臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

有鑑於臺灣低薪問題嚴重，且員工應為公司內部不容忽視之重要資產，不同於過去大多文獻主要探究公司管理階層薪酬與公司績效、公司治理間之關聯性，本研究將聚焦於員工薪酬，以2012年至2015年為樣本期間，以臺灣上市、上櫃公司為樣本公司，主要欲探討公司績效、企業社會責任與公司治理對員工薪酬之影響，並測試企業社會責任是否會提升員工薪酬敏感度，同時輔以公司績效、企業社會責任與公司治理對高階經理人及董監事薪酬所造成之影響進行對照。
本研究發現公司績效與員工薪酬存有顯著正向關係；獲得「天下公民獎」之企業，員工間接薪酬較高，但不會影響員工薪酬績效敏感度；「高薪100指數」除使公司之員工薪酬顯著較高外，市價淨值比與員工薪酬之關聯性也較強；公司治理方面，董事會規模與董監事持股與員工薪酬有正向關係，董事長兼任總經理與薪酬委員會獨立董事比例則與員工薪酬呈負面關係。

Different from previous studies that focus on issues of CEO’s and board of directors’ compensation, this study mainly investigates the effect of firm performance, corporate social responsibility and corporate governance on the compensation plans for employees, we also compare with these effect on top executives’ compensation and board of directors’ compensation.
Based on data for 1,143 observations for 2012-2015, we find that corporates with better CSR performance have positive effect on employee compensation, and strengthen employees pay-performance sensitivity. Besides, we also find that board size and board stock ownership have positive effect on employee compensation, and CEO duality and independent directors in compensation committee have negative effects on employee compensation.

致謝 i
中文摘要 ii
Abstract iii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討與假說 6
一、薪酬績效敏感度 6
二、企業社會責任與薪酬之關聯 7
三、公司治理品質與薪酬之關聯 8
四、企業社會責任與公司治理之交乘影響 12
第三章 研究設計 14
第一節 樣本選取與資料蒐集方式 14
第二節 各變數之衡量方式與定義 14
第三節 實證模型之建立 20
第四章 實證結果與分析 21
第一節 敘述性統計分析 22
第二節 相關係數分析 27
第三節 回歸模型結果分析 29
第五章 結論與建議 58
第一節 研究結論與建議 58
第二節 研究建議與限制 60
參考文獻 61
中文文獻 61
英文文獻 62

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