臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文延伸Rubinstein (1982)無限次數交互提案完全信息動態議價賽局，在模型中加入了兩種玩家特性，忌妒及優越感這一類相對的特性及惡意延遲議價特性，探討在提案者順序不同時，以及雙方特性強弱程度不同時，帶給自身以及對手議價協定的影響，根據我們交互分析的研究指出，當玩家B(忌妒與優越感)及玩家M(惡意延遲議價)的特性越強時，他們反而喜歡當第二個提案者，先行者優勢將不再。接著探討雙邊忌妒與優越感特性，根據我們交互分析的研究指出，雙方都希望能夠成為第一個提案者，先行者優勢還是存在此案例中，各自的忌妒及優越感越深，對議價協定越有利。

This paper extends from Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining games. We put two traits into the model. First is the two relative nature of envy and superiority and the rest of which is the malicious delay in bargaining. This paper discusses about the influence of the different order of players and the strength of the two sides’ traits on the agreement. According to our interactive study, we found that when the traits of player M and player B became stronger, they both preferred to be the second proposer. Then based on our interactions, we analyze the traits of bilateral envy and superiority and we found that both sides wanted to be the first proposer, and the deeper the envy and superiority, the better the bargaining agreement. Also first mover advantage exists in this case.

論文審定書 i
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構與方法 2
第三節 文獻回顧 3
第二章 理論模型 6
第一節 模型假設 6
第二節 Case I議價模型之個案討論 7
第三節 B、m及δ的大小對Case I議價協定的影響 11
第四節 Case II議價模型之個案討論 15
第五節 B、m及δ的大小對Case II議價協定的影響 17
第六節 提案者順序不同之效用分析 20
第三章 雙邊皆具有忌妒及優越感特性議價分析 23
第一節 雙邊皆具有忌妒及優越感特性議價之模型 23
第二節 提案者順序不同之效用分析 26
第三節 B1、B2及δ對議價協定的影響 27
第四章 結論 31
參考文獻 33

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