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研究生:黃誼庭
研究生(外文):HUANG,YI-TING
論文名稱:企業社會責任與進口關稅
論文名稱(外文):Corporate Social Responsibility and Import Tariffs
指導教授:楊雅博楊雅博引用關係
指導教授(外文):YANG,YA-PO
口試委員:蔡建樹許淑媖
口試委員(外文):TSAI,CHIEN-SHUHSU,SU-YING
口試日期:2017-07-03
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:46
中文關鍵詞:差別關稅進口關稅企業社會責任
外文關鍵詞:DiscriminatoryImportTariffsCSR
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本論文建立一個三國兩廠商進口模型,討論當兩外國廠商對進口之消費者具有企業社會責任時,進口國政府的最適進口關稅政策。在模型中,兩外國廠商將其產品出口到本國市場並從事Cournot競爭,本國政府則對兩種進口商品徵收進口從量關稅。我們發現,當進口國政府對兩外國的進口廠商課徵採取差別關稅政策時,關稅的差異不僅受到成本差異的影響,而且還受到兩個出口廠商之間的CSR差異效果影響。若兩產品的替代性較大(小)時,關稅的差異與CSR水平的差異正(負)相關。因此,兩產品的替代較小時,高成本廠商將比低成本廠商承擔更高的關稅,這與Hwang & Mai(1991)的結果形成鮮明對比。此外,我們得知兩產品的替代的較大時,國內可以對較關心CSR的廠商課稅,同時補貼較不關心CSR的廠商。當進口國政府對兩外國的進口廠商課徵單一進口關稅時,若兩產品完全獨立時,則政府應對兩廠商課稅;反之,若兩產品完全替代且兩廠商的CSR程度總和大(小)於1時,則政府對其兩廠商補貼(課稅)。
This paper sets up a three country-two firm model to discuss the optimal import tariffs of the domestic country when the exporting firms taking CSR on consumer welfare. In the model, a domestic firm and a foreign firm export their heterogeneous products to the domestic country in Cournot which imposes import tariffs on the two importing goods.We find the difference of the tariff rates is affected not only by the difference of cost but also the difference of CSR level between the two exporting firms. When the two exporting goods are more (less) substitute, the difference of the tariff rates is positively (negatively) correlated with the difference of CSR level. Therefore, when the two exporting goods are less substitute, high cost firm will lord a higher tariff rate than the low cost firm, which is sharply contrast to the result of Hwang and Mai(1991). Moreover, when the two exporting goods are more substitute, the domestic country may tax the CSR firm while subsidize the non CSR firm.When the imported government imposed an uniform tariff to both foreign manufacturers, and should have tax to the both manufacturers if the two products are independent. On the other hand, under the condition that the two products are substitute , if the sum of degree of CSR to both manufacturers are larger than one, the imported government should have a subsidy to both firms. If the sum of degree of CSR to both manufacturers is smaller than one, the imported government should have a tax to both firms.
第一章 緒論.....1
第一節 研究動機與目的.....1
第二節 研究方法.....3
第三節 本文架構.....3

第二章 文獻回顧.....5
第一節 企業社會責任之相關文獻.....5
第二節 進口關稅之相關文獻.....7
第三節 小結.....8

第三章 基本模型與差別關稅政策.....10
第一節 基本模型.....10
第二節 差別關稅下的市場均衡與最適稅率.....11
第三節 差別關稅下的福利分析.....20
第四節 小結.....26

第四章 單一關稅政策.....28
第一節 單一關稅下的市場均衡與最適稅率.....28
第二節 單一關稅下的福利分析.....29
第三節 小結.....34

第五章 結論.....36

參考文獻.....38
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