本研究透過兩個平台探究關聯方交易的效果：會計師審計意見以及投資現金流量敏感度。探討審計意見是基於過去研究提及關聯方交易成為控制股東從事資產掏空(e.g. Jiang, Lee & Yue, 2010; Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003) 或盈餘管理的管道 (e.g. Jian & Wong, 2010; Aharony, Wang & Yuan, 2010; Chen, Cheng & Xiao, 2011), 基於此，簽證會計師對於高幅度的關聯方交易應抱持負面的態度。本研究使用中國大陸上市公司於2006年至2014年樣本期間共5,684筆公司—年資料證實，使用高水位關聯方交易的公司確實比較容易收到會計師負面的審計意見，且不論關聯方交易的類別為何，以及關聯方交易是否考慮內生性的議題，二者負向關係皆顯著。

探討投資現金流量敏感度的原因在於關聯方交易所帶來的現金流量，有可能削弱資訊不對稱對公司投資不足的負面衝擊，但也有可能因多餘的現金流入導致過度投資的現象更為顯著。前者弱化投資現金流量敏感度，後者則會強化投資現金流量敏感度。實證的結果顯示，整體而言，關聯方交易減緩投資現金流量敏感度。本研究進一步探究不同類型關聯方交易對投資現金流量敏感度的影響發現，簡單關聯方交易弱化投資現金流量敏感度，但是複雜關聯方交易則強化投資現金流量敏感度，顯示簡單關聯方交易減緩資訊不對稱所造成的投資不足，而複雜關聯方交易則強化過度投資的代理問題。再者，銷售關聯方交易對投資現金流量敏感度影響不顯著，而購買關聯方交易則強化投資現金流量敏感度，隱含在金字塔底端的公司較容易利用關聯方採購去支撐其結構上方公司之績效。而這些支撐績效的底端公司因為資金進一步匯出，更加惡化資金不足的現象，進而強化投資現金流量的敏感度。最後，本研究發現，關聯方保證弱化投資現金流量敏感度，隱含提供擔保的公司可能因自我設限而降低過度投資的傾向，進而弱化投資現金流量敏感度。

In this study I examine the role of related-party transaction (RPT hereafter) via two platforms: audit opinion and the investment-cash flow sensitivity. The platform of audit opinion is of interest if RPT has been deemed a possible channel for controlling owners to engage in wealth expropriation (e.g. Jiang, Lee & Yue, 2010; Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003) or earnings management (e.g. Jian & Wong, 2010; Aharony, Wang & Yuan, 2010; Chen, Cheng & Xiao, 2011), attested auditors should respond negatively to firms with high-level RPT. Using a sample consisting of 5,684 firm-year observations from listed firms in China in the sampling period of 2006-2014, I find that firms with high-level RPT are more likely to receive adverse audit opinions, no matter what types of RPT being examined or whether RPT has been taken account of the endogeneity issue.

The platform of investment-cash sensitivity (ICS hereafter) is of interest because the cash flow indebted to RPT might weaken ICS for alleviating the negative impact of information asymmetry between fund-deficient firms and external capital market, or heightened ICS for aggravating the negative impact due to agency problem embedded in free cash flow. I find that RPT in general alleviates ICS. A further analysis of different RPT categories indicates that simple RPT alleviates while complex RPT aggravates ICS, indicating that simple RPT helps alleviate information asymmetry that results in underinvestment, while complex RPT aggravates agency problems that result in overinvestment. Furthermore, RPT sales have no significant impact on ICS while RPT purchases heighten ICS, implying that firms in bottom of pyramidal structure are more likely to engage in propping up through RTP purchases. These propping-up firms are more likely to confront with cash-deficient problems that result in heightened ICS. Finally, I find that RPT guarantee alleviates ICS, implying that firms rendering guarantee for RPT loans or project performance might self-restrict in cash abuse that results in a reduction in overinvestment and therefore a weakened ICS.

1. Introduction 1
2. Institutional Background 7
2.1. Background on Related Party Transactions 7
2.2. Audit Market in China 9
2.3. Revisions of RPTs Disclosure Requirements 10
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Developments 12
3.1. Motivations of Using RPTs 12
3.2. RPTs and Audit Opinion 14
3.3. RPTs and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 18
4. Data, Variables and Models 23
4.1. RPT and Audit Opinion 27
4.2. RPT and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 36
5. Concluding Remark 44

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