臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著極端氣候發生的頻率增加、產業用水型態的改變，導致水資源的需求日益提高，因此如何有效的分配水資源已成為近年來重視的議題。而過去由於地下水被視為一種公有財，使得用水者並沒有考慮抽取地下水所造成的外部環境成本，而使得地下水超抽所造成的地層下陷問題越來越嚴重，因此本研究希望以不同的觀點來探討用水者與環境永續的關聯和用水者之間的互動過程，以及提供地下水管理的相關政策去改善地下水超抽的問題。此研究採用行為者模式 (Agent-Based Model) 及博弈理論 (Game theory) 來模擬不同行為者之間的差異和決策過程中的互動，而此模式的行為者分為農業和工業兩大類，依照不同的行為者性格，農業總共分成九個不同的行為者，而工業則是一個單獨的使用者，這是一個對於水資源互相競爭的模擬，在用水者根據自己本身的行為特性來進行不同的抽水行為，並探討不同競爭模式對於各使用者抽水策略的影響，同時也考慮在環境永續的前提下，加入環境成本對於抽水策略的影響。最後希望透過分析不同的行為者特性及考慮環境成本的前提下，提供政府在未來地下水管理政策中不同的參考方向。

As the climate change, the demands of water user increases, how to allocate water resource efficiently become an important issue recently. In past years, groundwater is regarded as common pool resources so that water users not consider the impact of environment damage by groundwater depletion. Therefore, this research wants to discuss the interaction of water users and the relationship between sustainable development and over-pumping. The study will provide the policy of water management to alleviate the serious problem of groundwater over-pumping. In this research, an Agent-Based Model and Game theory are proposed to understand the behavior and interaction of agents. The model divides the agents into agriculture including nine agents and only one industrial agent. The purpose of model is to simulate the competition of water resource. Based on the results, we can discuss different competitions between agents and the impact of land subsidence. Finally, this research analyzes different characteristics of agents under considering the impact of land subsidence and provides insights to the government about groundwater management for future.

口試委員會審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
ABSTRACT iv
CONTENTS v
LIST OF TABLE vii
LIST OF FIGURES viii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Game theory 5
2.2 Agent-based modeling and simulation of groundwater 7
2.3 Land subsidence due to the drawdown of groundwater 8
2.4 The optimal pumping management (policy) 8
Chapter 3 Methodology 10
3.1 Modeling framework 10
3.2 Dynamic well response to pumping 11
3.3 The analytical method of groundwater withdrawal and land subsidence 13
3.4 The agents in the model 15
3.4.1 Agriculture 17
3.4.2 Industry 20
3.4.3 Environment 22
3.5 Scenarios 24
3.5.1 Current situation 25
3.5.2 Scenario 1: the agriculture agents only using the groundwater 25
3.5.3 Scenario 2: the agriculture agents using the water resource combined groundwater and surface water 25
3.5.4 Scenario 3: the policy of groundwater management 26
Chapter 4 Results and Discussions 27
4.1 Scenario 1: The agricultural agents only using the groundwater 27
4.1.1 The feature of agricultural agents 28
4.1.2 The distinct competition of agricultural agents 28
4.1.3 The impact of land subsidence 31
4.1.4 The random distributed location of homogeneous agents under different competition 34
4.1.5 The random distributed location of heterogeneous agents under different competition 37
4.2 Scenarios 2: The agricultural agents using the water resource combine groundwater and surface water 39
4.3 The policy for the groundwater management 49
Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 51
5.1 Conclusions 51
5.2 Recommendations 52
REFERENCES 53

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