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研究生:沈沅億
研究生(外文):SHEN,YUAN-YI
論文名稱:金融風暴後家族企業經營者替換對公司績效的影響
論文名稱(外文):The Firm Performance of Family Firm CEO Turnover: Post-crisis Evidence
指導教授:黃一祥黃一祥引用關係王功亮王功亮引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUANG,I-HSIANGWang,David K
口試委員:黃一祥王功亮黃旭輝闕河士
口試委員(外文):HUANG,I-HSIANGWang,David KHUANG,HSU-HUEICHUEH,Horace
口試日期:2016-06-16
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:金融管理學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:家族企業經理人替換公司績效
外文關鍵詞:Family firmCEO turnoverFirm performance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:140
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:3
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
台灣的中小企業大多為家族企業,雖然家族企業在台灣的經濟來說是非常關鍵的因素,但是許多家族企業的經營權與管理權集中在少數的家族成員中,因此在家族企業中的代理問題大多是管理部門與少數股權間的利益衝突,在公司績效不佳的時候,公司通常會更換高階經理人期望改善公司的經營模式及領導方針,但是家族企業有比較特殊的性質,本篇文章主要在探討在家族企業中更換高階經理人後是否會提升公司的經營績效?本研究經由股票報酬率做為評估公司績效的樣本,用來分析在替換經理人前後的超額報酬,研究樣本為在民國99年到民國101年之間有更換過高階經理人的家族企業公司,並使用Fama-French三因子模型來評估替換前後超額報酬的狀況,實證結果發現,整體而言,經理人異動對於公司績效並沒有顯著性,而且在替換過高階經理人之後,公司績效幾乎沒有改善的情形發生。
Most Taiwan firms are run by the family. Although family businesses contribute to the Taiwan economy (due to the fact that ownership and management are concentrated on only the very few family members), agency conflict can often seen among the management and the family owners. As a result, there is a high turnover rate in the top management (i.e., CEOs), especially when the firm has unsatisfactory performance. In this study, we examine whether CEO turnover would help improve the firm performance. We use stock returns to evaluate firm performance and compute abnormal returns during the CEO turnover period. The sample includes all family firms which go through CEO turnover during the period of 2010-2012. We use the Fama-French three factor model as our model. The empirical results indicate that most CEO turnovers in the family firms would not have impact on the firm performance.
中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT II
目錄 III
圖目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機及背景 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程及架構 4
第貳章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 經理人替換與公司績效 6
第二節 家族企業與公司經營績效 8
第參章 資料來源及研究方法 12
第一節 研究資料期間與來源 12
第二節 研究方法 13
第肆章 實證結果 15
第一節 替換過高階經理人前後的平均報酬率 15
第二節 Fama-French三因子模型 17
第伍章 結論 22
參考文獻 24

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