臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要是分析家族企業與非家族企業之公司績效與風險關聯性，採用台灣經濟新報（TEJ）資料庫排除金融產業，分析期間為2000年至2015年，共16年。本文用聯立方程式作為主要之分析方法，以股價報酬率為公司績效指標，以股價報酬率之波動為公司風險指標。實證研究發現，全體樣本中，公司風險越高，公司績效表現較差；而在家族企業中，公司績效與公司風險為負相關，即謂當公司風險越高時，對應較差的公司績效，而當公司績效越好時，公司承擔較低之風險；在非家族企業中，僅呈現公司風險越高時，公司績效有越差的表現。
此外，在家族企業中，對公司績效有負面影響之因素有；法人持股比率、獨立董事比率與有設置審計委員會。此外，可降低公司承擔風險的因素為：法人持股比率、獨立董事比率與有設置審計委員會。
相對的，在非家族企業中，董事持股比率越高、獨立董事越多，或企業有設置審計委員會，反而會有較差的公司績效表現。此外，當獨立董事比率越高，或企業有設置審計委員會，會使公司所承擔的風險較低。

This study examines the association between performance and risk in family and non-family controlled firms. Our evidence is based on a sample of non-financial firms in Taiwan from the financial statements data in Taiwan Economic Journal（TEJ）database over the period 2000-2015. We use the simultaneous equations model. The empirical results show that (1) in whole sample, the higher corporate performance, the lower firm risk; (2) in family controlled firms, there is a significantly negative correlation between corporate performance and firm risk; and (3) in non-family controlled firms, the higher corporate performance, the lower firm risk.
In addition, in family controlled firms, the independent variables such as institutional investor ownership, independent directors, and with audit committee are significantly negative related to corporate performance. By contrast, the independent variables such as institutional investor ownership, independent directors, and with audit committee are significantly negative related to firm risk.
In non-family controlled firms, director shareholding, independent directors, and with audit committee have a significantly negative correlation with corporate performance. By contrast, independent directors and with audit committee have a significantly negative correlation with firm risk.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 v
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景 1
第二節　研究目的 3
第三節　研究流程 3
第二章　文獻回顧 5
第一節　公司績效 5
第二節　公司風險 11
第三節　家族企業 14
第三章　研究方法 27
第一節　資料來源 27
第二節　變數定義 27
第三節　研究方法與實證模型 34
第四章　實證結果與分析 39
第一節　敘述性統計 39
第二節　Pearson相關係數 46
第三節　公司績效與風險間之實證結果 50
第五章　結論與建議 66
第一節　結論 66
第二節　建議 67
參考文獻 69
附錄 74

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