臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

鑒於我國目前統籌分配稅款制度，中央政府與地方政府之間稅收分配垂直不均，使得地方政府間積極爭取中央政府經費補助款，在經費補助款提供之地方公共財常兼具管轄區外溢性的情況下，地方政府間除了互相競爭以取得區域間經費使用權，事實上也會嘗試說服中央政府擴大補助款金額。本文以Faria et al. (2014)所建立的二維型態競租努力模型為基礎，透過進一步將競租標的設定為兼具公共財以及管轄區外溢性兩種性質的情況下，從事管轄區外溢性強度變化對社會競租浪費水準的影響進行分析。不同於既有的分析結果，本文發現隨著內生之競租標的管轄區正向(負向)外溢性增強，在某些情況下可能會增加(減少)社會競租浪費水準。這提醒我們在從事社會競租浪費水準的評估與分析時，若忽略競租標的為內生或具管轄區外溢性之特性，將會發生評估偏誤的問題。

Referring the tax distribution regulations in Taiwan as background. This paper is based on model of two-dimensional effort in rent-seeking established by Faria et al. (2014), assuming the rent-seeking targets combine the characteristics of local public goods and jurisdictional spillovers. We analyze effect of change in jurisdictional spillovers intensity on social rent-seeking waste.
The two types of efforts are rent-seeking effort and lobby effort (i.e., grow the pie bigger). We take that lobby effort affects the prize value, increasing the winner’s prospective rents, and rent-seeking effort impacts the probability of winning the contest. The results break new ground in showing that the cross-jurisdictional external benefit (cost) increases, the social rent-seeking waste will raise (reduce) in some cases.

目錄

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究動機與目的 4

第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 競租標的為公共財之競租活動 7
第二節 二維(多維)型態競租投入努力之競租活動 10
第三節 競租標的為內生之競租活動 11

第三章 理論模型與均衡 14
第一節 研究方法 14
第二節 模型設定 14
第三節 均衡解推導 17

第四章 比較靜態分析 22
第一節 正外溢性對二維型態競租活動之影響 23
第二節 負外溢性對二維型態競租活動之影響 29

第五章 結論 35

參考文獻 37

中文部分
李珮雯(2013)，《外溢性公共財之競租分析》，國立臺北大學財政學研究所碩士論文。

英文部分
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