臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究從TEJ上蒐集2003年到2015年私募普通股之公司，目的是在探討私募公司的公司治理情形與財務報表重編之關聯。本研究透過二元羅吉斯迴歸模型探討獨立董事比率、董監持股比率以及大股東持股比率對私募公司財務報表重編機率之影響。實證結果發現董監持股比率、大股東持股比率與財務報表重編呈現顯著負相關。此結果表示董監事持股比率越高的話，與公司的經營績效會呈現更攸關的情形，董監事會更有意願去監督公司，不讓損及公司價值的事情發生，財務報表重編機率會隨之下降。因為一旦發生舞弊情形，會使得公司的股價下跌，這是持有越高比例股票的董監事所不樂意看見的。而大股東持股比例越高，公司發生財務報表重編導致股價下跌所造成的損失就越大，所以會更加認真去監督公司，使財務報表重編機率下降。但本研究無法證實獨立董事比率越高，財務報表重編之機率就越低。

This study collects companies which raised capital by private placement from 2003 to 2015 from TEJ. The purpose is to discuss the relationship between corporate governance of companies which raised capital by private placement and the restatement .We uses the logistic regression model to investigate the effect of the percentage of independent directors in the directorboard, the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors, and the shareholding ratio of major shareholders on the restatement of financial statements. The empirical results find a significantly negative correlation between the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors or shareholding ratio of major shareholders and the restatement. This result indicates that the higher the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors is,the more relevant the interest is.Then they will be more willing to supervise the company, so as not to damage the value of company,and the probability of financial restatement will decrease. Once the fraud occurs, the stock price of the company will fall. The directors and supervisors holding a lot of stocks are not happy to see the situation.If the restatement happens,the major shareholders holding a lot of stocks will loss much money,so they will be more willing to supervise the company.The probability of financial restatement will decrease. However, this study can’t confirm that the higher the percentage of independent directors in the directorboard is, the lower probability of financial restatement is.

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
1-1 研究背景與目的 1
1-2 研究架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 4
2-1 私募之介紹 4
2-2 私募之種類 4
2-3 私募之相關規定 4
2-4 私募相關文獻 6
2-5 公司治理相關文獻 7
2-6 假說建立 9
第三章 研究設計 11
3-1 樣本選取與資料來源 11
3-2 樣本敘述 14
3-3 模型建立及變數衡量 18
3-4 資料分析方式 20
第四章 實證結果 21
4-1 敘述性統計 21
4-2 單變量分析 23
4-3 相關性分析 25
4-4 迴歸結果 27
第五章 結論 29
參考文獻 30

中文文獻
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