本文旨在研究CEO薪酬敏感性和內部負債是否會影響企業創新。根據代理理論，經理人可能會損害股東的財富，以最大化自身的利益。根據先前的文獻記載，CEO的薪酬計劃是解決代理問題的方法。然而，不同的CEO薪酬計劃將導致CEO們有不同的風險偏好。我們試圖證明，CEO有較高的薪酬敏感度將會導致CEO採取高風險項目，我們稱內部研發。換句話說，給予CEO更多的內部負債將導致CEO避免投資風險項目。我們調查2006 - 2015年度的S&P 500間企業。我們發現，如果企業的CEO薪酬敏感度很高，他們願意從創新活動中採取下行風險。 此外，在外部專利收購方面，對於CEO內部負債有比較小的風險投資項目。 本文試圖對文獻作出貢獻，為債權和股權兩者之間的薪酬敏感度對創新活動的影響。

This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities and inside debt affect firm innovation. According to agency theory, managers may damage shareholders’ wealth for maximizing their self-interest. Previous literatures have document that CEO compensation scheme is the way for fixing this agency problem. However, different CEO compensation schemes would lead CEOs to have different risk preferences. We try to argue that high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option would motive CEO to take high risky projects, saying in-house R&D. In other way, granting CEO more inside-debt would motive CEO to avoid risky projects, in terms of in-house R&D. By investigating S&P 500 firms from 2006-2015, we find that that if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option, they are willing to take downside risk from the innovation activities. Furthermore, firms with high CEOs’ inside debt have less risky projects, in terms of external patent acquisition. This paper tries to contribute the literatures to provide competent evidences for the influences of debt-like and equity-like compensations on innovation activities.

摘要..............................I
Abstract......................II
致謝辭.........................III
Contents ...................IV
Table Contents...........V
1. Introduction......................................1
2. Literature Review.............................9
2.1 Innovation Strategies......................9
2.2 How Do Managerial Pay-Performance Sensitivities Affect Innovation Strategies?.........................13
2.3 How Does CEOs’ Inside Debt Affect Innovation Strategies? 15
2.4 Hypothesis Development..............18
3. Data and Methodology....................21
3.1 Data and Sample Collection...........21
3.2 Methodology..................................21
3.2.1 Innovation Activities, In-House Patenting, and External Patent Acquisition...........................................21
3.2.2 CEO’s Inside Debt.......................22
3.2.3 Pay-Performance to Option and Pay-Performance to Stock 23
3.3 Models...........................................24
4. Empirical Results.............................27
4.1 Descriptive Statistics.....................27
4.2 Correlation Test.............................29
4.3 Regression Test: Examining How Inside and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivities Affect Innovation Activities......30
4.4 Multivariable Test: Examining How Firm Inside Debt and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivities Affect In-House Patenting Activities ........................................33
4.5 Multivariable Test: Examining How Firm Inside Debt and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivities Affect External Patent Acquisition Activities ...............36
4.6 Multivariable Test: Examining How Firm Inside Debt and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivities Affect External Patent Ownership Acquisition Activities.............................39
5. Conclusions.......................................42
References.............................................45

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