臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去文獻多著重探討雙重股權架構對公司治理之影響，本文則以雙重股權架構與集體訴訟風險之關係為研究方向。雙重股權架構時常導致控股股東的投票權與現金權比例存在巨大差異，此差異所衍生之代理問題，可能導致雙重股權公司之控股股東傾向於在犧牲股東利益之下追求個人私利，而為了掩飾剝削股東利益的行為，雙重股權公司則可能採取行動來避免外部股東的監督，外部股東則可能需要透過集體訴訟作為事後自保的機制。本研究以過去文獻為基礎，預期雙重股權架構與集體訴訟之間呈正相關。實證結果發現，雙重股權公司之集體訴訟風險較高，此外，控股股東投票權與現金權分離程度愈高的雙重股權公司，其涉及集體訴訟之可能性也愈高。

Most prior studies focus on the impact of dual class structure on corporate governance, this study examines whether firms with dual-class structure are more likely to engage in securities class actions (SCAs). Dual-class structure often resulted in a significant separation between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and cash flow rights. This divergence aggravates agency conflicts and dual class firms thus tend to extract private benefit at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. To conceal the extraction, dual class firms may take actions to avoid monitoring of outside shareholders. Outside shareholders may need to resort to SCAs as an ex post governance mechanism. Motivated by prior literature, this study hypothesizes the relation between dual class and SCAs is positive. My empirical results show that firms with dual class structure are more likely to involve in SCAs, and the likelihood of litigation occurrence increases as the gap of the rights separation widens.

謝辭 i
Abstract iii
Contents iv
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1. Introduction 1
2. Institutional Environment 6
2.1 Background of Dual Class Structure 6
2.1.1 The Separation of Voting Rights and Cash Flow Rights 6
2.1.1.1 Non-USA 6
2.1.1.2 USA 7
2.1.2 Definition of Dual Class Structure 7
2.2 Background of Securities Class Actions in USA 9
2.2.1 Definition and Procedure of Securities Class Actions 9
2.2.2 Why are Securities Class Actions Prevailing in USA? 11
2.2.3 Importance of Securities Class Actions 12
3. Literature Review 13
3.1 Related Literature of Dual Class Structure 13
3.1.1 Characteristics of Dual Class Structure 13
3.1.1.1 Anti-takeover Provision 13
3.1.1.2 Managerial Ownership and Incentives 14
3.1.1.3 Agency and Entrenchment Problem 16
3.2 Related Literature of Securities Class Actions 19
3.2.1 Related laws of Securities Class Actions 19
3.2.2 The Causes of Securities Class Actions 20
3.2.2.1 Overinvestment and Securities Class Actions 21
3.2.2.2 Executive Compensation and Securities Class Actions 21
3.2.2.3 Earnings Management and Securities Class Actions 22
4. Hypothesis Development 24
5. Research Design and Sample Selection 27
5.1 Research Model 27
5.1.1 Model for Testing H1 27
5.1.2 Model for Testing H2 29
5.2 Sample Selection and Data Source 30
6. Empirical Results 33
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 33
6.2 Empirical Results for H1 33
6.3 Empirical Results for H2 35
7. Additional Analysis 36
7.1 Disentangling Managerial Entrenchment and Incentives 36
7.2 Empirical Results for Additional Analysis 38
8. Conclusion 39
References 41
Appendix A Variable Definition 49
Appendix B Securities Class Action Procedure in USA 51
Appendix C Examples of Securities Class Actions 54

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