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研究生:林宥君
研究生(外文):LIN, YU-CHUN
論文名稱:高階經理人的權力與政府監督對銀行股利之證實分析
論文名稱(外文):The Influences of CEO Power and Government Supervision on Bank Dividends
指導教授:陳昇鴻陳昇鴻引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHEN, SHENG-HUNG
口試委員:盧永祥廖永熙
口試委員(外文):LU, YONG-XIANGLIAU, YUNG-SHI
口試日期:2017-05-22
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:南華大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系財務管理碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:28
中文關鍵詞:銀行股利高階經理人權力政府監督
外文關鍵詞:Bank DividendCEO PowerGovernment Supervision
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:189
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:3
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
  過去文獻指出強化銀行股利發放的機制,可有效地降低銀行高階經理人(CEO)將內部資金挹注在非極大化公司價值的投資方案上,因此做法可被視為是一種保護股東所採行的措施,也會提高外部投資人對CEO行為監督與審視。有鑑於此,本研究使用1997年到2016年之台灣地區銀行業年資料,實證探討高階經理人的權力與政府監督對銀行股利的影響。實證結果指出當高階經理人持股比率與資產成長率愈高時,則會顯著地降低銀行的現金股利率,但是董事長兼任高階經理人與國內政府持股比率愈高,則對銀行發放現金股利不具統計上的顯著性。其次,當國內政府持股比率愈高,則會顯著提升銀行的股票股利的發放率,然而此時高階經理人持股比率和董事長兼任高階經理人對股票股利的發放不具統計的顯著性。
  Previous studies indicate stronger mechanism on bank dividend policy would significantly mitigate bank CEO to inject internal resources into the non-maximum investment of corporate valuation whereas serving as the measure for protecting the shareholder's right. Based on this view, using annual data on Taiwanese commercial banks over 1997-2016, this paper empirically investigating the impacts of CEO power and government supervision on bank dividend. Our empirical results show that banks with higher CEO ownership and ROA growth significantly reduce the cash dividend ratio while there is insignificant relationship between board of director as CEO and government ownership and cash dividend ratio. Moreover, banks with higher government ownership significantly increase the stock dividend ratio, while there is insignificant relationship between board of director as CEO and CEO ownership and stock dividend ratio.
中文摘要ⅰ
英文摘要ii
目錄iii
表目錄iv
圖目錄v

第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究動機1
第二節 研究目的4
第二章 文獻回顧5
第一節 股利政策於高階經理的影響5
第二節 銀行業的股利政策6
第三節 政府監督的影響8
第三章 資料來源與實證模型10
第一節 資料來源10
第二節 實證模型11
第四章 實證結果分析12
第一節 基本趨勢分析12
第二節 整體股利發放的影響14
第三節 不同形式股利發放的影響14
第五章 結論20
參考文獻21

附錄26
附錄1個別銀行經理人持股比率的時間趨勢變化26
附錄2個別銀行政府持股比率的時間趨勢變化圖27
附錄3個別銀行董監席次的時間趨勢變化圖28

表目錄
表1敘述統計表15
表2總股利發放比率之估計結果16
表3現金股利之估計結果17
表4股票股利之估計結果18
表5股票公積股利之估計結果19

圖目錄
圖1不同股利發放類型的時間趨勢圖12
圖2銀行總股利與經理人持股比率的對應關係圖13
圖3銀行總股利與本國政府機構持股比率的對應關係圖13
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