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研究生(外文):SHIH, HSIN-YU
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Institutional Ownership on Related-party Transactions
外文關鍵詞:Institution investorRelated-party transaction (RPTs)Sales-based RPTsQualified foreign (Domestic) institutional investors
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本研究以我國上市(櫃)公司為對象,探討機構投資者持股對關係人交易的影響。本研究將機構投資者區分為境外與境內機構投資者,且採用Jian and Wong (2010)模型將銷貨基礎關係人交易區分為正常銷貨基礎關係人與異常銷貨基礎關係人交易,分別檢視不同類型機構投資者對關係人交易之影響。實證結果顯示:境外與境內兩種不同類型機構投資者持股率皆與正常銷貨基礎關係人交易呈現正向關係;在異常銷貨基礎關係人實證部分,則發現境外機構投資者的持股率與異常銷貨基礎關係人交易呈現正向關係,然境內機構投資者的持股率則與異常銷貨基礎關係人交易呈現負向關係。此實證發現顯示境內機構投資者與境外機構投資者對我國上市(櫃)公司的異常銷貨基礎關係人交易採取不同的觀點,前者(後者)對於異常銷貨基礎關係人交易有抑減(助長)效果。本研究進行若干敏感性測試,發現實證結果具備相當的穩固性。
This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and related-party transactionsusing the listed firms in Taiwan stock market.Firstly, this study examines whether different type of institutional investors, i.e., qualified foreign institutional investors and domestic institutional investors, reveal distinctive association with a firm’s related-party transactions. Secondly, this study adopts Jian and Wong’s (2010) model to estimate related-party transactions model and divides a firm’s sales-based related-party transactions into normal and abnormal related-party transactionsto further test the hypotheses.The empirical results show that both qualified foreign institutional investors’ ownership and domestic institutional investors’ ownership are positively associated with the normal sales-based related-party transactions. On the other side, qualified foreign institutional (domestic institutional) investors’ ownership is positively (negatively) associated with the abnormal sales-based related-party transactions. It is likely that qualified foreign institutional and domestic institutional investors demonstrate distinctive influences on a firm’s abnormal sales-based related-party transactions.This study demonstrates some diagnostic checks and evidences the results are robust to the various specifications.
摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第壹章、緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章、文獻探討與研究假說 6
第一節 文獻探討 6
第二節 研究假說 11
第參章、研究設計 13
第一節 資料來源、研究期間與樣本篩選 13
第二節 變數定義 15
第三節 實證模型 17
第肆章、實證結果分析 20
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析 20
第二節 實證結果 23
第伍章、敏感性測試 29
第一節 排除國際財務會計準則影響之測試 29
第二節 金融危機前後比較之測試 33
第三節 業外關係人交易之測試 38
第陸章、研究結論與限制 40
參考文獻 41

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