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研究生:陳彥志
研究生(外文):Chen, Yen-Chih
論文名稱:高齡社會創新保險商品之研究
論文名稱(外文):Innovative Insurance Products in Aged Society
指導教授:王儷玲王儷玲引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wang, Jennifer L.
口試委員:謝明華彭金隆楊曉文黃瑞卿
口試委員(外文):Hsieh, Ming-HuaPeng, Jin-LungYang, Sharon S.Huang, Rachel J.
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:風險管理與保險學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:風險管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:106
語文別:英文
論文頁數:64
中文關鍵詞:長期照顧保險年金保險商品設計
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本篇論文探討在高齡社會下,如何透過創新保險商品設計,提高長期照顧保險以及年金保險的銷售。本篇論文包含兩部分,第一部分討論長期照顧保險以及年金保險可能隱含的逆選擇成本,利用台灣地區中老年身心社會生活狀況長期追蹤調查資料,估算不同的健康轉移速率矩陣,並計算可能存在的逆選擇成本。更也進一步探討不同的商品設計,對逆選擇成本的影響。第二部分則探討這兩種商品結合降低逆選擇成本的效果,過去的文獻指出長期照顧保險結合年金保險可以降低長期照顧保險市場的核保問題,以及年金保險市場逆選擇成本過高等問題。不同於過去文獻,本研究討論當兩種商品結合為一新型產品時,在具備同時吸引具有不同個人健康資訊的長期照顧保險被保險人以及年金保險被保險人之特性下,可降低多少逆選擇成本。若降低逆選擇成本的效果夠大,相信這樣子的商品設計能吸引更多被保險人購買,並有助於商業保險市場之成長,提供更多對老年社會經濟的保障。
Abstract i
Table of Contents iii
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
Part One – Adverse Selection Cost in Long-term Care Insurance and Annuity 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Asymmetric Information Model 7
1.3 Data and Methodology 11
1.4 Results 20
1.5 Conclusions 32
1.6 Reference 34
Part Two – The Benefit in Long-Term Care Annuity Product 37
2.1 Introduction 37
2.2 Literature Reviews 40
2.3 Research Model 43
2.4 Numerical Results 49
2.5 Conclusions 57
2.6 Reference 60
2.7 Appendix 63
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