臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

為了鼓勵客戶購買更多產品，許多企業會編列預算推銷他們的產品。推銷的策略包含貿易促銷(企業對企業)及銷售促銷(企業與消費者)，在需求不確定性下本研究在製造商貿易促銷和零售商銷售促銷的考量下發展了兩個數學模型。第一個模型在製造商的貿易促銷決策給定下決定零售商的最佳訂購量及促銷努力使零售商利潤最大。第二個模型延伸了第一個模型，考慮製造商的貿易促銷決策。針對這兩個模型，本研究分別比較了三種不同的貿易促銷政策（傳統價格促銷，監視促銷，滯銷折扣），為了辨別哪個貿易促銷政策可以增加製造商及零售商的利潤。當製造商的貿易促銷決策給定時，在傳統價格促銷政策下，零售商的促銷努力、訂購量和利潤皆為最高。而當考慮製造商貿易促銷決策時，在傳統價格促銷政策下零售商的促銷努力、訂購量和利潤及製造商的利潤皆高於監視促銷政策。此外，當比較三種不同的貿易促銷政策時，研究發現批發價是影響製造商利潤的關鍵因素。本研究闡明了貿易促銷政策在供應鏈管理中的重要性。

To encourage customers to buy more products, companies always need promotional budgets for their products. Promotion includes trade promotion (B2B) and sales promotion (B2C). This research develops two models considering manufacturer trade promotion and retailer sales promotion under demand uncertainty. The objective of the first model is to determine the retailer’s optimal promotional effort and order quantity while maximizing the retailer’s profit under exogenous trade promotion. The second model extends the first model to consider the manufacturer’s endogenous trade promotion decisions. For these two models, three different trade promotion policies (off-invoice, scan-back, unsold-discount) have been compared to identify the trade promotion policy that can increase the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits. For the model with exogenous trade promotion, the retailer’s promotional effort level, order quantity and profit are the highest under the off-invoice trade promotion policy. With respect to the manufacturer’s endogenous trade promotion decisions, the retailer’s promotional effort level, order quantity, and profit, and the manufacturer’s profit are higher under the off-invoice policy than under the scan-backs policy. In addition, we find that the wholesale price is a key factor that influences a manufacturer’s profit when comparing the three different trade promotion policies. Our research sheds light on the importance of trade promotion policy in supply chain management.

摘要
ABSTRACT
致謝
LIST OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 LITERATURE
Chapter 3 EXOGENOUS TRADE PROMOTION
Chapter 4 ENDOGENOUS TRADE PROMOTION
Chapter 5 CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH

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