臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究探討當企業具有政治關係時，是否會對債務契約條件產生影響，並進一步Hofstede所提出之六項國家文化尺度瞭解在不同文化差異下對前述之關係有何影響。而本篇具有政治關係之企業的定義方法乃參考目前研究最為普遍使用Faccio（2006）之定義方法，若企業至少有一位大股東（直接或間接控制表決權至少10%）或董事曾經擔任過政府國家元首、部會首長、國會議員或和政黨有密切關係之政治人物，稱為具有政治關係，以此作為公司政治關係之代理變數。本研究以1996年至2015年全球上市公司作為主要研究對象，實證結果指出具有政治關係之公司對債務契約條件不具顯著影響，其理由有可能係樣本數過少因而不支持假說一所推論；但在加入Hofstede六項國家文化尺度指標後，結果可說明在不同的文化差異下，具有政治關係之企業，對債務契約條件之訂定具有影響。

This study examines whether there will be an impact on the terms of the debt contract when the firm has a political relationship and what are the influences on the aforementioned relationship after understanding the different cultural discrepancies learning from the six national cultural scales proposed by Hofstede. The definition of the enterprise with political relationship is based on the most commonly used method of Faccio (2006). If the enterprise has at least one major shareholder (direct or indirect control at least 10% of the voting rights) or the director has served as the head of nation, the head of the ministry, the member of the congress, or the politician who is closely related to the political party, the enterprise is defined as having political relation, serving as a proxy variable for the political relationship of the company. The main research object of this study is the global public companies from 1996 to 2015. The empirical results show that the companies with political relations have no significant influence on the debt contract conditions. The reason may be overgeneralization that the number of samples is too small to support the hypothesis. However, after joining Hofstede's six national cultural scales, the results suggest that companies with political relationships under different cultural discrepancies have an impact on the terms of the debt contract.

第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景、動機與目的 1
第二節、實證結果 2
第三節、研究貢獻 3
第二章、相關文獻探討 4
第一節、政治關係 4
第二節、債務契約 5
第三節、文化 7
第三章、假說建立 8
第一節、政治關係與債務契約條件 8
第二節、文化差異下政治關係與債務契約條件 10
第四章、實證模型、變數定義及資料來源 13
第一節、變數定義 13
第二節、實證模型 16
第三節、資料來源 18
第五章、實證結果 19
第一節、敘述性統計分析 19
第二節、實證結果與分析 21
第六章、結論與建議 24
第一節、結論 24
第二節、限制與後續研究建議 25
參考文獻 26

中文參考文獻
林宛瑩、許崇源、戚務君與陳宜伶，2009，企業治理與信用風險，台大管理論叢，第19卷第2期：71-98。
姚維仁、金成隆與王肇蘭，2016，銀行債務契約訂定與財稅差異之關聯性，會計評論（未出刊但已被接受）。
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