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研究生:黃佳玲
研究生(外文):HUANG, CHIA-LING
論文名稱:董事暨高階主管責任險與資訊揭露對企業價值之影響
論文名稱(外文):Impacts of the Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Information Disclosure on Corporate Value
指導教授:洪玉舜洪玉舜引用關係
指導教授(外文):HUNG, YU-SHUN
口試委員:劉正田戚務君
口試委員(外文):LIU, JEN-TENCHI, WU-CHUN
口試日期:2018-06-15
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:98
中文關鍵詞:公司治理資訊揭露評鑑系統資訊透明度公司市場價值托賓Q值董監事暨重要職員責任保險
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceInformation Disclosure Assessment SystemInformation TransparencyCompany's Market ValueTobin's QD&O
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企業核心為治理單位,董監事人員扮演極重要角色,帶領高階主管為股東創造極大利潤(Holderness, 1990),則企業投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險(Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance,亦稱D&O保險),提供合理保障,同時主動提供資訊攸關性,由第三方保險公司負責徹查,藉以降低企業內外資訊不對稱問題,若能提升資訊揭露透明度則亦有助於企業市場價值。
本研究探討企業投保D&O保險、資訊揭露透明度與企業市場價值之關係。實證結果發現,第一,企業投保D&O保險與資訊揭露透明度呈正向並達1%顯著水準,表示企業投保D&O保險,更能提高資訊揭露透明度,故假說H1獲得支持。第二,D&O保險與企業市場價值呈正向且達1%顯著水準,說明企業投保D&O保險,更能提升企業市場價值,故假說H2獲得支持。然而,D&O保險與資訊揭露透明度之交乘項,與企業市場價值呈反向但未達顯著,意寓著D&O保險與資訊揭露透明度之交互作用,與企業市場價值不具有不明顯關聯,故未支持假說H3。整體而言,當資訊揭露情況下,等同企業釋放內部訊息予外界,除內部董事會及外部獨立董事及監察人等負責控管外,企業投保D&O保險,藉由保險公司作為代理監督,D&O保險成功吸引優秀人才加入經營,強化治理效能,故企業投保D&O保險,不但能使揭露資訊更具透明度,亦能提升企業市場價值。

The core of the enterprise is the governance unit. The directors and supervisors play a very important role, leading the senior executives to create the utmost profits for the shareholders (Holderness, 1990), then the director and senior officer liability insurance (also known as D&O Insurance), providing reasonable protection and proactively supporting information, is subject to thorough investigation by third-party insurance companies, so as to reduce the problem of information asymmetry inside and outside the enterprise. If it can enhance the transparency of information disclosure, it will also contribute to the market value of the enterprise.
This study explores the relationship between corporate D&O insurance, information disclosure transparency and corporate market value. The empirical results show that, firstly, corporate insurance D&O insurance and information disclosure transparency is positively correlated reaching a significant level of 1%, indicating that D&O insurance can help improve the transparency of information disclosure, so hypothesis H1 is substantiated. Second, D&O insurance and corporate market value are positively correlated, reaching 1% significant level, indicating that D&O insurance proved to enhance the market value of enterprises, so hypothesis H2 is substantiated. However, the intersection of D&O insurance and information disclosure transparency is contrary to the market value of the enterprise but not significant. It means the interaction between D&O insurance and information disclosure transparency has no obvious relationship with the market value of the enterprise. Thus, hypothesis H3 is not substantiated.
On the whole, when the information is disclosed and the company releases internal information to the outside world, besides solid governance of the internal board of directors and external independent directors and supervisors, D&O insurance, with the insurance company as the agent, will serve well to attract talents to join the business and strengthen the efficiency of governance. Therefore, the company's coverage of D&O insurance will not only make the disclosure of information more transparent but also enhance the market value of the enterprise.
目 錄
圖 次 vii
表 次 vii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 董事暨高階主管責任險相關文獻 5
第二節 資訊揭露相關文獻 8
第三節 企業價值相關文獻 11
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節 研究假說 14
第二節 研究期間與資料來源、樣本選取 15
第三節 實證模型及變數定義與衡量 21
第四章 實證結果 28
第一節 敘述性統計 28
第二節 相關係數分析 31
第三節 迴歸分析結果 33
第四節 樣本分群迴歸分析 42
第五章 結論與建議 52
第一節 研究結論 52
第二節 研究建議 53
參考文獻 54
附 錄 63


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