本研究以2009到2015年台灣上市公司為研究樣本，探討公司治理股權結構變數與財報變數及控制變數，對(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比變化之影響。本研究從實證結果得到以下發現：其一、董監質押股比率、董事規模、董事長兼總經理、負債、電子業DM這些都與(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比呈現正向關係，代表有以上現象的公司，自肥的可能性機率很高。其二董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率、獨立董事人數、總資產週轉率、稅後淨利率、市值這些都與(總薪酬、董監事薪酬、經理人薪酬)佔淨利比呈現反向關係，代表有以上現象的公司，自肥的可能性機率較低。另外也加入董監事進修時數與出席董監事會平均次數來進一步探討是否有盡其義務來領這份薪資，惟受限於部分公司資料取得不易，故無法顯示其是否有受影響。

This study explores whether remunerations including total remuneration, directors’ remuneration, and top managers’ remuneration would be affected by the variables in terms of corporate governance, financial variables, and other controlling variables over the data period 2009-2015. By employing various remunerations over net income as our diverse remuneration variables, we derive the following finding as shown below. First, directors pledge ratio, board size, CEO duality, debt ratio, electronic dummy would have positive impacts on these remuneration variables. Second, directors’ holding ratio, managers’ holding ratio, independent directors, asset turnover ratio, net profit ratio, and firm scales are negatively related with these remuneration variables. These results revealed that the firms with ill-functioning corporate governance and inferior financial performance are inclined to have higher remunerations, indicating that these firms concerning the interest of directors and top managers instead of the interest of shareholders might not the firms with good corporate governance and superior financial performance.

目錄
中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT Ⅱ
目 錄 Ⅲ
圖目錄 Ⅴ
表目錄 Ⅵ
第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究背景與動機 1
第二節、研究目的 2
第三節、研究流程 4
第四節、研究架構 5
第二章、文獻探討 6
第一節、薪酬之相關文獻 6
第二節、公司治理之相關文獻 7
第三節、公司治理與薪酬之相關文獻 8
第三章、研究假說與方法 10
第一節、研究資料與變數 10
第二節、研究假說與模型 13
第三節、研究方法 14
第四章、實證結果 16
第一節、敘述統計量 16
第二節、多元迴歸模型 19
第三節、Petersen 迴歸模型 21
第五章、結論與建議 23
第一節、研究結論 23
第二節、研究的管理與財務意涵 24
第三節、研究限制與建議 24
參考文獻 26
圖目錄
圖1.1 研究流程圖 4
表目錄
表4-1 敘述統計量 16
表4-2 共線性VIF檢驗 18
表4-3 多元迴歸模型分析 20
表4-4 Petersen迴歸模型分析 22

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