臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去已有許多的文獻針對公司價值及銀行願意提供的貸款成本進行探討，銀行會提供穩定的公司較低的貸款成本，而大多文獻指出其影響公司價值，進而導致銀行貸款成本之主要原因，多著重於公司財務特性，因此忽略了無形資產---組織資本。然而組織資本的投入對公司績效之好壞未有定論，部分的文獻(Lev et al. 2009；Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013)提到組織資本的投入能為公司帶來更好的績效，然而部分文獻也指出SG&A費用之僵固性的問題，會對於股東的利益造成傷害，因此本研究以組織資本為出發點，探討其對銀行貸款成本的影響。
本研究更加入了管理者能力及執行長權力進行探討。過去文獻皆指向管理者能力愈高能為公司帶來極佳的績效，Bertrand and Schoar (2003)之研究發現，將管理者能力由高至低分為十等分，表現最好與最差的等分在ROA的表現上相差約3%；Hayes and Schaefer (1999)之文獻證實，若較好的管理者遭其他公司挖腳，原公司會有顯著負的異常報酬。執行長權力對公司的影響則未有定論，部分文獻指出執行長權力較大之公司因擁有較多資源，能夠透過組織資本的投入更有效率地做出決策，有助於增加公司價值；代理問題則主張管理者與股東利益不相同，會導致管理者為了追求自身利益而傷害企業價值。本研究透過加入執行長權利及管理者能力進行更深入之探討。

In the past, there have been many literatures on the relationship between the firm value and the cost of bank loans. The bank would provide a stable firm with lower lending costs. Most of the literatures focused on the firm’s financial characteristics that it affected the firm value, which in turn led to the main reason for bank lending costs. However, it ignored intangible assets—organizational capital. Some literature (Lev et al. 2009; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013) mentioned that the organizational capital can bring better performance to the company. However, some documents which pointed out that the problem of the SG&A fee's rigidity would hurt shareholders' interests. Therefore, this study uses organizational capital as a starting point to explore its impact on bank lending costs.
Our study has also added the ability of managers and CEOs to discuss. Previous literatures pointed to the higher managers' ability to bring excellent performance to the company. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) finds that the manager's ability is divided into ten equal parts from the highest to the lowest. The difference in the performance of the ROA is about 3%. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) confirmed that if better managers were dug by other companies, the original company would have significant negative abnormal returns. The influence of CEO's power on the company has not been determined. Some documents indicated that the company with the greater power of CEO has more resources and can make more efficient decisions through the organizational capital, which increased the value of the company. The problem is that the interests of managers and shareholders are not the same, which would lead managers to harm their value in order to pursue their own interests.

目錄.................................iii
表目錄...............................v
圖目錄...............................vi
第一章 緒論..........................1
1.1 研究背景與動機...................1
1.2 研究目的.........................2
1.3 研究流程.........................2
第二章 文獻回顧.......................4
2.1銀行貸款成本與公司價值相關文獻.......4
2.2組織資本與公司價值相關文獻...........4
2.2.1組織資本與公司價值的正向關係....6
2.2.2組織資本與公司價值的反向關係....6
2.3管理者能力與公司價值相關文獻.........7
2.4執行長權力與公司價值相關文獻.........7
2.4.1執行長權力與公司價值的正向關係...9
2.4.2執行長權力與公司價值的反向關係...9
第三章 研究方法.........................11
3.1 資料來源與篩選......................11
3.2 變數定義...........................11
3.2.1公司特性..........................11
3.2.2銀行貸款特性.......................11
3.2.3組織資本...........................12
3.2.4管理者能力.........................13
3.2.5執行長權力.........................14
3.3 實證模型............................15
第四章 實證結果..........................17
4.1 敘述性統計...........................17
4.2 組織資本及銀行貸款利差................18
4.3 強健性檢定...........................20
4.3.1總體經濟因素.........................20
4.3.2調整後之Z-score......................20
4.3.3排除異常值之年度......................21
4.3.4產業分類.............................21
4.3.5金融海嘯時期..........................21
4.4 組織資本及非利差合約之貸款成本...........22
4.4.1貸款到期日............................22
4.4.2擔保品................................22
4.4.3合約強度..............................23
4.5 交互作用...........................24
4.5.1管理者能力............................25
4.2.2執行長權力....................25
第五章 結論................................26
參考文獻...................................27
附錄.......................................30

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