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研究生:池昱萱
研究生(外文):Yu-Hsuan Chih
論文名稱:公司分析師人數對併購案之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impact of Financial Analyst Coverage in M&A
指導教授:廖源星廖源星引用關係
指導教授(外文):Y. Chris Liao
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:財務管理學系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:42
中文關鍵詞:併購支付方式併購異常報酬合併與收購被併公司分析師人數資訊不對稱主併公司分析師人數
外文關鍵詞:mergersacquisitionsfinancial analyst coverageinformation asymmetrymethod of paymentstock swapM&A
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本研究主要探討併購案中主併公司分析師人數與被併公司分析師人數對併購案中支付方式及主併公司併購異常報酬的影響,在實證研究結果中,發現當追蹤被併公司的分析師人數較少時,支付方式傾向使用現金、且主併公司會有較高的併購異常報酬;而當追蹤主併公司之分析師人數較多時,隱含主併公司的資訊較為透明、股價較不易偏離公平合理價值、較不易被高估時,主併公司將傾向使用現金支付併購案的價款,另外,當主併公司選擇以股票交換支付併購價款、且追蹤主併公司的分析師人數較高、股價不易被市場高估時,股票支付所帶來的負面宣告效果將會降低,主併公司也會有較高的併購異常報酬。
This study mainly discusses the influence of the target company financial analyst coverage and the bidder company financial analyst coverage on methods of payment and bidders’ abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions. In the empirical research results, first, we found that when the target company financial analyst coverage is high, the probability of using cash payment will increase as well as the value of bidders’ abnormal return. Also, the research analyses investigate the relation between the bidder company financial analyst coverage and method of payment. The result shows that when the bidder company financial analyst coverage is high, the probability of using cash payment will increase and the bidder will have less incentive to have market timing behavior. As the similar reason above, when the bidder company financial analyst coverage is high, due to the higher transparency these companies have, they will have higher abnormal return and mitigate the negative signal effect when using stock swap.
論文審定書 i
摘要 ii
ABSTRACT iii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第二章 文獻探討與實證假說 4
第一節 分析師人數與資訊不對稱 4
第二節 被併公司分析師人數對併購案支付方式的影響 6
第三節 主併公司分析師人數對併購案支付方式的影響 9
第三章 資料樣本與研究方法 13
第一節 資料樣本 13
第二節 研究方法 14
第三節 敘述統計 15
第四章 實證結果 19
第一節 併購案中公司資訊不對稱程度對支付方式之影響 19
第二節 併購案中公司資訊相對不對稱程度對支付方式之影響 22
第三節 併購案中公司資訊不對稱程度對主併公司CARs之影響 24
第四節 併購案中公司資訊相對不對稱程度對主併公司CARs之影響 27
第五章 結論 30
第六章 參考文獻 32
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