(3.237.20.246) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/04/15 09:16
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:莊偉良
研究生(外文):Chuang, Wei-Liang
論文名稱:代理衝突與債權薪酬
論文名稱(外文):Essays on Agency Conflicts and Inside Debt
指導教授:黃星華黃星華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Huang, Hsing-Hua
口試日期:2018-6-24
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:英文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:代理成本債權薪酬經理人薪酬實質選擇權
外文關鍵詞:Agency costsInside debtManagerial compensationReal options
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:66
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本論文以實質選擇權的架構來研究代理衝突及債權薪酬兩個問題。在第二章中,我們提出一種新的衡量代理成本的量測方法來解決既有文獻中的兩個缺陷。第一個是代理成本的量測方法可能會產生負值,例如Hackbarth與Mauer (2012)。第二個是代理成本的量測方法忽略了決策者之間的交互作用,例如Chen與Manso (2016)。我們以賽局理論中最適反應分析的概念,考量決策者之間的互相影響,證明新的代理成本量測方法是非負的。
在第三章中,我們研究債權薪酬對企業與經理人之間代理衝突的影響,其中最適投資決策與最適違約決策分別由經理人與股東決定。我們發現持有小額債權薪酬之經理人可能會延後投資,而持有大量債權薪酬可能會提早投資。數值結果顯示,對於風險小(大)的企業,經理人持有較多債權薪酬會降低(增加)風險承擔的誘因,此結果與Cassell等人(2012)的實證結果一致,並提出更全面的論述。另外,當債權薪酬有(無)風險時,經理人持有較多債權薪酬會有較低(較高)的債券收益率,此結果與Kabir等人(2013)的實證結果一致,並提出更完整的論述。
This dissertation applies real option framework to investigate two issues regarding agency conflicts and inside debt. In Chapter 2, we define a new measure of agency cost of debt to resolve two drawbacks of existing measures in literature. The first defect is the measure could be negative, e.g., Hackbarth and Mauer (2012). The second one is the measure ignores the interaction between the decision makers, e.g., Chen and Manso (2016). Using the best reaction analysis which is an idea from game theory, our new agency cost measure is shown to be nonnegative, and meanwhile, it takes the decision makers’ interaction into consideration.
In Chapter 3, we study the effect of inside debt on the agency conflict between a firm and its manager where the optimal investment and default policies are decided by the manager and shareholder, respectively. We find that the manager with a small inside debt holding could delay the investment, while the manager with a larger inside debt holding could accelerate it. In our numerical results, for a low (high)-risk firm, a larger inside debt holding gives a manager a less (more) incentive to take risk, which agrees with and complements the finding of Cassell et al. (2012). In addition, we find that a larger inside debt holding leads to a lower (higher) bond yield when the inside debt is riskless (risky), which is consistent with and supplement the finding of Kabir et al. (2013).
目 錄
摘 要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌 謝 III
目 錄 IV
表 目 錄 V
圖 目 錄 VI
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2. THE MEASURE OF AGENCY COSTS 2
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 2
2.2 THE MODEL 3
2.3 AGENCY COSTS 6
2.4 SUMMARY 11
CHAPTER 3. AGENCY CONFLICTS AND INSIDE DEBT 20
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 20
3.2 THE MODEL 22
3.3 NUMERICAL RESULTS 28
3.4 SUMMARY 36
CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 43
APPENDIX: REVIEW OF VALUATION 44
REFERENCES 49
1. Anantharaman, D., Fang, V. W., and Gong, G. (2014), “Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts,” Management Science, 60, 1260-1280.
2. Andrikopoulos, A. (2009), “Irreversible investment, managerial discretion and optimal capital structure,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 709-718.
3. Cassell, C. A., Huang, S. X., Sanchez, J. M., and Stuart, M. D. (2012), “Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 103, 588-610.
4. Chen, H., and Manso, G. (2016), “Macroeconomic risk and debt overhang,” Working paper, MIT Sloan School of Management.
5. Edmans, A., and Liu Q. (2011), “Inside debt,” Review of Finance, 15, 75-102.
6. Hackbarth, D., and Mauer, D. C. (2012), “Optimal priority structure, capital structure, and investment,” Review of Financial Studies, 25, 747-796.
7. Huang, H., Huang, H., and Shih, P. (2012), “Real options and earning-based bonus compensation,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 2389-2402.
8. Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
9. Kabir, R., Li, H., and Veld-Merkoulova, Y. V. (2013), “Executive compensation and the cost of debt,” Journal of Banking Finance, 37, 2893-2907.
10. Kanagaretnam, K., and Sarkar, S. (2011), “Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem,” Economic Modelling, 28, 308-315.
11. Leland, H. E. (1994), “Corporate debt value, bond covenants and optimal capital structure,” Journal of Finance, 49, 1213-1252.
12. Mauer, D. C., and Ott, S. H. (2000), “Agency costs, underinvestment and optimal capital structure: the effect of growth options to expand,” In Brennan, M. J., and Trigeorgis, L. (Eds.), Project Flexibility, Agency and Competition, New York: Oxford University Press, 151-180.
13. Mauer, D. C., and Sarkar, S. (2005), “Real options, agency conflicts and optimal capital structure,” Journal of Banking Finance, 29, 1405-1428.
14. Myers, S. C. (1977), “Determinants of corporate borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-275.
15. Sundaram, R. K., and Yermack, D. L. (2007), “Pay me later: inside debt and its role in managerial compensation,” Journal of Finance, 62, 1551-1588.
16. Wei, C., and Yermack, D. (2011), “Investor reactions to CEOs’ inside debt incentives,” Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3813-3840.
連結至畢業學校之論文網頁點我開啟連結
註: 此連結為研究生畢業學校所提供,不一定有電子全文可供下載,若連結有誤,請點選上方之〝勘誤回報〞功能,我們會盡快修正,謝謝!
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔