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研究生:陳岳鴻
研究生(外文):Yueh-Hung Chen
論文名稱:金融危機的警鐘: 市場性資訊報導策略—盈餘的觀點
論文名稱(外文):Warning bell on financial crisis: Market-wide information-reporting strategy from an earnings perspective
指導教授:劉啟群劉啟群引用關係
口試日期:2017-06-06
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:英文
論文頁數:40
中文關鍵詞:市場性資訊致股東報告書報導策略金融危機條件機率
外文關鍵詞:market-wide informationletter to shareholdersreporting strategyfinancial crisisconditional probability
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本文探討市場性資訊與個體特定資訊間的揭露行為。以標準普爾500指數金融機構的2007年致股東報告書為研究樣本,在2007年致股東報告書中,超過半數的樣本公司於2008年金融危機爆發前,揭露了與金融危機相關的市場性資訊。本文實證結果顯示闡述過去盈餘表現的個體特定資訊,與金融危機相關的市場性資訊呈現負向報導策略關係。進一步納入未來盈餘表現探討報導策略關係時,揭露金融危機相關的市場性資訊的條件機率,將隨著未來盈餘表現越差,而提高負面市場性資訊的揭露機率。本文支持致股東報告書傳遞了『警鐘』的市場性資訊。
I investigate the market-wide and firm-specific information-disclosure behavior. Using letters to shareholders from Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 Index’s financial institutions, I find more than half of the sampled managers’ letters to shareholders in 2007 disclosed crisis information, immediately prior to the 2008 crisis. This paper documents a negative reporting-strategy relationship between the firm-specific information of past positive earnings performance expression and market-wide information about the financial crisis. Further findings reveal that the managers’ conditional probability of disclosing their outlook of the imminent crisis increased with future negative earnings changes, supporting the position that the letters to shareholders conveyed market-wide information as a “warning bell” prior to the crisis.
Table of contents
口試委員會審定書………………………………………………………………………i
摘要……………………………………………………………………………………...ii
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………..….iii
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………...1
2. Background and empirical predictions…………………………………………...7
2.1 Unfavorable market-wide information and firm-specific past annual earnings performance expressions………………………………………………………….10
2.2 Warning effect: Strategic disclosure of market-wide information and expected negative earnings changes………………………………………………………..13
3. Sample selection and descriptive data…………………………………………...15
4. Empirical design and results……………………………………………………..22
4.1 Logit regression………………………………………………………………...22
4.2 Future negative earnings changes and strategic-reporting probability……….24
4.3 Individual reporting behavior………………………………………………….30
4.4 Robustness tests………………………………………………………………...32
5. Conclusions………………………………………………………………………..33
References……………………………………………………………………………..35
Appendix
Table A. Types of performance expression term (%)………………………………….38
Table B. Types of cautious market-wide information (%)……………………………..39
Table C. Variable definitions…………………………………………………………..40
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