臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在台灣上市櫃企業中，高科技產業為68%，非高科技產業為32%，所有產業對於研究發展支出的重視程度不一，而對於高科技產業類型的企業來說研究發展投資是不可或缺的且扮演著舉足輕重的腳色，故本研究所探討之產業類型為高科技產業，而隨著科技不斷的進步，企業積極投入研發活動以增加獲利及未來發展。鑑於國內探討財務寬鬆的論文有限，且鮮少針對財務寬鬆對研究發展支出所造成的影響，因此本研究探討在台灣高科技產業下，財務寬鬆、家族企業、獨立董事與研究發展支出的關聯性。
結果證實1.企業擁有愈多的寬鬆資源，愈有本錢及信念去投資研究發展支出，進而提高企業整體經濟效益；2.具有家族色彩的企業因家庭與企業財富關係密切，對家庭成員而言有更多的激勵效果，進而把企業價值極大化從事更多的研究發展投資；3.獨立董事能帶來更多外部專業知識和資源，使公司投資領域更多元並促進管理階層從事創新研發投資。

In this study, we examine how financial slack, family ownership, corporate governance, growth opportunities, different industries and business environment, influence the investment of research and development (R&D) by a firm.
Using samples from Taiwanese listed High-tech firms from 2009 to 2015. The results indicate that financial slacks are positively associated with R&D expenditures. This paper also finds that there are the positive relationship between family ownership and investment of research and development. We also find that firms with higher levels of independent director ratio show higher the investment ratio of research and development.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 3
第三節、研究架構及流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 7
第一節、財務寬鬆對研究發展支出之影響 7
第二節、家族企業對研究發展支出的影響 8
第三節、公司治理對研究發展支出的影響 9
第三章 研究設計方法 13
第一節、研究樣本、研究期間、資料來源 13
第二節、研究變數定義 14
第三節、實證模型 17
第四章 實證結果與分析 21
第一節、敘述性統計 21
第二節、相關性分析 24
第三節、實證分析結果 26
第五章 結論 30
第一節、結論 33
第二節、政策與管理意涵 34
參考文獻 35

(一)中文文獻
許嘉珊，2015，「研發支出對現金增資發行折價之影響」，國立臺中科技大學企　　
　　　業管理系碩士論文。
(二)英文文獻
Alexander, J. A., M. L. Fennell, and M. T. Halpern. 1993. Leadership Instability in hospitals：The influence of Board-CEO relations and organizational growth and decline. Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1)：74-99.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2)：263-285.
Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance： Evidence from the s&p 500. The Journal of Finance 58 (3)：1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb. 2004. Board composition： Balancing family influence in s&p 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 49 (2)：209-237.
Arregle, J.-L., M. A. Hitt, D. G. Sirmon, and P. Very. 2007. The development of organizational social capital：Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies 44 (1)：73-95.
Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman, and S.-H. Kang. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21 (3)：297-318.
Barker Iii, V. L., and G. C. Mueller. 2002. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. Management Science 48 (6)：782-801.
Baysinger, B. D., R. D. Kosnik, and T. A. Turk. 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management Journal 34 (1)：205-214.
Beiner, S., W. Drobetz, F. Schmid, and H. Zimmermann. 2004. Is board size an independent corporate governance mechanism? Kyklos 57 (3)：327-356.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1)：157-176.
Cleary, S. 1999. The relationship between firm investment and financial status. The Journal of Finance 54 (2)：673-692.
Cyert, R. M. a. M., James G. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm.
Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, J. L. Johnson, and A. E. Ellstrand. 1999. Number of directors and financial performance： A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal 42 (6)：674-686.
Dalton, D. R., M. A. Hitt, S. T. Certo, and C. M. Dalton. 2007. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation. The Academy of Management Annals 1 (1)：1-64.
Dalton, D. R., and I. F. Kesner. 1987. Composition and ceo duality in boards of directors：An international perspective. Journal of International Business Studies 18 (3)：33-42.
Damanpour, F. 1987. The adoption of technological, administrative, and ancillary innovations：Impact of organizational factors. Journal of Management 13 (4)：675.
Damanpour, F. 1991. Organizational innovation： A meta-analysis of effects of determinants and moderators. Academy of Management Journal 34 (3)：555-590.
El-Faitouri, R. 2014. Board of directors and tobins q：Evidence from U.K.firms. Journal of Finance and Accounting 2 (4)：82-99.
Ellstrand, A. E., L. Tihanyi, and J. L. Johnson. 2002. Board structure and international political risk. Academy of Management Journal 45 (4)：769-777.
Gaver, J. J., and K. M. Gaver. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1-2-3)：125-160.
George, G. 2005. Slack resources and the performance of privately held firms. Academy of Management Journal 48 (4)：661-676.
Gersick, K., J. A. Davis, M. M. Hampton, and I. Lansberg.1997. Generation to generation： Life cycles of the family business.
Ghosh, A., D. Moon, and K. Tandon. 2007. CEO ownership and discretionary investments. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 34 (5/6)：819-839.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48 (3)：831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm： Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4)：305-360.
Khanna, T., and K. Palepu. 1997. Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets. Harvard Business Review 75 (4)：41-51.
Lee, P. M., and H. M. O'Neill. 2003. Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. And japanese firms：Agency and stewardship perspectives. Academy of Management Journal 46 (2)：212-225.
Mahmood, I. P., and W. Mitchell. 2004. Two faces： Effects of business groups on innovation in emerging economies. Management Science 50 (10)：1348-13651.
Manso, G. 2011. Motivating innovation. Journal of Finance 66 (5)：1823-1860.
McGuire, J., S. Dow, and K. Argheyd. 2003. CEO incentives and corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics 45 (4)：341-359.
Nam, J., R. E. Ottoo, and J. H. Thornton, Jr. 2003. The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk on corporate capital structure and R&D investment. Financial Review 38 (1)：77-101.
Nohria, N., and R. Gulati. 1996. Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of Management Journal 39 (5)：1245-1264.
Reitz, H. J. 1979. The external control of organizations：A resource dependence perspective. Academy of Management Review 4 (2)：309-310.
Skinner, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice：Preliminary evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (4)：407-445.
Weidenbaum, M., and M. Jensen. 1992. Modern corporations and private property. Society 30 (1)：101-106.
Westphal, J. D. 1998. Board games：How CEOs adapt to increases in structural board independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (3)：511-537.
Westphal, J. D., M.-D. L. Seidel, and K. J. Stewart. 2001. Second-order imitation：Uncovering latent effects of board network ties. Administrative Science Quarterly 46 (4)：717-747.
Zouari Ghazi, Z.-H. R. 2015. Directors' board, R&D investment and firm's performance：
Evidence from france. Corporate Board： Role, Duties & Composition.