本文研究報告顯示董事會監督影響企業研發投入（R＆D）的研究結果不一致。然而，研發投入將推動市場產品和市場的創新，為公司帶來更好的業績。 研發投入的回收期長，且失敗率高，使得研發活動風險極高。另外，研發所投入的結果存在資訊不對稱的問題，這常常導致經理人與股東之間的代理衝突。因此，本研究探討了董事會監督機制下管理者研發投入對未來成長的影響。在實證研究中，2012-2017 年經濟略微成長後，選擇了台灣3657 家上市櫃檯電子製造企業。實證發現公司的發展機會高時，外部董事和董事會、董事與監事的比例越高，將對未來公司的研發投資成長能產生積極的影響。此外，本研究亦發現董事長兼總經理時，投入研發對企業的成長機會存在負面影響。

This research report shows that the Board of Directors has inconsistent
research results on the impact of R&D on corporate R&D. However, R&D
investment will foster innovation in market products and markets, which can
bring better sales performance to the company. Moreover, the investment
recovery period of R&D is long, and there is a high rate of failure. In this way,there will be extremely high risks in R&D activities. In addition, there is a problem of information asymmetry in the R&D investment results, which often leads to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Therefore, this study examines the contribution of managers' R&D investment to future
growth under the supervision mechanism of the board of directors. In the
empirical study, 3657 listed counter electronic manufacturing enterprises in
Taiwan were selected after the recovery of business climate in 2012 - 2017. As
a result of this study, the percentage of outside directors, the board of directors and shareholders is high in the firms with high growth opportunities will have a positive influence on future growth for the company's R&D investment. In addition, this study also found that when the chairman and general manager,R&D has a negative impact on the company's growth opportunities.

目錄
中文摘要………………………………………………………i
英文摘要… … … … … … … … … … i i
誌謝 … … … … … … … … … … … i i i
目錄… … … … … … … … … … … … i v
表目錄 … … … … … … … … … … … … v
一、緒論
第一節、研究動機與目的……………………………………1
第二節、 研究流程圖…………………………………………………5
二、文獻探討
第一節、探討董事會監督與研發投資…………………………6
第二節、假說推導……………………………………………8
三、研究設計與方法
( 一) 、研究對象… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1
(二)、變數操作與定義……………………………………12
(三)、實證模型……………………………………………18
四、資料分析
(一)、敘述性統計…………………………………………14
( 二) 、假說檢定……………………………………………18
(三)、實證結果…………………………………………………19
五、結論與建議………………………………………………………20
參考文獻…………………………………………………………… 21

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