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研究生:洪梓菱
研究生(外文):HUNG,TZU-LING
論文名稱:以國家社會福利觀點探討課徵國際武器交易稅
論文名稱(外文):The Effect of Implementing International Arms Trade Taxes on Social Welfare
指導教授:陳盛通陳盛通引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chen,Sheng-Tung
口試委員:謝耀智黃定遠
口試委員(外文):Hsieh,Yao-ChihHuang,Ting-Yuan
口試日期:2018-06-13
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:逢甲大學
系所名稱:財稅學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:58
中文關鍵詞:武器交易稅社會福利跨國性稅制
外文關鍵詞:Arms Trade TaxSocial WelfareTransnational Tax
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國際武器交易量逐漸上升,且亞洲國家開始興起軍備戰,等等議題使得我們開始思考,該如何以稅制影響交易量,使得情勢緊張的區域趨於減緩。本文藉由Brander and Spencer(1985)提出的模型,假設武器交易市場為三個國家,分別有著一個進口國以及兩個出口國,且出口國販售至進口國的武器商品具有同質性,透過計算三方國家社會福利的變化,評估武器交易稅的課徵是否有實施的可能以及分析課徵前後進出口國社會福利之變化。
本文研究發現,進口國的社會福利變化如同原先預期的,具有先增而後下降的趨勢,該結果與Brander and Spencer(1984)提出進口國能利用進口關稅來獲取出口國的在該國所賺得的利潤的結論相同;反觀兩個出口國國家,其社會福利的變化僅是隨著稅率的調漲而上升 ,且當進口國僅對最大出口國課稅時,兩個出口國家皆為社會福利最大值,但若僅針對第二大出口國課稅時,則不會發生此種情況。
儘管本研究結果顯示武器交易稅課徵的可行性較低,但其受限於武器交易假設中市場僅有三方國家。目前全球的武器出口領頭羊—美國、俄羅斯,武器製造成本較低,對該國的社會福利而言更是一項加項,若將出口國對全球交易情況加總,其社會福利的數值可能遠遠超乎研究結果,因此關於課徵武器交易稅的議題,仍待各界深入研究。

The volume of international arms trade has gradually increased, as Asian countries have arouse an arms race. As a result, we began to think about how to limit the trade with the arms taxes, so that some country can reduce the tension. In this paper, the model proposed by Brander and Spencer (1985) who assumes that the market of arms is divided into three countries, one importer and two exporters, moreover, the products sold by the exporter are highly homogeneous. Through computing the welfare change in three countries, estimate whether the tax is possible to conduct and analyze the variety of welfare in three countries after levying the arms tax.
This study observed that the social welfare of the importing country changed as our expectation, with a trend of increasing first and then decreasing. This result correspond to the conclusion that Brander and Spencer (1984) suggested, the importing country can use the import tariff to obtain the export country’s earned in the country. In contrast, the changes in social welfare of the two exporters are only rising with the increase in the tax rate, and when the importer only taxes the largest exporter, the two exports has the maximum value of social welfare, but this will not happen if the second largest exporter country is only taxed.
Although the results of this study show that the feasibility of arms transaction tax levy is low, it is constrained by the arms trading hypothesis that there are only three countries in the market. The current weapons export leaders—the United States and Russia—have lower weapons manufacturing costs and are a major addition to the country’s social welfare. If the exporting countries aggregate global transactions, their social welfare values may be far beyond the results of the research. Therefore, the issues concerning the arms tax transaction tax are still to be studied in depth.


第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究流程及架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 全球性稅收 5
第二節 國際武器貿易 8
第三節 策略性貿易政策 18
第三章 基本模型設定 22
第四章 資料來源與變數分析 28
第一節 資料來源說明 28
第二節 假設模型推演 30
第三節 小結 44
第五章 結論與建議 46


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