愈少,推估當大股東對企業捐贈決策控制力大,產生超額捐贈機會較小。 超額捐贈與獨立董監事人數及營業淨利呈正相關,可能因企業捐贈決策之內部核准程序,非證依交法所明定董事會必要審核事項,故獨立董監事人數影響力較小; 企業營業淨利愈高表示企業本業獲利高,需取得較多稅遁,並具較多資源可投入捐贈活動。 研究結果說明公司治理對超額捐贈之影響及影響情形並提出具理論涵及價值。
關鍵字: 公司治理、企業社會責任(CSR) 、超額捐贈及基金會

In recent years, global economics have been changing rapidly, compelling corporations in Taiwan to use cost reduction to maximize gains as the country undergoes industrial transformation. Industrial transformation is often achieved at the expense of society (external cost) and distorted operations have yielded many social problems, particularly in relation to food safety, environmental protection, occupational safety, wealth inequality, and social conflict. Such problems have compelled the public to reflect on the conduct of corporations in the hope that corporations will adopt appropriate policies to achieve a balance between profit and social responsibility. After the Paris Agreement officially came into effect in December 2015, corporations in Taiwan could no longer shirk their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and could only fulfill their CSR for a sustainable environment to win public acknowledgement.
Corporate donations are considered a key element of CSR. Bound by limited available resources, corporations must develop effective and efficient modes of operation. Therefore, the motives behind and purposes of corporate donations are usually to win praise or compensate for faults. In Taiwan, codes and regulations on corporate donations are advisory rather than mandatory. Essentially, corporate governance and authorization mechanisms are respected and whether to donate is determined by the board of directors or authorized management. However, a downside of such a practice is that decisions regarding the purpose, receiver, and contents of a donation can easily be manipulated by interested parties at the expense of minority shareholders. Presently, most corporations in Taiwan donate to affiliated foundations or schools and retain substantial control or influence over the donated resources. If the operations of such foundations or schools are characterized by information asymmetry and nontransparency, concerns over the proper use of donations are inevitable.
In the prevailing corporate power structure, shareholders elect a board of directors to take charge of managing the enterprise. As a decision-making unit, the board of directors and managers they hire and preside over play a decisive role in determining a corporation’s donation policy. Therefore, the present study investigated various corporations and estimated suitable donation amounts from the perspective of corporate governance. The estimations were used to determine whether any donations had been excessive. Subsequently, this study investigated the sizes and functions of the boards of directors in the investigated corporations and the corporations’ shareholding structures to determine whether managers played any part in determining excessive donations and how far their influence reached. Subsequently, this was used as a basis to discuss the relationship between corporate donations and corporate governance and compare theories and practices. The empirical evidence indicates that corporate donations were influenced by the demand for disaster relief and the economic situation. In addition, excessive donations were negatively correlated with the shareholding ratio of major shareholders, suggesting that corporations with major shareholders who owned a high percentage of outstanding shares would be less inclined to make excessive donations. The reason for this could be that major shareholders have stronger control over their corporations, which reduces the likelihood of excessive donations being made. By contrast, excessive donations were positively correlated with the number of independent directors and net operating income, likely because the internal approval procedures for corporate donations were not included in the responsibilities of the board of directors stipulated in the Securities and Exchange Act, hence the weaker influence of individual independent directors. Furthermore, corporations with higher net operating incomes are in greater need of tax shields, hence the excessive donations. In addition, a higher income denotes more available resources for donations. These findings illustrate the influence of corporate governance on excessive corporate donations and related theoretical implications.
Keywords: corporate governance、, corporate social responsibility (CSR) 、excessive donation and foundations

目錄
壹、 緒論 7
一、 研究背景與動機 7
二、 研究目的及假設 9
三、 研究流程 9
貳、 文獻探討及法令規定 10
一、 公司治理及台灣現況 10
二、 董事會與股權結構 16
三、 企業社會責任與捐贈 20
參、 研究方法 23
一、 資料來源與範圍 23
二、 解釋變數 23
三、 獨立變數 (公司治理之變數) 23
四、 控制變數 25
五、 實證模型 27
肆、 實證結果與分析 30
一、 敘述統計量 30
二、 相關係數 35
三、 迴歸分析 38
伍、 結論與建議 42
一、 結論 42
二、 建議 42
三、 研究限制 43
陸、 參考文獻 44
一、 中文參考文獻 44


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