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研究生:張詠勛
研究生(外文):Yung-Hsun Chang
論文名稱:機率銷售與綑綁銷售之比較
論文名稱(外文):Comparison of Probability Selling and Product Bundling
指導教授:蕭櫓蕭櫓引用關係
指導教授(外文):Lu Hsiao
口試委員:喬友慶涂宏任
口試日期:2017-06-12
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:107
中文關鍵詞:機率銷售綑綁銷售差別取價賽局理論
外文關鍵詞:Probability SellingProduct BundlingPrice discriminationGame theory
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:258
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
機率銷售與綑綁銷售是市場上須多廠商會運用的銷售策略,機率銷售舉凡福袋、扭蛋、到旅行業的秘密訂房制度,都是其機率銷售策略的運用。綑綁銷售的運用在日常也是隨處可見,舉凡博客來網路書店的A+B書的折扣優惠,加價購等都是綑綁銷售的應用。經由文獻,我們可以發現機率銷售與綑綁銷售其背後能讓廠商獲利的原理有許多相似之處,而到底哪種策略可以帶給廠商更多的利潤呢?這問題引起了我們研究的興趣。
本研究運用Hotelling Line模型,考量產品的定位、價格、差異性、消費者的屬性、及產品對消費者的效用,去計算在不同情形下廠商使用傳統策略、機率銷售策略及綑綁銷售策略其最適定價、利潤、與限制,並從而去比較在不同情形下廠商該使用何種策略可以帶給其最大效用。
本研究結果發現,當兩種產品對於消費者來說是負相關時,全部市場上的消費者只要該產品對其有非負效用就願意購買的情境下,廠商使用綑綁銷售策略可以帶給其最大效用;當產品對於消費者來說是正相關時,消費者對於該產品對其有非負效用就願意購買的情境下,傳統銷售帶給廠商的利益與機率銷售策略、綑綁銷售策略相同,最後當市場上同時存在只願意消費一個產品的消費者與只要該產品對其有非負效用就願意購買的消費者,當只願意消費一個產品的消費者其比例很高,則機率銷售可以帶給廠商最多獲利。
Probability Selling and Product Bundling are the sales strategy that many vendors used on the market. Probability Selling have many examples. Luck bag, gashapon and Secret reservation in tourism industry are cases of probability selling. Examples of product bundling are common in the life. A + B discounts in bookstore which is on the internet and additional purchase discount are application of product bundling. According to the literature, we can find the theory between Probability Selling and Product Bundling of the methods of manufacturers increasing profits are similar. Which one can bring more profits for manufacturers ? That’s why we start this study.
This study uses model of Hotelling Line. We consider some factor such as position, price, product differences and utility of customer. We compare price, profit, and limit of traditional sales, Probability Selling and Product Bundling with different cases. And find the answer which one can make more profit for manufacturers.
We find three research results. First, when two products with negative correlation and customer willing to buy product which have non-negative utility, the utility of Product Bundling is best for manufacturers. Second, when two products with positive correlation and customer willing to buy product which have non-negative utility for customer. Traditional sales, Probability Selling and Product Bundling have the same profit.Finally, when customers only buy one product and willing to buy the products which with non-negative utility exist at the same time in the market, if the percentage of customers which only buy one is high , Probability Selling utility could bring better profits to manufacturers.
目次
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究問題 3
第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 機率銷售 4
第二節 綑綁銷售 6
第三節 賽局理論 8
第三章 模型假設 11
第四章 均衡分析 13
第一節 傳統銷售策略(TS) 13
第二節 機率銷售策略(PS) 16
第三節 機率銷售之最適定價 22
第四節 綑綁銷售策略(Bn) 25
第五節 綑綁策略之最適定價 29
第六節 機率銷售策略與綑綁銷售策略比較 30
第五章 延伸研究 33
第一節 模型假設(一) 33
第二節 均衡分析(一) 34
第三節 模型假設(二) 38
第四節 均衡分析(二) 40
第六章 結論與未來研究方向 59
第一節 結論與貢獻 59
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 60
參考書目 61
附錄一 基本模型機率銷售個別情境推導 65
附錄二 基本模型機率銷售利潤及限制式推導 71
附錄三 基本模型綑綁銷售各式情境最適定價推導 74
附錄四 延伸模型一各式情境最適定價推導 78
附錄五 延伸模型二傳統銷售各式情境最適定價推導 89
附錄六 延伸模型二機率銷售各式情境最適定價推導 92
附錄六 延伸模型二機率銷售最適定價 99
附錄七 延伸模型二綑綁銷售各式情境最適定價推導 101
附錄八 延伸模型二綑綁銷售最適定價 105
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