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研究生:莊偉安
研究生(外文):CHUANG, WEI-AN
論文名稱:混合雙占市場、專利授權與民營化
論文名稱(外文):Mixed Duopoly, Patent Licensing and Privatization
指導教授:謝修謝修引用關係
指導教授(外文):SHIEH, SHIOU
口試委員:孫嘉宏邱敬淵
口試委員(外文):SUN,CHIA-HUNGCHIOU, JING-YUAN
口試日期:2018-06-13
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2018
畢業學年度:106
語文別:中文
論文頁數:135
中文關鍵詞:專利授權混合雙占異質產品民營化數量競爭
外文關鍵詞:patent licensingmixed duopolydifferentiated productsprivatizationCournot competition.
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本論文旨在分析混合雙占市場中,產業外、內專利擁有者的授權行為,並探討若考量公、民營廠商購買專利技術的意願後,公營廠商民營化是否有助於社會福利的提升。其中,兩廠生產異質產品並從事數量競爭,而專利擁有者授權模式的選擇,我們考慮的是固定費用及單位權利金授權。
第一章討論本論文的研究動機、提供文獻回顧,以及研究架構與使用的分析概念。
在第二章中,我們探討產業外授權及民營化政策。研究發現,第一,在混合雙占市場中,專利擁有者只有在產品異質性相對大且成本降幅足夠大時,會採用固定費用只授權給公營廠,其他情況下,皆採單位權利金同時授權給兩家廠商。第二,若公營廠商成為追求利潤極大的民營廠商後,專利擁有者無論產品異質性與成本降幅為何,皆以固定費用同時授權給兩家廠商。第三,在產業外授權的架構裡,我們發現,只有在產品異質性相對大且成本降幅足夠大時,公營廠商民營化會提升社會福利,其他情況下,民營化反而會降低社會福利。
在第三章中,我們討論產業內授權及民營化政策。研究發現,第一,在混合雙占市場中,無論專利廠商為公營或私營廠商,其授權選擇皆為,無論產品異質性與成本降幅為何,皆採用單位權利金來授權。第二,若公營廠商成為民營廠商後,無論專利廠商是私營廠或民營化前的公營廠,其授權選擇皆為,只有在產品異質性相對大且成本降幅足夠大時,會以固定費用來授權,其他情況下,則以單位權利金來授權。最後,在產業內授權的架構中,我們發現,無論產品異質性與成本降幅為何,公營廠商民營化皆會降低社會福利。
第四章為本論文的結論整理。

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the superiority of fixed-fee versus royalty licensing in the context of a mixed duopoly market in which one public and one private firm produce differentiated products and compete in quantities. We consider outsider licensing and insider licensing, respectively. Moreover, we explore whether or not privatization of the public firm can improve social welfare in the contexts of outsider and insider licensing, respectively.
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation of the study, provides a literature review, and describes the analytical framework as well as solution concept used in the thesis.
In chapter 2, we investigate the licensing behavior of an outside innovator and privatization policy. The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, in a mixed duopoly market, licensing by means of a fixed fee ( only to the public firm ) is superior to licensing by means of a royalty when the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation are both large enough; otherwise licensing by means of a royalty is superior. Second, if the public firm becomes a profit-maximizing firm, licensing by means of a fixed fee ( to both firms ) is superior to licensing by means of a royalty regardless of the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation. Third, in the context of outsider licensing, privatization will enhance social welfare only when both the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation are large.
In chapter 3, we study the licensing behavior of an inside innovator and privatization policy. The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, in a mixed duopoly market, no matter who owns the patent, licensing by means of a royalty is superior to licensing by means of a fixed fee. Second, if the public firm becomes a profit-maximizing firm, no matter who owns the patent, licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior when both the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation are large enough; otherwise licensing by means of a royalty is superior. Lastly, in the context of insider licensing, privatization cannot improve social welfare regardless of the degree of product differentiation and the size of the innovation.
Chapter 4 concludes with some remarks.

1 緒論01
1.1 研究動機01
1.2 文獻回顧02
1.3 研究方法與架構06
2 產業外授權08
2.1 簡介08
2.2 模型設定10
2.3 均衡結果14
2.3.1 固定費用授權14
2.3.2 單位權利金授權25
2.3.3 專利擁有者授權模式的選擇28
2.4 民營化政策30
2.5 專利擁有者隸屬於國內42
2.6 結論46
3 產業內授權48
3.1 簡介48
3.2 專利廠商為私營廠商49
3.2.1 模型設定49
3.2.2 固定費用授權51
3.2.3 單位權利金授權56
3.2.4 私營廠商授權模式的選擇59
3.2.5 民營化政策60
3.2.6 小結74
3.3 專利廠商為公營廠商74
3.3.1 模型設定74
3.3.2 固定費用授權75
3.3.3 單位權利金授權80
3.3.4 公營廠商授權模式的選擇83
3.3.5 民營化政策84
3.3.6 小結89
3.4 結論90
4 結論92

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