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研究生:劉士傳
研究生(外文):SHIH-CHUAN LIU
論文名稱:環境保護政策對中央及地方主導意願之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of the Environmental Policy to the Federal Government and the State Government Dominant Intent
指導教授:宋玉生宋玉生引用關係
口試日期:2017-07-10
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:22
中文關鍵詞:環境聯邦制政策制度轉移政策和執法Stackelberg 調節模型NASH 均衡模型
外文關鍵詞:environmental federalismpolicy regime shiftolicy and enforcementsequential-move Stackelberg gamesimultaneous-move Nash regulation game
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:163
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
在美國環境法規歷史上,聯邦環保局的集中監管一直是規範。然而,Williams III, R.C. (2012)文中認為,美國過去都由聯邦作為主導後來變成地方主導,過去美國皆為從量管制,後來美國採用從價管制,主要的原因來自於,從指揮和控制管制轉向更加鼓勵性監管的,本文中利用中央為主導Stackelberg調節模型、NASH均衡模型中發現,無論從量與從價管制,仍然都會是聯邦來做主導。

此外,我們還將政策實施和執行成本納入我們的分析。發現聯邦和州政府的均衡政策取決於這些成本。當政策實施具有規模經濟效益時,聯邦政府將在環境監管中發揮主要作用,只有在某些狀況下聯邦政府將放棄,改由地方來作主導環境政策。
In the history of US environmental regulations, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency''s centralized regulation has been a norm.

However, Williams III, RC (2012) argues that the United States has been dominated by the federation in the past and has become a local dominance. In the past, the United States had all volume control, and then the United States adopted ad valorem control. The main reason came from the command and control to a more encouraging regulatory.

In this paper, the use of Federal Government-led sequential-move Stackelberg game model, NASH equilibrium model found that both from the amount and ad valorem control, will still be the federal to do the lead.

In addition, we incorporate policy implementation and implementation costs into our analysis. Found that the federal and state governments'' balanced policies depend on these costs.

When the implementation of the policy with economies of scale, the federal government will play a major role in environmental regulation,

Only in some cases the federal government will give up, by the local to lead the environmental policy.
目錄
誌謝 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
第一章、研究動機 1
第二章、文獻探討 3
第三章、模型設定 6
3.1污染外部性 7
3.2獨立環境監理機關 7
第四章、初步分析 10
4.1數量管制 10
4.2汙染排放價格管制 13
第五章、環境政策設定成本 18
第六章、結論 21
第七章、參考文獻 22
1.Wellisch, Dietmar, 1995. “Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments.” Journal of Urban Economics 37:290-310.
2.Oates, Wallace, 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” Journal of Economic Literature 37(3):1120-1149.
3.Wellisch, D. (2000) Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
4.Oates, W. (2001) “A Reconsideration of Environmental Fedralism,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 01-54
5.Poroski, M. (2001) “Clean air federalism: do states race to the bottom?” Public Administration Review, 61(3), 335-342
6.Oates, Wallace E., and Paul R. Portney, 2003. “The Political Economy of Environmental Policy.” In K.-G. Mäler and J. R. Vincent (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
7.Adler, Jonathan, 2005. “Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism.” New York University Environmental Law Journal 14:130-178.
8.Nordhaus W.D. (2006) “After Kyoto: alternative mechanisms to control global warming,” American Economic Review, 96(2),31-34
9.Cramton, Peter, and Steven Stoft, 2010. “Price Is a Better Climate Commitment,” The Economists'' Voice: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1, Article 3.
10.Williams Ⅲ, R.C. (2012) “Growing state-federal conflicts in environmental policy: The role of market-based regulation,” Journal of Public Economics,96,1092-1099
11.楊慧敏(2017),《中央及地方環境政策的衝突與變化-地方政府先行之循序賽局》國立臺灣大學社會科學院經濟學系在職專班碩士論文。
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